Архив за месяц: Ноябрь 2015

U.S. needs larger Army, not a smaller one

By Timothy M. Bonds and Michael Johnson

September 9, 2015

Источник: http://www.armytimes.com/story/opinion/2015/09/09/commentary-us-needs-larger-army-not-smaller-one/71590176/

Last year, the Pentagon proposed significant reductions in the size of the Army active and reserve components. But with the global threat landscape ever evolving, the proposed cut to the Army is a decision the nation may well come to regret. We will attempt to explain why.

The latest Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), released in March 2014, proposed cutting the Army’s end strength from 570,000 active component soldiers to 450,000; the Army National Guard from 358,000 to 315,000; and the Army Reserve from 205,000 to 195,000. These force reductions would be even greater if additional spending cuts are mandated through sequestration, which could kick in next year.

The Department of Defense said in issuing the QDR that it could cut troop strength without compromising its pillars of protecting the homeland, building global security and projecting power when necessary. But meeting these commitments in today’s world has proven a challenge, one that will be made even more daunting by a smaller Army.

In the 17 months since the QDR was issued, new threats have emerged and old ones have worsened. Among them are the Russian invasion of Ukraine and its implications for the NATO Baltic states, the potential for provocations or collapse of the nuclear-armed regime in North Korea, and the rise of the Islamic State group in Syria and Iraq. These and other global challenges could threaten regional stability and national security if the United States is not prepared to prosecute robust military responses.

For example, how would the United States respond if Russia were to take the same course in the Baltics it has taken in its illegal occupation of Crimea? Against currently stationed forces, the Russian Army could reach the Baltic capitals within a matter of days, leaving the United States with few choices — all bad ones at that.

The president could seek to negotiate a Russian withdrawal, but that would risk fracturing NATO if negotiations and sanctions dragged on for months or years. Or the United States could launch a counteroffensive to retake NATO territory against a nuclear-armed Russia. This option would be particularly dangerous because the Russians would have time to prepare their defenses, and their military doctrine reserves the right of first-use of nuclear weapons to defend their territory from attack; and Russia would almost certainly claim conquered Baltic territories as their territory. Making this even more difficult would be the necessity of attacking Russian forces in cities with large civilian populations of NATO allies.

However, these difficult choices could be avoided by putting sufficient forces in the Baltics to strengthen deterrence by denying Russia a quick fait accompli. This would require that the United States and NATO place armored brigades in each of the Baltics, along with other U.S. and NATO quick-response forces before a war started. If the Russians attacked anyway, an additional 14 brigades and their accompanying enabling forces — with perhaps six coming from the United States and eight from NATO allies, along with air and sea forces — would be needed to defeat and expel invading forces.

Similarly, a diminished U.S. military could be ill-prepared to respond to a North Korean artillery attack on Seoul or the collapse of the North Korean regime that would leave a large nuclear, chemical and biological program unsecured. An appropriate response would require U.S. forces to evacuate U.S. noncombatants and secure North Korean artillery and weapons of mass destruction. Doing so would require ground combat forces and engineering, logistics and other units to sustain operations.

To meet potential challenges in the Baltics and Korea while at the same time countering the existing terror threat posed by the Islamic State group and dealing with other problems that will doubtless emerge, the United States would need more troops, not less. In the event of conflict, in addition to maintaining the fiscal year 2015 troop levels, this would require lengthening combat tours to 18 to 24 months, making broad use of stop-loss and improving readiness. If the existing Army will be challenged to meet America’s current and potential future commitments, a smaller force would hardly be up to the task. This leaves the U.S. leaders with but two choices: limit responses to existing and emerging threats, or pause the current troop drawdown until known threats are more adequately addressed.

Limiting response capabilities would mean taking strategic risks. Fully engaging in the Baltics, for example, would leave the United States unprepared to quickly defeat aggression in Korea and vice versa. Taking such chances could provide adversaries an opportunity to commit aggression and cause U.S. allies to question U.S. reliability as an ally or partner.

A pause in the troop drawdown, meanwhile, would provide another 40,000 active and 20,000 reserve soldiers and could be paid for using Overseas Contingency Operations funding. When the threats have diminished, this funding could cease and the drawdown continue. Additional funding would be needed to ensure that this force is made ready and tested regularly, and that equipment is pre-positioned where needed.

The best alternative might be to increase the size of the Army to ensure it is capable of meeting known threats. But short of that, the United States should not go forward with force reductions at the risk of its stated security goals.

The Strategic Value of Terrorism

by Brian Michael Jenkins

August 25, 2015

Источник: http://www.rand.org/blog/2015/08/the-strategic-value-of-terrorism.html

The convergence of ruthless terrorist networks and greedy criminal underworld operatives can pose unique and dangerous challenges. It offers terrorists access to human resources and skillsets that can enhance their operational capabilities, while it offers criminals new sources of profit and political rationalization. But convergence also entails risks for both terrorist groups and criminal gangs.

The specter of drug cartels lending their advanced skills in penetrating America’s borders to bloodthirsty terrorists intent on attacking the American homeland may indeed sound terrifying, but such relationships are nothing new and hardly the perfect threat multiplier they may seem.

Terrorist groups engage in criminal activities to fund their operations all the time. They carry out bank robberies and engage in ransom kidnapping and extortion. The Irish Republic Army became deeply involved in insurance fraud. Terrorist organizations in Columbia, Afghanistan, and the Middle East derive revenue from drug trafficking. Hezbollah is involved in counterfeiting, including fabricating pharmaceutical products. The Islamic State runs a plunder economy, seizing mobile assets—automobiles, generators, construction equipment—in towns it captures to sell on the black market. Its destruction of ancient sites conceals a profitable traffic in antiquities.

Terrorists also recruit convicts into their own ranks, who can provide the militants with criminal skills and connections terrorists themselves may lack. They may also see convicts as victims of oppression by infidel capitalist society, or as individuals who may be especially vulnerable to their recruiting propaganda. Criminals may embrace extremist ideologies as justification and cover for crime.

Uruguay’s Tupamaros recruited criminals as did Italy’s Armed Proletarian Nuclei, which viewed them as “sub-proletarian.” And the terrorist label can provide a sort of underworld credibility to ambitious criminals. Terrorist leaders like Andreas Baader, a co-founder of Germany’s Red Army Faction, and Donald DeFreeze, the self-proclaimed “field marshal” of the Symbionese Liberation Army, both began their careers as ordinary criminals who became radicalized through encounters with leftwing extremists.

At the same time, criminal syndicates are no strangers to the strategic value of terrorism. Italy’s Mafia has long known this, carrying out fear campaigns that have included assassinating public officials and terrorist bombings to scare off investigators. Colombia’s drug traffickers carried out kidnappings and bombings to dissuade the government from extraditing imprisoned comrades to the United States. Mexico’s cartels employ classic terrorist tactics as well, including beheadings and mass murders.

Terrorist groups may commission criminals or collaborate on specific missions. In 2011, a senior Iranian official allegedly recruited his cousin in America to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to Washington. The cousin, in turn, reached out to what he thought was a Mexican cartel, that was, in fact, a U.S. undercover agent, to do the killing. This bizarre episode fueled concerns that Mexico’s criminal cartels were already in league with jihadist terrorists.

