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The Growling Bear or «Why The Army Owes Mr. Putin a Favor»

Lieutenant Colonel Michael A. Adelberg

The Army owes Mr. Vladimir Putin a “thank-you.” So does the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—because his reckless aggression is providing both institutions a resurgent identity. Russia’s current actions provide the United States a unique opportunity, as well as foreshadowing the future. This is because Russia appears likely to be an adversary to the West for some time. If the United States wants to influence Russia’s behavior and actions, it must recognize that it has to act from a position of both real and perceived strength. One of the most concrete demonstrations of strength to both Russia and to our European allies is a robust ground force presence in Europe. Such a robust force will likely keep Putin from acting too aggressively in Europe.

Putin’s position has been unambiguous, to return Russia to its former glory during the Soviet era. Time and again, his bombastic rhetoric emphasizes the theme that Russia is a great power that cannot be ignored. This is not new, nor is it necessarily unique to Putin. As Strobe Talbot outlined in, “The Making of Vladimir Putin,” the forces now at play in Russia were in place from the 1980s. Mikhail Gorbachev’s ascension to power, according to Talbot, began the struggle between reformers and reactionaries fighting for the future path of the Soviet Union, later Russia. Reactionaries viewed Gorbachev’s actions as an existential threat to the Communist system; and when they attempted to overthrow Gorbachev, the result ironically led to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the re-emergence of an independent Russia under Boris Yeltsin.1

U.S. policymakers must appreciate the psychological and emotional differences of Russia as a whole, and Russians individually in the current environment. First, Russia has a long history of xenophobia. However, Putin called xenophobia “a manifestation of weakness” in his annual speech on December 4, 2014. Yet the entire Russian foreign policy position, which emphasizes the right to protect ethnic Russians and Russian speakers abroad, relies very much on a xenophobic “us-vs-them” logic. The notion that Russia has the right to intervene in foreign sovereignty based upon perceived ethnic repression, i.e., Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Crimea, has little basis in a Westphalian world. While Putin uses the protection of ethnic Russians as a convenient instrument to argue for intervention, the historical mistrust of foreigners makes it a resounding argument to Russian ears.

Second, policymakers must understand that most Russians are willing to believe that the West, and in particular the United States, really is to blame for their declining economy. While American voters tend to find fault with their own elected leaders and will place the blame on them, Russians will tend to blame outside powers, not their leaders—another facet of Russian xenophobia. For example, Russian media blames the United States for destabilizing Ukraine and causing the Ukrainian crisis. This perception is widely accepted among Russians. Along the same lines, Russia continues to view NATO as an offensive threat to Russia just as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) did. To Russia, the NATO expansion into their near-abroad is perceived as a direct threat. Although to be fair, one would imagine that a permanent major Russian naval base in Cuba, for example, would be viewed by the United States as a direct threat.

Third, Russians have a high level of respect for Putin due to his personal and national demonstrations of strength, as evidenced by his approval rating which is above 80 percent. In contrast, American President Barack Obama’s is nearly 45 percent.2 To Russians, Putin embodies the return to Russian greatness, the theme of much of his rhetoric. He is seen as strong and decisive. His pronouncements and those of several of his foreign policy ministers, throughout the second half of 2014, have been extraordinarily bellicose. It vacillates between warning the United States against war and threatening the United States with war. In the U.S. media, such statements are seen as reckless and irresponsible, but to the Russians, these comments continue to demonstrate Putin’s resolve. Such support does not imply that he enjoys universal adoration in Russia. There is still a very vocal opposition, from business leaders, to the press, to at least one popular punk rock group. However, Putin has been managing to keep the opposition somewhat under control through a variety of methods, and the opposition is neither active enough nor strong enough to present much of a roadblock to him.

Putin’s claim of returning Russia to a position of strength and greatness is not solely rhetorical. Russia is undertaking many actions that further the cause, as well as upping the ante to the rest of the world. Without question, Russia has been modernizing and revitalizing its military capabilities. Russia actually has done a decent job of assessing its conduct in both the Chechen war and the Georgia war and drawing on lessons learned. For example, it is working toward creating a professional volunteer military force with the intent of completely eliminating its conscription. It is modernizing its equipment and its command and force structures. Russia has adopted brigade-based battle groups for greater flexibility, a move the U.S. Army took a decade ago.

Russia has been funding its modernization through increased annual defense spending. In 2015, it is projected to spend approximately $80 billion in U.S. dollars, which is nearly 4 percent of its gross domestic product and which marks the highest defense budget to date. According to Reuters:

Between 2004 and 2014, Russia doubled its military spending and according to the newly adopted budget, it will further increase it from 17.6 percent of all budget spending this year to 20.8 percent, or 3.36 trillion rubles ($84.19 billion), in 2017. Defense spending was foreseen at 23 trillion rubles ($576 billion) in the decade to 2020 under the original plan to upgrade 70 percent of military equipment by then.3

In addition to increased military spending and capability, Russia has increased the number of show of force exercises. NATO has had to scramble interceptor jets more than 400 times this year in response to Russian air incursions, more than double that of last year, according to NATO.4 In addition to the number of Russian flights, the size of their military sorties is also increasing. On both December 6 and 7, 2014, Russia flew formations of a dozen bombers, refuelers, and transport aircraft in the Baltic Sea region each day, although they did not violate any NATO airspace. Such Cold War-style shows of force continue to demonstrate that Russia does have real capability.