But such alliances create dangers for both sides. A terrorist organization’s criminal activities produce cash flows that can become ends in themselves. This can turn religious zeal into greed, transform political causes into for-profit criminal enterprises, corrupt individuals and tarnish the group’s reputation among more devoted adherents.

Lacking the fervent dedication of their extremist partners, criminal elements are generally loyal only to profit and are certainly threats to double cross terrorists if it suits them. Criminal organizations are also more likely to be infiltrated by informants.

Perhaps of most concern to successful criminal enterprises is that alliances with terrorists could threaten their businesses by prompting authorities to target them for more aggressive enforcement. Mexico’s drug cartels reportedly make billions of dollars a year and are not likely to engage with terrorists if it could mean a hit to their bottom line. When law enforcement problems morph into national security threats, the rules of engagement change—drone strikes could replace arrests and prosecution.

The notion that hostile governments will work through criminal cartels to avoid being held responsible for attacks works only to a degree. The United States has demonstrated its willingness to retaliate against those it considers to be state sponsors of terrorism—Libya and Iraq are two examples—no matter who carries out the attacks.

While terrorists and criminals joining forces is certainly a scary thought, it’s nothing new and not something that works as simply in practice as it does on a white board. Still, it’s a threat worth watching.

What Works Best When Building Partner Capacity in Challenging Contexts?

by Christopher Paul, Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Beth Grill, Colin P. Clarke, Lisa Saum-Manning, Heather Peterson, Brian Gordon

2015

Источник: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR937.html

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For both diplomatic and national security reasons, security cooperation continues to be important for the United States. The needs and existing capabilities of various nations differ, however, as will results. In previous research, RAND identified a series of factors that correlate with the success of building partner capacity (BPC) efforts. Some of these are under U.S. control, and some are inherent in the partner nation or under its control. Strategic imperatives sometimes compel the United States to work with PNs that lack favorable characteristics but with which the United States needs to conduct BPC anyway. This report explores what the United States can do, when conducting BPC in challenging contexts, to maximize prospects for success. The authors address this question using the logic model outlined in a companion report and examining a series of case studies, looking explicitly at the challenges that can interfere with BPC. Some of the challenges stemmed from U.S. shortcomings, such as policy or funding issues; others from the partner’s side, including issues with practices, personalities, baseline capacity, and lack of willingness; still others from disagreements among various stakeholders over objectives and approaches. Among the factors correlated with success in overcoming these challenges were consistency of funding and implementation, shared security interests, and matching objectives with the partner nation’s ability to absorb and sustain capabilities.

Key Findings

Many Challenges Stem from U.S. Policy or Practice

  • Such issues as changes in funding and other support and which specific entities may receive support or training can affect the overall success of building partner capacity (BPC) efforts.
  • While a robust partner can usually fill in any gaps in U.S. processes or support, a partner that already faces challenges may not be able to do so.

The Partner Nation (PN) Itself Must Be Willing to Engage Fully

  • The lack of willingness to support and participate in BPC of PN personnel at any level (head of state or ministry, service or command, or individual trainees) can disrupt BPC efforts.
  • Such willingness is often contingent on a shared understanding of and agreement on both the approach to and goals of BPC efforts.

PN Ministerial Capacity Can Be Extremely Important

  • The size, health, and capability of the PN’s ministry of defense or equivalent play significant roles in both managing the BPC process from the PN side and in prospects for organizing for and funding the sustainment of built capacity.
  • When capacity built through U.S. BPC efforts has endured rather than atrophied rapidly, an effective PN ministry has played a role in that outcome.

Consistency Is Key

  • Not only funding but also objectives, agreements, and relationships need to be consistent.
  • Without sustainment and maintenance, however, any capacity built may atrophy.

Recommendations

  • BPC planners should engage senior leaders and resource managers in every stage of the planning cycle, from concept to evaluation, to ensure that aspects under U.S. control are well coordinated and conducted.
  • Objectives, funding, and plans should be consistent over time.
  • Existing mechanisms need to support a wider range of efforts over a longer period or need to be joined by (or replaced by) new authorities and programs able to resource sustainment in later years.
  • Managers and executors need to be agile in planning and execution and have the flexibility to respond to changes on the ground and to incentivize or disincentivize PN behaviors.
  • At the outset, planners need to assess potential challenges and develop workarounds for them.
  • Strive to reach shared BPC objectives with the PN.
  • Match any equipment to its utility to the PN and the PN’s ability to maintain it.
  • Plan for sustainment, working with U.S. stakeholders and assessing what the PN’s ministerial-level capacity.

Algeria: The Bastion of North Africa

by Christopher S. Chivvis and Amanda Kadlec

August 11, 2015

«If regional trends continue on their recent course, Algeria could become a last line of defense against the chaos that has engulfed Libya and threatened the whole region.»

Источник: http://nationalinterest.org/feature/algeria-the-bastion-north-africa-13545?page=show

The old adage that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure is highly relevant but elusive when it comes to making effective security strategy. All too often, global attention is riveted on the crises unfolding today at the expense of preventing those of tomorrow.

In North Africa’s deteriorating security environment, Algeria is a prime candidate for a dose of preventive attention. As counterterrorism resources are focused on the expansion of the Islamic State and other jihadist groups across Libya, Egypt, Tunisia, and the Sahel region, Algeria is at risk of being overlooked. A regional behemoth, but a problematic and paradoxical U.S. partner, the country is itself beset with challenges new and old.

Algerian security forces face a formidable challenge policing the country’s 6,734 miles of permeable desert borders with Tunisia, Libya, Niger, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, and Western Sahara. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) was born in Algeria, and it maintains a presence east of Algiers in the Kabylie mountains. Smaller organizations including al-Murabitun (the breakaway group led by former Al Qaeda honcho Mokhtar Belmokhtar), Al Qaeda-linked Oqba Ibn Nafia, and Islamic State-linked Jund al-Khalifa continue to operate across and within Algeria’s borders. And late last monthAQIM killed at least nine Algerian soldiers in an ambush not far from the capital Algiers.

Because of its size and geographical position, Algeria could be a key regional partner for the United States and France in security and counterterrorism efforts against Al Qaeda and the Islamic State. Algeria has a clear interest in quelling the threat posed by regional jihadists. It has local knowledge that could be helpful to U.S. counterterrorism efforts. Without active cooperation from Algeria, bolstering Tunisia’s security will be very difficult. Without Algeria, ending the civil war in Libya will be near impossible.

Closer cooperation with Algeria will be tough, however, for several reasons. Algerians remain intensely protective of their sovereignty and regional role and have been leery of cooperating with the United States—let alone their former colonial master, France—in any way that appears subordinate to global powers. Algeria prefers to lead regional efforts with other North African countries like Tunisia and Libya, and, in the past, with Mali when it brokered the peace deals prior to the 2012 uprising. (It also remains locked in stalemate with Morocco—a key U.S. and French ally—over the decades-old conflict in Western Sahara, while maintaining warm relations with Russia.)

Algerian officials portray their country as a strong, regional leader free of the domestic discord and extremism that plague other Arab states. Yet, the reality is that Algeria is a large and potentially unstable state itself.

The question of who will succeed Algeria’s septuagenarian president Abdelaziz Bouteflika tops the list of concerns about its future. Bouteflika is the embodiment of the military regime that has ruled since the Algerian war of independence against French rule. After a stroke in 2013 left him in poor health, however, he no longer appears in public, creating great uncertainty about who will follow him. The military and much feared security apparatus (known by the French acronym, DRS) are thus in a suspended state of friction. Moreover, the rest of the regime is also aging and at odds with the younger generations that have long awaited their turn to govern. Bouteflika and his hero cadre of the 1950s battle against French colonialism will soon be replaced, but no one knows for sure by whom or what. The result is the prospect of increased elite infighting and new ruptures within the top level of the state.

Meanwhile, declining oil and gas production, coupled with global energy price declines are beginning to strain the economy and state finances. Oil and gas exports make up over 90 percent of Algeria’s total exports and 60 percent of the state revenue. Hydrocarbon revenue plunged 43 percent in the first half of 2015 alone, with an aggregate drop of 25 percent since 2012, according to the International Monetary Fund. The government has relied on its sovereign wealth fund to cushion this decline, but cannot do so forever.

The drop in income and constant fiscal deficits since 2008 have complicated the state’s efforts to address chronic economic problems, youth unemployment, and civil tension. Since 2005, low-level violence has occurred in every corner of the country resulting in thousands of micro-protests, which sometimes lead to rioting; the clash near Guerrera in July between Arabs and Berbers that killed over 20 people is but one recent example. Public anxiety is understandably compounded by the turmoil in neighboring Mali and Libya, not to mention the recent inroads of the Islamic State in the latter.

These tensions do not, of course, mean the nation is verging on internal revolt. Algerians lived through a decade of civil war in the 1990s and will be cautious about reigniting the passions that brought that conflict about. If troubling, most protests still seem aimed at goading the state into handouts, not regime change. Despite their rifts, elites are dependent on each other to keep the bunker state from falling apart. Opposition groups are, moreover, divided and ineffectual.

Perhaps most of all, Algerians have the recent examples of Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, Libya, Egypt, Yemen, Syria and Iraq—and threats everywhere else—to dampen enthusiasm for rebellion against the state. Even if the government today is corrupt, it at least provides a measure of personal and economic security.

In the next few years, as long as uncertainty about succession and economic problems persist, so will the risks to Algeria’s stability. Missteps, for example, by security services deployed to quell these protests, could generate more genuine resentment and waves of wide scale protests, as occurred so many times in the past.

Needless to say, the world needs to be paying closer attention to this North African regional power broker. If regional trends continue on their recent course, Algeria could become a last line of defense against the chaos that has engulfed Libya and threatened the whole region.

 

Is Winter Coming? Or, Our Russia Strategy

by Michael Spirtas

November 12, 2015

Источник: http://www.rand.org/blog/2015/11/is-winter-coming-or-our-russia-strategy.html

In Washington, and across the globe, many ask if Russian actions represent a new challenge to international order, and, if so, what is the best course of action to respond to it.

Defense Secretary Ash Carter cited Russian military intervention in Ukraine, Georgia, and most recently, Syria in his speech at the Reagan Defense Forum at the former president’s library in California. Carter also pointed to Russian intimidation of the Baltic states, revitalization of its Arctic bases, and its aggressive actions in the air, at sea and in cyberspace. Carter expressed alarm at repeated Russian statements that seem to indicate a more cavalier attitude about the use of nuclear weapons.

The United States cannot control what Vladimir Putin and the other leaders in Russia do, but it can choose what course it wishes to take.

So what should be done? Current U.S. defense spending, like other U.S. government spending, is hampered by repeated threats of a government shutdown and sequestration. Even with the recent budget agreement, the Defense Department faces a number of fiscal challenges, including rising spending on health care and other benefits, rising acquisition costs for a number of weapons systems, and the increased prospect of the reduction or elimination of the Overseas Contingency Operations account. DoD faces serious choices about whether or not to invest in the maintenance of the nuclear triad, the revitalization of tactical aircraft and long-range bombers, and the size of the Army and the Marine Corps.

Some argue that the Russian threat is being overhyped to justify increased defense spending. Undoubtedly, there are those who cynically view Russian actions as a boon for the defense industry. But DoD’s need to maintain its capabilities and develop new ones is real, and requires investment if the United States is to maintain its leading position in the global order.

A vigorous response to the perceived Russian threat would involve a range of actions. As the Defense Secretary indicates, it would involve placing more forces and equipment in Europe, including upgrades to infrastructure necessary to supply and maintain military operations in East Europe. It requires an increased pace of activity, including field exercises and other actions that would improve U.S. and allied military effectiveness and demonstrate resolve against potential aggression. The exact costs are unknown, but rough estimates indicate that real improvements are possible without large increases in the defense budget.

What role should we play as we manage our relations with allies? Allies such as the Baltic states and Poland are understandably eager for assistance due to their proximity to and relative military weakness compared to Russia. Bolstering U.S. military capabilities in Eastern Europe could encourage them to unnecessarily snub Russia and hasten conflict. In contrast, a build-up in Eastern Europe could unnerve allies like Germany and France since their calculus of the Russian threat may differ from that of the United States. Maintaining cohesion, if not unity, within NATO will be an ongoing challenge.

Upgrades to U.S. defense capability in East Europe could easily be perceived to be threatening by Russia. Open dialogue and discussion between the United States, its partners, and Russia could ameliorate tensions, but some level of disagreement and conflict will be inevitable. During the Cold War, much thought went into building military capabilities that would be beneficial for defense without being provocative. The United States faces a similar challenge today.

Improving the U.S. Security Assistance Model

by Michael Shurkin

November 18, 2015

Источник: http://www.rand.org/blog/2015/11/improving-the-us-security-assistance-model.html

Nobody likes comparisons with the Vietnam War, but in the case of United States security assistance, the comparison is worth considering. The United States often approaches security assistance the same way it did in Vietnam, with the same results.

Moreover, because the United States has been using the same approach, it has measured its efforts according to the same metrics, resulting in the same false assessments: Security assistance in Vietnam by 1973 was understood to be a success, with “Vietnamization” progressing so well that Washington felt free to withdraw U.S. ground forces.

Of course, that was before the South Vietnamese Army’s breathtaking collapse in 1975. More recently, U.S. special forces equipping and training Malian units in 2009-2012 gave good marks to their charges, until they deserted or defected in 2012 rather than fight Islamist militants. Similarly, reports on the progress of Iraqi Security Forces suggested that because they were growing sufficiently in size and capability, the United States could proceed with its withdrawal. That, of course, was before Iraqi units’ lopsided defeat by Islamic State irregulars in 2014. So far so good with “Afghanistanization,” although President Obama’s recent decision to keep U.S. troops in Afghanistan suggests a lack of confidence.