Aside from its blatant muscle-flexing, Russia is also entering into partnerships in ways that are counter to U.S. interests. Recently, Russia signed a military cooperation pact with Pakistan. Russia, of course, has been a long-time arms supplier to Pakistan’s arch-rival India; Pakistan has received significant U.S. foreign assistance over many decades with a dramatic increase since the September 11, 2001 attacks on the U.S. homeland and the subsequent war in Afghanistan. According to data cited by the Center for Global Development,5Pakistan was ranked as the fourth greatest recipient of U.S. Foreign Assistance. Pakistan significantly influences the stability and security of Afghanistan, and at this delicate juncture, after the withdrawal of U.S. combat troops from Afghanistan, any new actors on the stage risks upsetting the balance that the United States has worked to achieve.

Russia also is expanding its military, economic, and energy ties to China. Russia and China have agreed to conduct combined naval exercises in 2015 in the Mediterranean Sea and the Pacific Ocean. Additionally, as reported by The Christian Science Monitor in November, “economic relations between them have taken a quantum leap, with two massive energy deals totaling almost $1 trillion signed in the past few months alone.”6

Finally, in recent years, Russia has reinvigorated its involvement in Latin America. Dr. Evan Ellis writes that:

Whether or not such activities are benign, the pattern of Russian diplomatic and military activity in Latin America and the Caribbean in response to tensions with the U.S. over states of the Former Soviet Union demonstrates that, for Russia at least, its activities in Latin America is part of its strategic position globally as it seeks to re-project itself as a significant actor on the world stage.7

Such activities include trade agreements and military basing negotiations with several Latin American states.

For several years now, Russia has been attempting to achieve its stated goal of returning to great-power status even though it has been experiencing extremely significant financial challenges. Oil, oil products, and natural gas account for more than 50% of Russia’s federal budget revenues.8 Russia’s 2015 national budget was based on an estimated price for crude oil trading at $100 per barrel, unfortunately for them, oil was trading at approximately $50 per barrel in mid-January 2015. Furthermore, the price of oil is expected to continue to decline as the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries announced that it does not intend to lower production. According to Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov, the decline in oil prices plus the effect of Western sanctions will cost Russia at least $140 billion. In October, he was quoted as stating that Russia’s military spending must be “more realistic” due to the increasing economic constraints.9 Russia’s budget called for $576 billion of defense spending over the next 6 years, which Silianov now says must be re-evaluated and scaled back. The lack of diversity in Russia’s export markets has the potential to drastically curb Russian defense spending. As of December 16, 2014, the ruble was valued at 72 to the dollar, a 60 percent decline in its value over the past year.10

To summarize the previous discussion, Russia’s goal is to return to the world stage as one of the dominant powers. It has been modernizing its forces and using them, but it will face significant economic obstacles in the next few years. Therefore, the question for the United States is: What can the United States expect from Russia? Lacking any indicators that Russia intends to change its present course, policymakers should anticipate that Russia will continue to engage in the same type of actions that it has been doing for the past several years, especially the aggressive use of its forces as it has throughout 2014. Basically, the United States can expect to see Russia continue to flex its muscles in its near-abroad among non-NATO states, while it seeks to frustrate U.S. influence and efforts globally. Most likely, the United States will see Russia executing activities reminiscent of its Soviet predecessor, albeit without the ideological drive behind them. It will continue to work diplomatically and militarily to expand its influence among nonaligned states, and will continue to harass NATO with aggressive show-of-force and out-of-area flights and naval maneuvers. The United States can anticipate seeing at least one large-scale ground exercise annually in the Western Military District, and also may see some additional movement of forces into the Kaliningrad Oblast. With Russia’s permanent membership on the Security Council, the United States can expect to see Russia foiling U.S. efforts there as well.

NATO can expect to see Russia whittling away at NATO’s influence in non-allied states while working to create fissures and questions of credibility within the Alliance. What forms this will take are unknown, but most likely, Russia will continue to strategically posture forces in such a way that the Baltics continue to feel threatened. Much as Russia always views NATO as an imminent threat, the Baltics will likely always believe Russia is an imminent threat, perhaps justifiably so, given Soviet/Russian history and the simple proximity. Putin, and the rest of the world, has probably surmised that being a NATO Partner for Peace does not really guarantee any security, and so he may make more aggressive moves in Transnistria and the Caucasus. He certainly will ensure through all means available, including military means, that neither Georgia nor Ukraine move any closer to full membership in NATO.

Although Russia is likely to conduct Cold-War style activities, this by no means implies that Russia wields the same economic weight of the former USSR. It absolutely does not. Michael Cembalast from JP Morgan found, according to Zack Beauchamp of VOX:

that the bulk of economic power in the former communist bloc now isn’t Putin’s to command, and often is aligned against him. Most of that power is now in NATO and/or EU countries, like Poland and the part of Germany that used to be East Germany, or countries where [Cembalest] judges Russian influence to be fairly limited.11

For U.S. policymakers, all of this means that Russia will remain an obstacle to American interests.12 It is unlikely, given the economic hardships facing Russia, that it will be able to directly threaten U.S. vital interests.It also cannot directly threaten the vital interests of Europe, as currently underwritten and guaranteed by NATO.

There is a distinction to be made here. To say that Russia cannot directly threaten U.S. and European vital interests does not mean that Russia cannot interfere with or negatively influence U.S. and European vital interests. It absolutely can, and will. Policymakers, therefore, must develop a strategic approach that addresses continued Russia adventurism. First and foremost, they must understand that the United States probably cannot dissuade Putin from continuing his “return to great power” actions. The Russian leadership has already determined that this is critical to their own national interest. Economic sanctions have not induced them to change their course of action, and probably will play to the Russian narrative that it is under attack from the West. In actuality, this is likely to have the reverse and unintended effect of giving Putin the pretext to further consolidate his domestic power base; nothing unifies people like a common outside threat whether it is real or perceived.