The approach in question—and the metrics that reflect it—is two-fold. First, even though one might acknowledge the essentially political nature of client states’ conflicts, the U.S. government tends to focus on security issues and make security assistance the de facto center of gravity for U.S. policy. Second, the focus with respect to security assistance ultimately has come down to quantifiable, measurable things—namely the number of men and units trained, and the numbers that the U.S. military uses to assess its own unit “readiness.” These include personnel and equipment “fill,” and how many people have been trained on “mission-essential tasks” and demonstrated technical competence. How many units are there? How many people are in those units? How many of them have guns? How many of them have been trained to fire those guns?

The resulting reductionism fosters the notion that if one spends enough money to build enough units and give them enough capability, one eventually will reach some tipping point and ‘win.’ Indeed, President Lyndon Johnson reportedly often complained that the only answer provided to him regarding what Vietnam needed seemed to be “more of everything.” Never mind the larger political aspects of a conflict, to which more military capability is often irrelevant if not an aggravating factor.

Operational “readiness” may be necessary, but history has shown that it is by no means sufficient at least in cases of fragile states riven by civil wars or insurgencies. It matters little how many units a government has and if their men have guns and know how to use them if they will not stand and fight, or if they fight the wrong enemy or otherwise alienate civilians and weaken state legitimacy rather than build identification with the state and foster its legitimacy.

A better way would be to focus on politics and shaping the political context. Security assistance represents an opportunity to do that by attending less to “readiness” and more to ideology, indoctrination, motivation, and unit cohesion. Does the force identify with the state? Is the force “republican” in the sense that it promotes the values of the republic it serves? What motivation do troops have to fight against those who challenge the state’s legitimacy and who offer rival ideologies and narratives of the nation?

If a state has compelling ideologies and narratives, one can help it promote them among the ranks and use the force to legitimize and promote them among the population. The United States, in fact, did just that in Korea. If it does not have compelling ideologies and narratives, there is not much one can do, which is good to know lest one have unrealistic goals. Countries like Afghanistan, Iraq, Vietnam, and Mali, after all, did not lack weapons and men who knew how to use them. The contest, rather, often hinges on legitimacy, and on rival efforts to define what it means to be a patriot. The Taliban has its narratives and ideology; what narratives and ideology does the Kabul government have to offer, and what is it doing to instill them among the troops or use the force to foster its own legitimacy? Those are the questions outsiders need to ask.

Any Review of Syria and Iraq Strategy Needs Realistic Reappraisal

by Brian Michael Jenkins

September 28, 2015

Источник: http://www.rand.org/blog/2015/09/any-review-of-syria-and-iraq-strategy-needs-realistic.html

As the fighting continues and refugees flood Europe, many in Washington are calling for a fundamental review of U.S. strategy in Syria and Iraq. That must begin with a realistic appreciation of the situation.

The continued fighting has seen the diminishing strength of Syria’s secular rebels and the ascent of its most extreme jihadist component, represented by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Since the American-led coalition bombing campaign began a year ago, ISIS has suffered some military setbacks and lost territory, but it also has been able to capture several more key cities in Iraq and Syria, and, despite the bombing, continues to attract a large number of foreign fighters. The threat they pose — along with ISIS’s continued exhortations to supporters abroad to carry out terrorist attacks — has security officials in Europe and America on edge.

The conflicts in Syria and Iraq seem to be at a stalemate. Towns may fall or be recaptured, but “front lines” move marginally. Insurgents in Syria and Iraq will likely not be able to overthrow the governments in Damascus and Baghdad, but neither will the Syrian nor Iraqi governments be likely to restore their authority throughout their national territories.

National armies in both countries have failed. Power has shifted to militias capable of defending ethnic and sectarian enclaves but limited in their ability to conduct strategic operations beyond their home ground. This shift will, in turn, weaken future central government authority.

Syria and Iraq are now effectively partitioned. These partitions are likely to persist. With U.S. backing, ethnic Kurds have been effective fighters against ISIS and have consolidated their traditional territory in northern Syria and Iraq. Turkey worries that the Kurds are laying the foundation for a future independent state, although no such intention has been announced. Although the Kurds fight forcefully when supported by coalition bombing, they are unlikely to advance into traditional Sunni areas.

The Syrian government has largely abandoned the Sunni areas of the country and is increasingly devoted to defending Damascus and its sectarian bastion in western Syria. Baghdad’s Shiite-dominated government has not been able to win over many of Iraq’s Sunnis, and that will impede its ability to recapture the cities and towns now held by ISIS.

It remains to be seen whether ISIS, despite the bombing campaign, will be able to consolidate its Islamic State and make it the primary political expression of Sunnis in Syria and Iraq. Alternatively, we could instead see the emergence of a Sunni badlands where warfare between armed rivals continues indefinitely.

Easier to forecast is that the fighting is likely to continue for the foreseeable future. Sectarian and ethnic divisions are now driving the conflicts, making the contest more existential for its participants. Yearnings for peace may be universal, but none of the belligerents appears able to imagine surviving under rule by their foes.

Foreign powers in the region and beyond have significant stakes in the conflicts. This is now complicated by the military intervention of both Turkey and Russia, but absent large-scale direct military investments, which can easily backfire, none of the foreign powers can guarantee the triumph of their local allies or ensure the defeat of their foes. Moreover, the interests of the external powers compete with, rather than complement, each other.

Foreign fighters continue to head for Syria to join jihadist fronts, mainly ISIS, which recruits by advertising the opportunity to build a so-called “authentic” Islamic State and opportunities for unlimited violence. Foreign fighters will continue to pose an additional layer of threat to neighboring states and their countries of origin. The volume of individuals wanting to join ISIS or returning from Syria and Iraq is overwhelming authorities in Europe.

The conflict in Syria has produced millions of refugees on a scale approaching that of Europe during World War II. As long as the fighting continues — which is likely — these refugees will not be able to go home, nor can so many be absorbed by the surrounding countries. They are the new Palestinians and will remain an international burden and a source of regional instability.

Although these stark conclusions hardly sound controversial, they are antithetical to American policy. The very idea of a military stalemate lasting years — or decades — defies America’s sense of progress. Secular, democratic governance and religious tolerance are deeply held American values. The United States operates on the presumption that the sectarian and ethnic divisions can be bridged; that Iraq’s national army can be rebuilt into an effective fighting force; that the Bashar Assad regime in Syria can be replaced by a more inclusive government; that the Sunnis can be won over and the jihadists can be isolated, contained and defeated; that peace and national unity can be restored, enabling the refugees to return; and that this can be achieved without the commitment of large numbers of combat forces or even with the commitment of American combat forces.

Unquestionably, these are noble aims, and diplomats are required to be optimists. Nonetheless, national objectives must be based upon realistic assessments of the situation. Here, the distance between presumed aspiration and reality seems great.