Given the previous discussion, there are two more strategic assumptions that should be considered. First, one can assume that a stable, secure, economically strong, and unified Europe remains absolutely essential to U.S. national security for the foreseeable future. The second is that NATO is the guarantor of such a secure Europe. Taking these assumptions and understanding Russian motivations and associated factors, the United States should adopt a strategy that employs hard power (military forces) in Europe to allow the other elements of national power (diplomacy, information, and economics) to influence Russia from a position of strength. Such a policy is based on three elements: 1) the United States cannot simply ignore Russia, for example, by hoping the Ukraine crisis resolves itself, and expecting Russia to cease its aggression due to financial challenges; 2) Russia responds to strength; and, 3) NATO is the counterweight to Russian aggression.

The current set of U.S. actions do not appear to have substantially influenced Putin’s behavior. These include several rounds of sanctions, as well as small-scale military activities. For example, during the spring and summer of 2014, the United States sent infantry companies to each of the Baltic states and to Poland in April 2014 to conduct training with the host countries. The United States enhanced its Baltic Air Policing rotation with additional aircraft, as well as sending other aircraft to Poland.13 None of these were major forces, however, and they have apparently done little to cause Putin to cease actions in Ukraine or to scale back his aggressive shows-of force.

Similarly, U.S. policy and actions over the past several years in Europe have also caused several eastern NATO members to question U.S. commitment. The Pacific “pivot” was a poor choice of words that gave the misperception of “turning away” from Europe. While the U.S. policy was actually a Pacific “rebalance,” its material actions made Europe question otherwise. The United States removed the only two armor-equipped Brigade Combat Teams from Europe. It removed A-10 ground attack aircraft from Europe. It also removed the Maritime Prepositioned Ships Squadron One (MPSRON 1) with all of its prepositioned Marine combat equipment. It removed significant amounts of other support units and support equipment from all the Services in Europe. These reductions were, understandably, driven by fiscal uncertainty coupled with an apparently stable Europe. But they did little to assuage European uncertainty about U.S. commitment. One can therefore extrapolate that, if the NATO Allies are uncertain about our commitment, the Russian adversary must be equally uncertain.

This uncertainty, coupled with Russian adventurism could lead to unintentional Russian miscalculation that causes a major military confrontation. To prevent such a catastrophe, the United States should re-evaluate its ground force presence in Europe, and rebuild its ground forces in Europe to reassure allies and dissuade Russian opportunism. If the draw-down was based on a seemingly cooperative Russia and a safe Europe, the reverse must equally apply: an adversarial Russia challenging Europe should logically drive an increased U.S. force presence in Europe. While this may seem to represent Army interests parochially, in a much larger sense it protects U.S. interests. Dr. Luis Simón writes that “if the West is ever to establish any sort of meaningful dialogue with Russia on global security issues, it must do so from a position of strength.”14 A strong U.S. ground presence in Europe, with permanent stationing of the proper heavy capabilities to defend against Russian ground forces, greatly reduces the risk of a Russian miscalculation, making all of Europe that much safer.

ENDNOTES

1. Strobe Talbotte, «The Making of Vladimir Putin,» August 19, 2014, available fromwww.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/08/putin-the-backstory-110151.html, accessed on November 12, 2014.

2. Gallup Daily: Obama Job Approval, February 19-21, 2015, available fromwww.gallup.com/poll/113980/Gallup-Daily-Obama-Job-Approval.aspx.

3. Lidia Kelly, «Finance Minister Warns Russia Can’t Afford Military Spending Plan,» October 7, 2014, available from www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/07/us-russia-economy-spending-defence-idUSKCN0HW1H420141007, accessed on December 9, 2014.

4. Brad Lendon, «NATO Jets Scrambled More Than 400 Times This Year for Russian Intercepts, November 21, 2014, available from www.cnn.com/2014/11/21/world/europe/nato-russia-intercepts/index.html, accessed on November 21, 2014.

5. Center for Global Security, «Aid to Pakistan by the Numbers,» n.d., available fromwww.cgdev.org/page/aid-pakistan-numbers, accessed on December 9, 2014.

6. Fred Weir, «Russia, China plan war games, arms sales. Could alliance be in the cards?» The Christian Science Monitor, November 21, 2014, available from news.yahoo.com/russia-china-plan-war-games-arms-sales-could-130004941.html, accessed on November 21, 2014.

7. R. Evan Ellis, «The New Russian Engagement in Latin America, Strategic Position, Commerce, and Dreams of the Past,» Draft, November 19, 2014.

8. U.S. Energy Information Administration, «Russia,» March 12, 2014, available fromwww.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=RS, accessed on January 27, 2015.

9. Kelly.

10. Associated Press, «Russian Ruble Falls to Historic Lows, While Pressure Increases on Putin,» December 16, 2014, available from www.foxnews.com/world/2014/12/16/russian-ruble-falls-to-historic-lows-while-pressure-increases-on-putin/, accessed on December 18, 2014.

11. Zack Beauchamp, «Why Putin’s Russia is Weaker Than the USSR, In One Chart,» September 4, 2014, available from www.vox.com/2014/9/4/6105491/putin-russia-chart, accessed on September 23, 2014.