Political Scientists and the Military

Before engaging military leaders on issues of policy and strategy, spending some time on the basics can pay terrific dividends for civilian academics

by Paula G. Thornhill and Rachel Whitlark

August 10, 2015

Источник: http://warontherocks.com/2015/08/political-scientists-and-the-military/

In a conversation a few years ago with one of us, a senior political scientist from a prominent Ivy League university asked for insights on how to offer defense policy advice on a contemporary Middle East security issue. It quickly became clear that this academic had no idea of the overall structure of the defense policy community, much less specific ideas about who to approach or how best to offer advice. Specifically, this individual wanted to approach the military leadership but did not know the difference between the service chiefs and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, much less understand the unique roles of the Joint Staff, combatant commands, or Special Operations Command. Moreover, this person was uncertain what was actually under the purview of the military leadership when it came to selecting and implementing policy recommendations. As the conversation went on, it became clear that this expert lacked the most basic understanding of the defense policy world and especially of how the military fit into it. The academic’s opportunity to offer advice, unsurprisingly, never materialized.

Though the international relations community has for some time focused on the need to “Bridge the Gap” between academia and policy, the above anecdote illustrates an important aspect of this divide that has received far less attention: the lack of military expertise in academia. Indeed, while articles in the Schoolhouse series here at War on the Rocks, journal articles, and entire books have been dedicated to closing the broader gap, they have collectively overlooked the military component. We highlight here bridging the academic-military gap because both communities can contribute to and learn from one other, and because greater interaction will ultimately lead to improved policymaking and policy-relevant research.

Much political science scholarship in the security arena aims to explain military phenomena and to draw theoretical insights from technical and complex events. At the same time, very few academics understand whether this scholarship reflects technical or strategic realities — either on the battlefield or in decision-making circles. Moreover they lack the professional military contacts to evaluate their claims. Indeed, only a minority of political scientists are well versed in military affairs and have access to the military community, but this minority has written some of the most influential security studies scholarship with significant policy-relevant impact. This is particularly true when we consider academic studies on civil-military relations, where Samuel Huntington and Eliot Cohen, to name just two political scientists, have had a profound affect on both the academic and practitioner communities. What follows reflects the idea that this kind of scholarship — technically sound, militarily relevant, and accessible to both academics and military personnel — will become even more important as the future unfolds. Likewise, it suggests that increasingly informed dialogue between the two groups can improve how political science is utilized within the military.

Before getting into specific recommendations, it is worth highlighting the informal cultural dynamics that could inhibit this discussion. While they might be obvious to political scientists, they are probably opaque to the military:

1. The military is not the intended audience for political science scholarship. Military-focused scholarship is not incentivized within the discipline; thus unsurprisingly, political scientists are not trained to communicate their work to the military. Moreover, while many political scientists are open to learning about the military, they lack the necessary time, opportunity, and instruction. This oversight stems from an already-overcrowded graduate curriculum and the fact that only a small minority of departments pay dedicated attention to this type of expertise — MIT’s Security Studies Program, Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies, and Columbia’s Department of Political Science, with the affiliated School of International and Public Affairs and its Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace among them. This is especially ironic given that international relations as a dedicated field of study only became professionalized after two world wars.

2. Policy-relevance is not trained or rewarded. Even those who would like to engage the military need to make a deliberate effort to independently acquire the necessary skills. However, given the well-documented incentives that push scholars away from policy-relevant work, political scientists may choose to prioritize other kinds of training, especially early in their careers. Both of these factors (1 and 2) may cause political scientists to postpone their efforts to learn about the military, much less engage in military-relevant research, until after tenure.

3. Not all political science research is relevant to the military, yet there is a large body of it to cull through. Obviously, political scientists have different goals, purposes, methodologies, and audiences when they write. For those in the military, knowing where to access the research itself can be mysterious. Even a highly esteemed journal like International Security goes largely unread in military circles. Thus having a specific sense of the policy problem and a general understanding of the scholarship available are essential preconditions for military personnel when engaging the political science community.

It is worth noting that despite the above constraints, many political scientists want to be part of the solution. Moreover, our military colleagues describe instances where academic expertise could be useful in tackling challenges the military is currently facing or might face in the future. For example, nuclear and deterrence theory experts could offer creative new ways to communicate the importance of today’s nuclear deterrence mission to those on the forefront of this vital effort but unfamiliar with the dynamics of the Cold War and the first nuclear age. However, while many international security experts want to contribute, there is no obvious mechanism for participation, beyond the scholarship already being produced.

With this in mind we offer five recommendations to get civilian academics started in acquiring basic information about the military that will encourage improved interaction, better policy-relevant scholarship, and an enhanced policy process.

1. Learn key components of the defense organizational structure. At a minimum, anyone who deals with the military needs to understand the structure and role of the military services, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and combatant commands. Absent this, it is virtually impossible to offer meaningful advice or find the correct audience for it.

2. Learn military rank structure. Policy advisers need to spend time memorizing military ranks. Having a discussion with a Navy captain for example is very different than having a discussion with an Army or Marine Corps captain. It is also critical to understand that rank itself means different things depending on location. An Air Force colonel at the wing level is in a very different role than an Air Force colonel in the Pentagon.

3. Learn key pieces of military hardware. Many aspects of policy advice are contingent on the actual hardware available to implement it. The basic composition of an aircraft carrier strike group, the difference between a P-8 and a CV-22, the capabilities of the A-10 versus the F-35: These are just a few of the kinds of items a policy adviser should come to know and speak of with ease.

4. Appreciate that history tends to be more appealing than political science for the military. Although most political scientists are loath to hear it, the majority of those in uniform gravitate to narrative history much more than to theoretical political science models full of variables and hypotheses. Indeed, many in uniform have an innate connection to military history because it gives them a sense of identity and connection to their past. Thus, political scientists with historical expertise should seek to leverage it where applicable.

5. Read what those in the military are reading. For those interested in the policy realm, it is worth taking some time to understand what those in the military are already reading. Depending on the challenges it is facing, this could be books on organizational management (e.g., The Starfish and the Spider), biographies (e.g., Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War), historical fiction (e.g., Once an Eagle, Killer Angels), or science fiction (e.g., Ender’s Game). These are in addition to strategy classics like Clausewitz and Sun Tzu. Online outlets can also provide a glimpse into the military’s mindset. For example, War on the Rocks issues a holiday reading list every year, polling its contributors — many of whom have spent their careers in uniform. The service chiefs and the chairman, among others, annually release a variety of reading lists that reflect organizational focus. They vary in quality but offer an important glimpse into the mindset and focus of the organizations publishing them. David Barno and Nora Bensahel have also recently penned a great reading list for the incoming Joint Chiefs that is likewise useful for the broader policy community.

We’ve unfortunately bifurcated the security studies and military communities for far too long. For political scientists interested in bridging the political science–military gap, regional expertise or mastery of strategy and policy classics only get you so far. Before engaging military leaders on issues of policy and strategy, spending some time on the basics can pay terrific dividends. By demonstrating a willingness to take these five basic steps, political scientists and others interested in influencing defense policy will find that they better understand those in the military they seek to advise. They will ask more knowledgeable questions and reveal a mastery of the inner workings of the military that will open many more doors than advanced degrees and peer-reviewed articles. In short, their actions will tangibly demonstrate a respect for those who serve in this large, fascinating, and imperfect organization. The resultant scholarship, policy processes, and hopefully policy outcomes would benefit greatly from having this engagement commence at once.