12. “Vital” in this article means the security of the United States (notwithstanding nuclear attack, of course), her citizens, and her economy.

13. Luis Simón, “Assessing NATO’s Eastern European ‘Flank’,” Parameters, Vol. 44, No. 3, pp. 67-79.

14. Ibid., p. 79.

The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11

Amy Belasco

December 8, 2014

Источник: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/index.html

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With enactment of the FY2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act on January 1, 2014 (H.R.
3547/P.L. 113-73), Congress has approved appropriations for the past 13 years of war that total
$1.6 trillion for military operations, base support, weapons maintenance, training of Afghan and
Iraq security forces, reconstruction, foreign aid, embassy costs, and veterans’ health care for the
war operations initiated since the 9/11 attacks.
Of this $1.6 trillion total, CRS estimates that the total is distributed as follows:
• $686 billion (43%) for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) for Afghanistan and
other counterterror operations received;
• $815 billion (51%) for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)/Operation New Dawn
(OND);
• $27 billion (2%) for Operation Noble Eagle (ONE), providing enhanced security
at military bases; and
• $81 billion (5%) for war-designated funding not considered directly related to the
Afghanistan or Iraq wars.
About 92% of the funds are for Department of Defense (DOD), 6% for State Department foreign
aid programs and diplomatic operations, 1% for Department of Veterans Administration’s medical care for veterans. In addition, 5% of the funds (across agencies) are for programs and activities tangentially-related to war operations.
The FY2015 war request for DOD, State/USAID, and Veterans Administration Medical totals
$73.5 billion including $58.1 billion for Afghanistan, $5.0 billion for Iraq, $ 100 million for
enhanced security, and $10.4 billion for other war-designated funding. These totals do not reflect the new FY2015 request submitted in November 2014 to cover expenses for Operations Inherent Resolve (OIR) that began with airstrikes launched in late August 2014, to aid Syrian insurgents and the Iraq government to counter the takeover of territory by the Islamic State (IS). The Administration submitted a $5.5 billion FY2015 budget amendment for this operation that
Congress is considering. Including the new request, the FY2015 war funding now totals $79.0
billion.
In late May 2014, the President announced that troop levels in Afghanistan would fall from
33,000 to 9,800 by January 1, 2015 with the U.S. role focusing on advising Afghan security
forces and conducting counter-terror operations. A year later, by January 1, 2016, the President
stated that the number of troops in Afghanistan would halve to about 4,900 and then by the
beginning of 2017, settle at an embassy presence of about 1,000.
Overall U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan and Iraq began to decline with the withdrawal of all U.S.
troops from Iraq by December 2011. The troop decline continued with President Obama’s
announcement in February 2013 that the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan would halve from 67,000 to 34,000 by February 2014. Annual war costs also decreased from a peak of $195 billion in FY2008 to $95 billion enacted in FY2014. After the reversal of the 2009 Afghanistan surge, the President promised in the 2013 State of the Union address that “our troops will continue coming home at a steady pace as Afghan security forces move into the lead [and] our mission will change from combat to support.” He also stated that by “2014, this process of transition will be complete, and the Afghan people will be responsible for their own security.”
The FY2015 Continuing Resolution (H.J.Res. 124/P.L. 113-164) sets war funding at the FY2014
enacted level of $95.5 billion, which exceeds the FY2015 amended request (with OIR) by about
$16.5 billion. The CR expires on December 11, 2014, and Congress is expected to enact another
CR or an Omnibus appropriations act for the rest of the fiscal year.
Congress may face several budgetary issues about how to respond to the FY2015 war request and longer-term war cost issues including:
• assessing the amount, purposes, and level of funding to support U.S. troops
during the post-2014 drawdown;
• evaluating the Administration proposal for a new flexible funding account that
would provide $5 billion for a Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTFP) to
respond to unspecified “evolving threats from South Asia to the Sahel” by
“building partnership capacity” through Train & Equip programs;
• defining what is an appropriate war-related cost as opposed to what is in the base,
non-war budget, a choice made more difficult in part by the potential squeeze on
agencies’ base budgets that are subject to Budget Control Act spending limits
(P.L. 112-25);
• estimating the potential long-term cost of the war, including repairing and
replacing war-worn equipment and maintaining an “enduring presence” that
could entail a substantial footprint in the region; and
• responding to the November 2014 request for $5.5 billion for Operation Inherent
Resolve, the new operation to counter the Islamic State.
There are some indications that the FY2015 DOD war funding request may be more than is
needed in light of FY2014 experience when expenses for returning troops and equipment have
proven to be lower and the pace faster than anticipated. If expenses are lower and withdrawal is faster than anticipated, the FY2015 request may also include excess funds that could be used to pay for part or all of the new $5.5 billion request to counter the Islamic State. Savings in FY2015 could be partly offset by the recent announcement by Secretary Hagel that up to 1,000 U.S. troops could be kept in Afghanistan until the spring of 2015 to substitute for a delay in NATO troops being available to provide needed support.
Members have raised various concerns about the broad authorities requested for the new CTPF, which exceed current authorities for other Train & Equip programs. The conference version of the FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act, H.R. 3797, reduces the funding and rejects most of the new authorities requested. Other concerns include the lack of evidence of success in previous similar programs, particularly in situations like the complex political-military environment in Syria and Iraq.
Congress may wish to consider ways to restrict war-funding to exclude activities marginally
related to war operations and support, and to limit the use of ground troops in Operation Inherent Resolve.