NEXT UP: What the military needs to know about political scientists …

The Implications of the Paris Terrorist Attack for American Strategy in Syria and Homeland Security

by Brian Michael Jenkins

Источник: http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT445.html

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Testimony submitted before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee on November 19, 2015.

The Terrorism Threat to the United States and Implications for Refugees

by Seth G. Jones

Testimony presented before the House Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence on June 24, 2015.

Источник: http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT433.html

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The Enemy You Know and the Ally You Don’t

Sunni tribal fighters stand guard near a school used as a shelter for displaced people in the city of Ramadi

by Benjamin Bahney, Patrick B. Johnston, Patrick Ryan

April 11, 2015

Источник: http://www.rand.org/blog/2015/06/the-enemy-you-know-and-the-ally-you-dont.html

In the weeks since the Islamic State captured the Iraqi city of Ramadi, a loud and diverse chorus of voices, including the New York Times editorial board, has called for the Iraqi government and the United States to arm Sunni militias to fight the extremist group’s advance. The administration increased the number of U.S. trainers last week, adding an additional 450 as early as this summer to the 3,100 American troops already in Iraq. Regardless, current political and military dynamics on the ground may merit giving arms to Sunni fighters if the Islamic State can’t be pushed back soon.

But the decision to hand weapons over to the Sunni militias also poses risks. Before directly arming more ethnic- or sectarian-aligned militias, both U.S. policymakers and the public should have a deeper understanding of our potential allies’ past and their possible future interests. And what the unintended consequences of arming these Sunni militias might be.

Newly declassified documents from the Islamic State’s predecessor, captured during a U.S.-Iraqi raid in 2010 and published by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, suggest that some of Iraq’s most prominent Sunni politicians collaborated with the Islamic State’s predecessor in 2009, when the group faced its darkest hour. Some of these senior figures may have worked with the Islamic State to benefit themselves, some to benefit the Sunnis, and some to weaken the hand of the Kurds in Iraq’s ethnically mixed areas in the country’s north. While the threat of the Islamic State has moved these dynamics to the back burner today, they will likely reemerge if and when the security environment improves. And now some of these same politicians are lobbying the United States to send money and weapons to the militias from their territories.

While most of the U.S. public hadn’t heard of the Islamic State before its breakout last summer, the group declared an “Islamic State of Iraq” back in 2006 and maintained a presence in the northern city of Mosul through the U.S. military’s withdrawal in 2011. Conventional wisdom says that the Islamic State’s place in Iraq’s sectarian political strife rose out of the disarray that followed the U.S. withdrawal. It was at that moment that Iraq’s Sunnis were left to fend for themselves against the domineering, Shiite-oriented central government. The Islamic State’s resurgence in Iraq in 2013 and 2014 came at a time when the country’s Sunni minority was ripe to accept the group as a bulwark against political marginalization and crackdowns at the hands of then-Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s government.

In this telling, which has dominated U.S. media and policy circles, Maliki and his Shiite allies in the Iraqi government bear the brunt of the blame for inciting the renewed sectarian tensions that enabled the Islamic State to reemerge and unleash the brutal campaign that has arrested the world’s attention.

The new documents published by the CTC suggest the need to approach this conventional wisdom with caution. They have important implications for understanding Iraq’s sectarian schism and for informing the ongoing policy debate on how to stabilize the war-torn country.

A key document sent to Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, who preceded Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as the group’s leader, suggests that the Islamic State established cooperative relationships with key Sunni politicians by 2009 that gave it access to extortion opportunities, kickbacks, and other revenue-generating activities in and around Mosul. Assuming the document is authentic — for the moment, there is no evidence to suggest it is not — these revelations should give pause to those recommending that the Iraqis train and equip local Sunni forces under the auspices of the provincial governments in Nineveh and Anbar. Reporting from Mosul indicates that similarities between Sunni government officials and the Islamic State likely continued after U.S. troops withdrew from Iraq, and Maliki’s government began to intensify its repression of Sunni political leaders.

It is impossible to know the specific motivations of these officials — Sunni politicians may simply have been buying themselves protection in an environment where no other party was able or willing to provide it. But what is clear is this: For the Islamic State, these relationships enabled the group to access tens of millions of dollars to finance its operations in 2009 and after, some of which may have been diverted from Western reconstruction aid through political favors and phony contracts. The Islamic State likely used these funds to expand its extortion and intimidation networks in Mosul even prior to the 2011 U.S. withdrawal. This would go far in explaining how it had become so rich, even before it seized over $400 million from Mosul’s bank vaults last June.

One document dated August 2009 — when the Islamic State was regrouping in Mosul following military defeats in Anbar and Baghdad — sent from a senior Islamic State operative known as “Hatim” to Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, provides evidence that the group remained active in Mosul throughout the period by financing itself through project-skimming and extortion of contractors. In one example of these arrangements, the Islamic State claimed a $4 million profit from a construction contract in east Mosul. The expected revenues from these deals ranged from $7 to $34 million each.

The operative’s report on this special project describes how Islamic State agents established relationships with the Iraqi central government and with high-level Sunni politicians in Nineveh province, which forms the northern tip of the so-called Sunni triangle. Several Sunni politicians, according to the operative, had agreed to give the group access to lucrative contracting and extortion opportunities. As the author describes it, the Islamic State sought to “infiltrate the infidel government administratively, for the purpose of directing some of the economic and financial decisions issued by the apostates … also to benefit from the possibility of recruiting individuals from the infidel government as sources of information.”

These opportunities would have been a significant boon to the Islamic State during a period after senior U.S. intelligence officials declared the group “essentially defeated.”

To be sure, some uncertainty remains about how far the Islamic State went toward exploiting these opportunities. The author of the key document, likely a high-level Islamic State operative in Iraq, was making a direct entreaty to the Islamic State’s top leaders to allow the group to move forward with more deals after many months of internal bureaucratic bungling, inertia, and poor communication. It is possible that the Islamic State cut these deals short to avoid being a party to Sunni politics — the group’s radical version of Islam views democratic politics as idolatrous — but this raises the question of why the group’s third-in-command, a Swedish extremist of Moroccan descent called Abu Qaswarah, purportedly directed these activities in the first place.

These arrangements could have also affected the course of Iraq’s sectarian politics by increasing mistrust of the Sunnis by Iraq’s Shiites and Kurds and contributing to sectarian political conflict, which further marginalized Iraq’s Sunnis. The Islamic State operative’s report names several individuals, including some of Iraq’s most prominent Sunni politicians: Atheel al-Nujaifi, the former governor of Nineveh; Dildar al-Zibari, the former deputy chairman of the Nineveh Provincial Council; Faruq Abd al-Qadir, the former Iraqi minister of communications; and Hajj Riyad, the director of the office of then-deputy Prime Minister (and later Minister of Finance) Rafi al-Issawi.