Defense: FY2015 Authorization and Appropriations

Pat Towell

January 28, 2015

Источник: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/index.html

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In contrast with the debate over the FY2014 defense budget, congressional action on the FY2015
Department of Defense (DOD) “base budget” (that is, the part of the budget not associated with
operations in Afghanistan or other situations designated by the President as emergencies) was not
complicated by disputes over the total amount at issue. For both the FY2015 National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) and the FY2015 Defense Appropriations Act, President Obama’s
request, and versions of the legislation that were passed by the House, approved by the relevant
Senate committees, and finally enacted, varied by amounts that amounted to a small fraction of
1%. The narrow range of disagreements reflected the fact that, in each case, the request and all
versions of the legislation were consistent with the binding cap on defense spending in FY2015
that had been established by the Balanced Budget Act of 2013 (P.L. 113-67).
For the FY2015 NDAA, the President requested base budget authorizations for DOD totaling
$495.5 billion. The version of that bill passed by the House (H.R. 4435) would have authorized
$495.8 billion, the version reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee would have
authorized $496.0 billion, and the enacted bill (H.R. 3979/P.L. 113-291) authorizes $495.9
billion. (See Table 11.)
For base budget programs covered by the FY2015 Defense DOD Appropriations Act (which does
not cover the military construction budget), the Administration requested $484.3 billion. The
version of the bill (H.R. 4870) passed by the House would have added $166.3 million to that total
while the version of H.R. 4870 reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee would have cut
$1.1 billion. The final version of the Defense Appropriations Act (Division C of H.R. 83/P.L. 113-
235) provides $$483.7 billion. (See Table 19.)
Within those similar gross totals, however, the Administration’s budget request and the enacted
DOD funding legislation have some significant differences. Both bills either reject outright or
defers a decision on several cost reduction initiatives proposed by the Administration. At the same
time, both add to the budget billions of dollars for weapons programs and “readiness”
improvements that were not included in the budget request. Those added costs, are offset, in part,
by reductions which, according to the congressional defense committees, will have no adverse
impact on DOD programs. The cost of the congressional additions (in the base budget) is further
offset by the fact that some other costs are shifted into the part of the bill that funds war costs (or
Overseas Contingency Operations – OCO), and thus are exempt from the statutory cap on
discretionary spending. (See “NDAA Highlights” and “DOD Appropriations Overview”,
below.)
The Administration amended its FY2015 budget request for Overseas Contingency Operations
(OCO) three times in the course of 2014, each time expanding its scope to fund other emergent
DOD activities in addition to combat and post-combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.
The final version of the NDAA (H.R. 3979/P.L. 113-291) addressed an OCO request totaling
$63.7 billion from which it cut $1.5 million. Additions, including $1.25 billion to fund equipment
for the National Guard and reserve components and $351.0 million for the Iron Dome anti-rocket
system were offset by a cut to the amended request for the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund
(CTPF) for which the act authorizes $1.3 billion of the $4.0 billion requested.
Defense: FY2015 Authorization and Appropriations
Congressional Research Service
The final version of the FY2015 Defense Appropriations Act (H.R. 83, Division C/P.L. 113-265)
adds $1.54 billion to a $63.7 billion OCO request (which included $112.0 million in emergency
appropriations for DOD activities to combat the Ebola virus).

Fiscal Futures, U.S. Forces, and Strategic Choices

By Mark F. Cancian, Todd Harrison

Nov 16, 2015

Источник: http://csis.org/publication/fiscal-futures-us-forces-and-strategic-choices

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Defense strategy is ultimately about choices. While strategy should, in principle, drive budget decisions, strategy must also align with the resources available, or it will not be executable in practice. The U.S. military is currently experiencing a high degree of fiscal and strategic uncertainty as a result of the 2011 Budget Control Act (BCA) and subsequent political stalemate. These budget constraints were set without regard to defense strategy or the threats facing the United States and its allies. At lower budget levels the United States must make increasingly difficult choices. As an abstract proposition, choice sounds fine. As concrete policy, choices are hard. Choosing means saying that the United States will not counter certain threats as aggressively or defend certain allies as effectively.

Budgetary turmoil at the Department of Defense from 2010 to 2014: A personal and professional journey

By: Robert Hale

August 2015

Источник: http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2015/08/budget-turmoil-defense-department-hale

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During the past five years, the Department of Defense (DOD) has experienced nearly constant budgetary turmoil. The large and sudden sequester cuts of 2013 and the government shutdown in that same year constitute the best known events. Other instances are less well known but contributed to disruption. They include creating plans to shut down DOD on five different occasions, creating two budgets for the same year on several occasions because of uncertainty about the ultimate size of the appropriation, a major out-of-cycle planning process, and accommodating budgets that were six months late in enactment during two of the past five years. While this paper focuses on past budgetary turmoil at DOD, that turmoil unfortunately continues today.

Author Robert Hale, a fellow at Booz Allen Hamilton, believes that this budgetary turmoil imposed a high price on DOD and therefore on the nation it serves. The price was not measured in dollars, since DOD certainly didn’t get any extra funding to pay the costs of the turmoil. Rather, the price took the form of harm to the efficiency and effectiveness of the department’s mission. The 2013 sequestration led to adverse effects on military readiness, leaving the military less prepared than it should have been had a major contingency occurred. The 2013 back-to-back furloughs for sequestration and shutdown led civilian employees to wonder whether the department still valued their efforts. That year’s sequestration and government shutdown imposed costs that siphoned money away from more useful purposes, not to mention about $400 million in wasted civilian personnel costs. Finally, the budgetary turmoil consumed substantial amounts of the time of thousands of managers already burdened with managing the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, thereby delaying their efforts to bring about long-term improvements such as audit readiness.