At least two of these figures, Qadir and Zibari, wittingly aided the Islamic State, according to the report. Qadir had reportedly placed two Islamic State operatives in official government positions in the Ministry of Communications. Other officials were reportedly more reluctant to collaborate, but eventually capitulated. Hajj Riyad and Qadir, who was also head of the Nineveh Reconstruction Council at the time, had initial hesitations about collaborating with the Islamic State but buckled under additional pressure, according to the documents.

Fast forward to today: Several figures described in the document remain key players in Iraq’s Sunni political landscape. Atheel al-Nujaifi, governor in absentia of Nineveh and the brother of Iraqi Vice President Usama al-Nujaifi, continues to try to build a 3,000-man local security force to fight the Islamic State after he was sacked in May, when a majority of Iraqi MPs voted to fire him for corruption and complicity in the fall of Mosul to the Islamic State. Even if such a security force ostensibly fell under Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi’s National Guard, Nujaifi has indicated that he would continue to “work as a politician in the governorate and will be a fighter in the liberation process.”

In September of last year, Nujaifi paid (PDF) $300,000 of his own money to a Washington consulting firm to help rally support among influential foreign-policy elites and policymakers in the United States for his plan to arm a state militia for Nineveh. This May, Nujaifi and Issawi met with key players in Washington’s foreign-policy circles and gave a talk at the Brookings Institution. In the talk, Issawi emphasized the dire security situation and pleaded for help, arguing that the Shiite militias are nearly an equal threat to the stability of Iraq as the Islamic State is. Issawi also noted that he and Nujaifi were two of the few Sunnis to participate in politics since the beginning of the new Iraqi state, as others boycotted politics for years. The sidelining of such key Sunni politicians diminishes the chances that successful political reconciliation between Iraq’s Sunni and Shiite groups will occur.

If members of Iraq’s Sunni leadership indeed had ties to the Islamic State, it raises serious questions about these figures as reliable long-term partners and as stewards of their own security forces. The U.S. strategy in Iraq hinges on putting in place a power-sharing agreement based on a willingness by all parties to set aside narrow sectarian agendas. However, none of the major political blocs — Sunni, Shiite, or Kurd — appear likely to change their zero-sum calculus. Political leaders on all sides have demonstrated a willingness to do whatever it takes to advance their sectarian agendas. And in the case of Sunni leaders, this has likely included direct cooperation with the Islamic State.

These sectarian gambits have failed everyone involved — except for the Islamic State. On the Sunni side, Issawi and Nujaifi fled the Islamic State’s military onslaught last year for exile in Iraqi Kurdistan. On the Shiite side, the Islamic State’s 2014 breakout cost Maliki his position as prime minister. Meanwhile, the Islamic State’s organization gained significant military capability, financial resources, and popular support within Iraq.

The Islamic State’s recent victories against government troops in Syria and against Iraqi security forces in Anbar are alarming signs of its growing power and influence. In this context, proposals to arm and support Sunni-led provincial forces are compelling. But policymakers also must consider the prospects for eventual demobilization. Arming provincial militias will increase the power of Iraq’s governors, which would complicate eventual disarmament and could even spark new fighting among Iraq’s factions. Disarming tribal militias would prove easier, but the tribes have been weakened in the years since they joined U.S. forces to fight al Qaeda, and some now openly back the Islamic State. If Iraq needs more security forces, the United States should help to reform and strengthen the troops Iraq already has. Going around them is only asking for trouble.

Tunisia in the Crosshairs

by Michael D. Rich and K. Jack Riley

June 22, 2015

Источник: http://www.rand.org/blog/2015/06/tunisia-in-the-crosshairs.html

Muslims around the world have been warned: “Do not fly with Tunisair from June 3rd.” The warning came in late May from Ifrikia Media, the “official voice” of the Islamic State group in Tunisia. The implication is that the Islamic State group is going to target the airline at some time in the indefinite future — and that the Islamic State group has done its part to spare Muslims the carnage. Tunisair has thus been put on notice of a continuing threat, which can hardly be good for the economic health of the airline or its owner, the Tunisian government.

It should come as no surprise that the Islamic State group would have Tunisia firmly in its crosshairs. Many nations across the Arab world have failed to live up to the promises of the Arab Spring, leaving power vacuums that attract extremist groups such as the Islamic State group. Tunisia, which gave birth to the Arab Spring more than four years ago, stands out as a notable exception, making it an inviting target for threats from the Islamic State group.

About a week before the Islamic State group issued its threat, we stood on the steps of the Tunisian Parliament in the capital city of Tunis, in the same spot where a Tunisian soldier had provided cover for tourists fleeing the terrorist attack at the adjacent Bardo National Museum on March 18. Standing on those steps, after two days of meetings with Tunisian executive branch officials, civil society leaders and business leaders and before another series of meetings with Tunisian legislative leaders, it was impossible not to reflect on the potential long-term consequences of the March attack, let alone those that could soon follow.

Prior to the Bardo museum attack, Tunisia has been on a trajectory to democracy, political stability, economic openness and social tolerance. Virtually alone in the Islamic world, Tunisia has successfully integrated moderate Islamic leaders into its government, led the Arab world in supporting the rights of women and navigated the security challenges associated with being sandwiched between two larger, and substantially less secure, neighbors (Algeria and Libya). The museum attack had the potential to derail all of this progress and more by scaring away tourists, siphoning off resources and diverting the attention of leaders.

Instead, throughout our meetings, including the final ones with parliamentary leaders, we heard strong commitments to political reform, to the development of human capital and to domestic security. On the security front, there were especially strong pledges to improve border security, confront the Islamic State group, engage youth and divert them from the path of radicalization.

These commitments and pledges will have to be pursued in an austere budget environment in Tunisia and in the United States, as both countries juggle other claims and demands. Nevertheless, there is a compelling justification to make Tunisia and its security a strategic U.S. priority. Tunisia sits at Africa’s northernmost point, potentially offering the United States strategic access to an increasingly troubled region that is now sending tens if not hundreds of thousands of refugees a year, mostly via Libya, to Europe. Equally important is to help Tunisia retain its role as a beacon for its neighbors as a stable, peaceful, pluralistic and democratic Arab state.

The Obama administration understands the importance of Tunisia. On May 21, President Barack Obama met in Washington with Tunisian President Beji Caid Essebsito assure him that more U.S. aid was on its way to protect Tunisia’s gains and to help sustain its fledgling democracy. Obama also designated Tunisia a “major non-NATO ally,” which clears the way for Tunisia to receive more military aid and other upgraded security arrangements.

Just four days later, however, another security incident caused alarm in Tunis. Seven Tunisian soldiers were killed and 10 wounded when one of their fellow soldiers opened fire inside the central army barracks. The gunman was killed in the resulting exchange of fire. It was a stark reminder that the path to success in Tunisia will be long and winding and perhaps never assured. Meanwhile, up to 3,000 Tunisian citizens have joined the fight in Iraq and Syria, most joining the Islamic State group, which has targeted Tunisia’s vulnerable disenfranchised youth.