What should be done about the harm caused by budgetary turmoil? Past events cannot be reversed, but there must be an end to the threat of future turmoil. As soon as possible, and no later than the next month or so, the president and the Congress need to reach a two-year budget agreement that provides reasonable budgetary certainty. The country also needs a long-term and broader budget agreement that ends the threat posed by sequester cuts, government shutdowns, and budget delays. That agreement will no doubt have to wait until after the 2016 election, but it should be a high priority for the next administration.

Pentagon acquisition policy: Three-quarters right, one-quarter broken

By Michael E. O’Hanlon

June 4, 2015

Источник: http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2015/06/04-pentagon-defense-acquisition-policy-reform-ohanlon

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The American defense debate is afflicted by a certain schizophrenia about how the Pentagon buys its weapons and other equipment, and about the state of America’s defense industrial base. On the one hand, the media narrative often fixates on horror stories concerning $600 toilet seats, billion-dollar aircraft and ships, fighter jets costing three times what was originally expected, and programs canceled for poor performance. The Department of Defense went into the Iraq and Afghanistan wars only moderately well prepared, in terms of equipment and training, for the kind of fighting that ensued, and took several years to find its stride. Eisenhower’s warnings of a military-industrial complex bilking the taxpayer and putting the nation’s economy at risk still echo today—but now it is the military-industrial-congressional complex that adds parochial politics and log-rolling appropriators to the witches’ brew as well.

Defense acquisition reform has been a major preoccupation of planners for more than half a century—and will likely remain that way for at least as long into the future—given the complex nature of the defense research, development, and procurement enterprise. But even gradual, incremental progress is worth striving for—and it is also of considerable value to the taxpayer, the armed forces, and the nation. And in some areas such as IT acquisition, where the technologies are newer and change faster, the opportunities may be particularly ripe for exploitation if DOD can truly learn to do business better. The system is not broken, but it can do better:

  • Use Federal Acquisition Regulations Title 12 more often, rather than falling back on Federal Acquisition Regulations Title 15. In theory, the Pentagon is supposed to buy commercial goods, as under the so-called FAR 12 code, whenever possible, and avoid the complex and cumbersome FAR 15 rules that involve negotiated contracts.
  • Streamline oversight when the Pentagon can rely on competition to discipline firms about price. The competitive process can provide the discipline—just as it does in the commercial market—and oversight can be scaled back enormously. DOD can base its future-years purchases of a given weapon in part on which of two companies may be providing a better buy at present.
  • Follow the JIEDDO model for other technologies. When so many Americans were being hurt or killed by improvised explosive devices in Iraq and Afghanistan, the congress allowed the Department of Defense to create special, expedited acquisition procedures and ultimately the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization to research and produce relevant technologies quickly.
  • Break down information technology purchases into smaller batches. By using open-source and modularity concepts, making sure different systems can talk to each other but allowing more discrete and smaller buys by various agencies, the Department of Defense may do better.
  • For technologies that have commercial analogues but certain military-specific attributes up to a certain percentage of value, allow firms to keep their intellectual property rights rather than sharing all relevant data with the government. In such cases, the government cannot really claim to have generated the relevant expertise and information, so it makes more sense to keep it proprietary.

U.S. defense strategy and the defense budget

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On defense, the presidential candidates should spell out the spending level they would seek as well as details about how the money would be spent – but there are no cuts to be had, according to Brookings Senior Fellow Michael O’Hanlon. Despite numerous mistakes and challenges, U.S defense has won the Cold War, prevented another 9/11, limited the scale of nuclear weapons proliferation, sustained a U.S.-led coalition accounting for two-thirds of global GDP and military spending, and maintained a mostly peaceful international environment conducive to trade and prosperity. Yet there will be further needs and there are ways to make American defense posture and policy more efficient with modest budgetary increases in the years ahead, O’Hanlon writes.

“Policymakers looking to achieve fiscal balance by cutting the defense budget will be disappointed. Defense spending is already down below 15 percent of total federal spending and equals just over 3 percent of GDP—very modest figures by post-World War II standards. Indeed, under my proposal, its share of federal spending and GDP would probably continue to decline. To be sure, at nearly $600 billion a year, defense spending will remain large. But the world is challenging and dangerous, and American military power is a generally stabilizing force within it. Thankfully, while the Pentagon cannot provide an easy panacea for fiscal reformers looking for painless budget cuts, its additional needs are eminently affordable as well,” he concludes.

Пентагон распланировал свое будущее

Американская армия станет меньшей по численности, но лучше вооруженной

Владимир Иванов
Обозреватель «Независимого военного обозрения»

21.03.2014

Источник: http://nvo.ng.ru/forces/2014-03-21/13_pentagon.html

В ближайшие 10 лет в ходе строительства ВС США будут решаться три стратегические задачи: защита континентальной части Америки, обеспечение национальной безопасности в глобальном масштабе путем распространения влияния Вашингтона в различных регионах планеты и предотвращение выступлений агрессивных антиамериканских сил, а также сохранение возможностей ВС противостоять любому противнику. Такие задачи сформулированы министром обороны США в представленном 4 марта конгрессменам и сенаторам «Четырехлетнем обзоре оборонной политики» (ЧООП). На базе документа, который обновляется раз в четыре года, соответствующие органы Министерства обороны и министерств видов ВС разрабатывают планы развития и поддержания на требуемом уровне боевой готовности воинских контингентов как в США, так и на зарубежных военных базах, число которых, по некоторым оценкам, превышает уже тысячу, и формулируют свои бюджетные заявки.

СИТУАЦИЯ В МИРЕ И ВОЕННЫЕ ФИНАНСЫ

Как отмечается в ЧООП, в настоящее время Пентагону приходится решать свои задачи в условиях быстро меняющихся угроз национальной безопасности США, исходящих из многих регионов планеты. В различных странах создаются передовые технологии военного назначения и образуются новые центры военной силы, ситуация в мире меняется быстро, становится все менее предсказуемой и в ряде случаев угрозы национальной безопасности США продолжают возрастать.

Угрозы безопасности многих союзников и партнеров Америки в различных частях земли тоже носят крайне динамичный характер и в большинстве случаев мало предсказуемы. Особенно угрозы со стороны Северной Кореи и Ирана. В разных регионах планеты продолжает сохраняться нестабильная обстановка и возникают все новые очаги насилия. Это создает благотворную среду для формирования экстремистских группировок и возникновения религиозно-политических конфликтов на территориях ряда государств, начиная с Центральной Африки и заканчивая Юго-Восточной Азией. Кроме того, современные средства вооруженной борьбы, которыми владеют потенциальные враги Америки и которые они могут применить на сухопутных, морских и воздушных ТВД, а также в космосе и в киберпространстве, становятся все более совершенны.

Руководство Пентагона считает, что необходимо уделять постоянное внимание глобальным изменениям в мире – как положительным, так и отрицательным. Беспрецедентная взаимосвязь событий, происходящих в различных странах мира, требует расширения сфер международного сотрудничества в области обеспечения безопасности и выработки единообразных форм взаимодействия. Возрастающая военная мощь некоторых государств позволяет им играть большую или даже лидирующую роль в своих регионах и решать общие задачи обеспечения безопасности на контролируемых ими территориях.

США в условиях глобальных изменений в мире будут решать задачи обеспечения своей безопасности и защиты национальных интересов, опираясь на сильную экономику, сотрудничество с союзниками и партнерами, военную мощь и технологическое превосходство. Выполнение всех этих функций потребует быстрого принятия решений о проведении необходимых мероприятий по планированию, формированию, развитию и размещению объединенных сил.

В настоящее время МО США находится в условиях изменения и значительной неопределенности своего финансового положения. В соответствии с Законом «О контроле федерального бюджета» начиная с 2012 финансового года в течение ближайшего десятилетия бюджет Пентагона должен сократиться на 487 млрд долл., причем ежегодно ассигнования будут снижаться на 50 млрд долл. В прошлом году МО США получило отсрочку от ежегодного урезания ассигнований, но действие указанного закона должно быть возобновлено в 2016 финансовом году. Правда, начиная с 2015 финансового года в ближайшие пять лет расходы Пентагона все же возрастут на 113 млрд долл.

Учитывая быстрые изменения внешней обстановки, опубликованный ЧООП предусматривает проведение необходимых мероприятий по реформированию ВС США в будущем в условиях сокращения ассигнований и обеспечения их возможностей по решению стоящих перед ними задач в настоящее время и в не очень отдаленной перспективе.

ИНИЦИАТИВЫ ПЕНТАГОНА

В представленном парламентариям документе определены три главные инициативы, которые намерено реализовать МО США. Прежде всего военное строительство будет осуществляться в соответствии с положениями подписанного президентом США в 2012 году «Стратегического руководства по обороне», в котором излагается отредактированная военная стратегия, обеспечивающая защиту национальных интересов Америки и сохранение ее лидирующего положения в мире. Во-вторых, в обзоре расписываются мероприятия, которые должны провести соответствующие виды ВС, чтобы сбалансированно изменить структуру объединенных сил, принимая во внимание все изменения внешней обстановки. И, в-третьих, в ЧООП указываются меры по контролю расходов, с тем чтобы избежать деградации войск и сохранить боеготовность контактной армии в условиях финансовых ограничений.

В документе отмечается, что отредактированная военная стратегия США позволяет Америке поддерживать глобальное лидерство и создает базу для принятия решений, которые позволят в ближайшие 10 лет создать сбалансированную структуру ВС, способных решать стоящие перед ними задачи в условиях стратегических и финансовых неопределенностей. В соответствии с уровнями ассигнований на оборону, указанными в бюджетной заявке президента, Пентагон будет в состоянии защищать интересы США и обеспечивать решение предписанных стратегических задач. Однако в некоторых областях это будет сопряжено с определенными рисками. Выделенных средств будет явно недостаточно для качественной подготовки и обучения военнослужащих и полного материального обеспечения войск, а также может привести к принятию неправильных долгосрочных решений по ликвидации рисков, возникающих в условиях быстроменяющейся обстановки.

По инициативе президента США, в 2015 финансовом году Пентагону предлагается дополнительно выделить 26 млрд долл., что позволит ему восстановить и поддерживать на требуемом уровне боевую готовность войск, модернизировать вооружение и военную технику (ВВТ) и развивать инфраструктуру. Однако риски деградации ВС значительно возрастут, если требования по сокращению военного бюджета начнут действовать с 2016 года, предлагаемые военные реформы ВС не будут приняты законодателями, а уровни финансовой неопределенности Пентагона сохранятся.

СТРАТЕГИЧЕСКИЕ ПРИОРИТЕТЫ

Как указывается в ЧООП, Соединенные Штаты продолжат обеспечение национальной безопасности Америки и ее союзников и партнеров, будут и далее поддерживать на высоком уровне национальную экономику, а также обеспечивать защиту универсальных ценностей и сохранять мировой порядок, мирное сосуществование государств, их безопасность и многостороннее сотрудничество.

В соответствии с положениями стратегии национальной безопасности США в «Четырехлетнем обзоре оборонной политики» сформулированы основные приоритетные стратегические установки Пентагона на XXI век, которые полностью отражают указания Белого дома, изложенные в «Стратегическом руководстве по обороне». Этим документом предусматривается решение таких задач, как передислокация значительной части ВС США в район Азиатско-Тихоокеанского бассейна в обеспечение поддержания стабильности в этом регионе, последовательное проведение мероприятий по сохранению сложившейся ситуации в Европе и на Ближнем Востоке, а также принятие в глобальном масштабе всех необходимых мер по противодействию экстремизму и ликвидации террористических угроз, исходящих прежде всего из Африки и Ближнего Востока. Для решения этих задач Пентагон планирует и дальше укреплять сотрудничество с другими странами и привлекать к нему новых партнеров. Лидеры военного ведомства даже в условиях сокращения ВС намерены обеспечить необходимое финансирование программ развития некоторых перспективных военных технологий.

В ЧООП сформулированы три приоритетных стратегических направления деятельности МО США. Первостепенным из них является обеспечение безопасности США, противодействие атакам на Америку со стороны ее противников, а также поддержание федеральных властей в ликвидации последствий подобных атак и в снижении негативных последствий стихийных бедствий, число которых постоянно возрастает. Вторым направлением стратегии Пентагона является обеспечение безопасности в глобальном масштабе с целью сохранения региональной стабильности, оказание необходимой поддержки союзникам и партнерам США, а также расширение сотрудничества с другими странами по общим вопросам глобальной безопасности. И, наконец, предусматривается создание таких ВС, которые будут способны одерживать полную победу в условиях любой агрессии, уничтожать террористические сети, а также оказывать гуманитарную помощь другим государствам и ликвидировать последствия стихийных бедствий на их территориях.

По каждому из указанных направлений реализации отредактированной военной стратегии МО США намерено выработать эффективные и действенные мероприятия, которые позволят ВС решать все стоящие перед ними задачи. Внедрение инноваций как в американских войсках, так и в ВС союзников является ключевым аспектом деятельности Пентагона. Военное ведомство разработало новые подходы к обеспечению передового базирования воинских контингентов СВ, ВВС и ВМС в различных регионах мира, где могут возникать кризисные ситуации, вооруженные конфликты и стихийные бедствия, влияние которых на обороноспособность США и других стран, в связи с глобальными изменениями климата, становится все более опасным. Решение указанных задач предполагается проводить с максимальной эффективностью при минимальных расходах. При этом планируется все действия Пентагона постоянно координировать с союзниками и партнерами.

МОДЕРНИЗАЦИЯ ВОЙСК

В связи с глобальными изменениями геополитической обстановки, появлением новых видов ВВТ у других государств и возникновением финансовых ограничений руководство МО США планирует изменить структуру ВС таким образом, чтобы они были способны решать самый широкий комплекс боевых задач в различных конфликтах, в борьбе с противником, способным проводить асимметричные операции или имеющим в своем распоряжении самые современные ВВТ или оружие массового уничтожения (ОМУ). Лидеры Пентагона считают, что ВС США больше не придется вести широкомасштабные и длительные войны, поэтому их размеры будут существенно сокращены. Однако Пентагон планирует сохранить возможность наращивания численности войск, если в этом возникнет необходимость.

Новые объединенные ВС США должны быть готовы к борьбе с противником, способным использовать самые современные формы и методы боевых действий и вооруженным по последнему слову техники. На современном этапе воинские контингенты США превосходят всех своих вероятных противников, особенно в космосе и в киберпространстве. Пентагон планирует и дальше искать новые пути военного строительства, чтобы сохранить создавшееся соотношение сил и средств и быть способным побеждать в самых тяжелых условиях боевой обстановки.

США, как отмечается в ЧООП, будут продолжать поддерживать международный подход к борьбе с насилием и в противостоянии террористическим угрозам. При этом будут использоваться экономические, дипломатические, законодательные, разведывательные и технологические формы воздействия на экстремистов, а также военная сила. Америка продолжит проведение мероприятий по противодействию распространению ОМУ с более широким привлечением к этому процессу всех заинтересованных стран. При этом руководители объединенных и специальных командований должны разработать такие планы развития подчиненных войск, чтобы они были наиболее приспособлены к решению любых задач в быстро меняющихся стратегических условиях.

В документе указывается, что в ближайшие 5–10 лет ВС США станут меньше – воинские контингенты, включая подразделения Национальной гвардии и резерва, будут сокращены на несколько сотен тысяч человек. В целях экономии средств будет закрыт ряд программ разработки, производства и закупок вооружений, которые, по мнению руководства Пентагона, не потребуются в будущем. В то же время войска в перспективе все-таки будут лучше вооружены и сохранят способность поддержания требуемого уровня боевой готовности.

На современном этапе в условиях будущей финансовой неопределенности руководство Пентагона не рассматривает в обзоре более долгосрочные задачи военного строительства, но надеется, что в перспективе жесткие ограничения с военного бюджета будут сняты и ВС США смогут развиваться более эффективно и в тех направлениях, которые будут полностью соответствовать требованиям международной обстановки.