Which brings us back to the threat on Tunisair. The mere threat to the airline, amplified by the advance warning to Muslims, constitutes an economic attack against Tunisia, whether or not there is a physical attack. The open-ended nature of the threat suggests that the Islamic State group intends to target Tunisia for the long haul. The United States should do the Islamic State group one better, countering the threats against Tunisia with steadfast and sustained cooperation and assistance.

Greater Disorder Does Not Imply Greater Insecurity

December 23, 2014

Источник: http://www.the-american-interest.com/2014/12/23/greater-disorder-does-not-imply-greater-insecurity/

By most measures of national security, the world is getting safer. So why do we feel so insecure?

President Obama observed this June that “if you had to choose any moment to be born in human history…you’d choose this time. The world is less violent than it has ever been.” While his proposition may seem incongruous with the present cavalcade of crises across Eurasia, the evidence suggests that the world is indeed becoming more secure. With Thanksgiving just behind us and the new year fast approaching, we should all give thanks.

Consider nuclear dangers. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, which the late historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. famously called “the most dangerous moment in human history,” John F. Kennedy believed there was at least a one-in-three chance of nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union; 20 years later, a top adviser to Ronald Reagan, Richard Pipes, put that figure at two-in-five. Recently declassified documents establish, moreover, how close the Americans and Soviets came to the precipice of nuclear war in September 1983. Leading U.S. officials of the Cold War period spoke with equanimity about civilization’s ability to survive a nuclear exchange—so ingrained was the concept of mutually assured destruction in establishment defense planning. In July 1981, speaking at his hearing to be confirmed as Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Eugene Rostow reassured Senator Claiborne Pell that “[t]he human race is very resilient.” “Some estimates,” he went on to note, “predict that there would be ten million casualties on one side and 100 million on another. But that is not the whole of the population.”

Today, thankfully, the probability of a nuclear war is closer to zero than it has been at any other point since the dawn of the atomic age.

Armed conflicts offer another benchmark for gauging our progress. While some observers wax nostalgic for the “long peace” of the Cold War, the reality is that proxy wars, civil wars, and genocides exacted a staggering toll between 1945 and 1991. That we enjoy unprecedented security today is further apparent if one considers World Wars I and II: 20 million perished in the former, and roughly three times as many died in the latter. All told, organized violence is estimated to have claimed at least 160 million lives in the 20th century. Milton Leitenberg, the first American to work at the distinguished Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, places that figure at 231 million.

The 21st century appears to be moving in a better direction. The Human Security Report Project notes that “[f]rom the early 1990s to the present day, [the total number of armed conflicts has] dropped by some 40 percent, while the deadliest conflicts, those that kill at least 1,000 people a year, have declined by more than half.” Between 1950 and 2007, moreover, the annual rate of reported battle deaths per million people fell from roughly 240 to fewer than ten. A growing body of research in political science corroborates such findings. In its latest report, for example, the Center for Systemic Peace concludes that “the general global magnitude of warfare decreased by over sixty percent since peaking in the mid-1980s, falling by 2010 to its lowest level since 1961.” It also found that deaths from political violence fell from roughly 200 per million people in 1946 to fewer than 40 in 2011.

These realities do not, of course, diminish the dangers we face. While the global stockpile of nuclear weapons is dropping, India and Pakistan are assiduously building their arsenals and delivery systems; furthermore, America’s top military commander in South Korea fears that North Korea may have succeeded in building a nuclear weapon small enough to be mated to a ballistic missile. Meanwhile, organized violence continues to exact a significant toll: the rampages of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, internecine fighting in Syria, clashes between Russian separatists and Ukrainian forces, and humanitarian crimes in the Central African Republic, among other horrors, remind us that “collective action” is too often an unfulfilled promise.

Still, one would have to search hard to find someone who would trade today’s threats for those of the previous century. Why, then, is the perception of greater global insecurity so pervasive? It is difficult to neglect the role of social media, which are far more effective at fanning fears than at contextualizing threats. Had Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube existed in the first half of the 20th century, they would likely have portrayed the world wars as harbingers of civilizational collapse, even though the greatest gains in global prosperity have occurred in the postwar period.

Another possible explanation is growing uncertainty in world order. The existence (more accurately, the perception) of U.S.-Soviet bipolarity and the possibility of mutually assured destruction combined to impose an enduring high-level framework on world affairs for nearly half a century. Today, however, as both relative U.S. decline and the inability of another country or coalition to replace it become more apparent, there is growing concern about the possibility of a vacuum in world order and its presumptive concomitant: global disorder. Compounding this concern is the increasing sway of non-state actors—whether terrorist outfits, hacking units, or drug cartels—which have leveraged the fruits of globalization far more effectively than governments.

Of the infinite number of forms disorder could take, it is anyone’s guess as to which ones will prevail. Mathew Burrows—former director of analysis and production at the U.S. National Intelligence Council, and arguably the most regarded futurist alive today—believes we are entering “a new era that we are only just beginning to understand.” Perhaps it is our innate fear of uncertainty that explains the contemporary tendency to conflate disorder with insecurity. In the new issue of Foreign Policy, George Packer notes that “[b]y the metric of corpses, the catastrophes of 2014 have hardly been more severe than those of any given year in the past 100; in some cases, they’ve been much less so.” Still, he explains, they have “produced an unmistakable sense of disintegration. What’s gone is…any sense of a framework, an order, a system in which [peace and stability] could be restored.”

Henry Kissinger has called the renewal of world order “the ultimate challenge to statesmanship in our time.” At least three tasks are built in to that enterprise: reconciling the aspirations of the present system’s architects with the ones of those countries that regard it as an imposition; devising a structure that accommodates not one foundational unit, but two (the nation-state and the nonstate actor); and, perhaps most vexingly, bringing urgency to the undertaking—world ordering—in the absence of immediate existential threats.

Pope Francis lamented this September that “[e]ven today, after the second failure of another world war, perhaps one can speak of a third war, one fought piecemeal, with crimes, massacres, destruction.” While the centenary of World War I has focused enormous attention on the possibility of another world war, the pope’s insight suggests that world order is actually more vulnerable to piecemeal decay than sudden disintegration. With some exceptions (climate change, for example), the pressing challenges on today’s agenda—whether the impasse over Iran’s nuclear program or China’s approach to resolving maritime disputes with its neighbors—do not pose overarching challenges to that order; instead, they chip away at its norms and arrangements gradually. Rousing the world to stop slow-drip degradation is much harder than mobilizing it in the face of global perturbations (for example, the financial crisis of 2008–09).

Few labor under the illusion that renewing world order will be easy, and many esteemed observers question if such a task can even be accomplished. Still, contending with the disorder that is likely to attend this enterprise is preferable to staving off nuclear Armageddon and ending world wars.

Expanding the Caliphate

by Seth G. Jones

June 11, 2015

Источник: http://www.rand.org/blog/2015/06/expanding-the-caliphate.html

For over a year, the Islamic State (also known as ISIS) has been attempting to expand into South Asia. ISIS has developed a loose organizational structure in Afghanistan and Pakistan, provided money to local groups, and adopted a confrontational approach to the Afghan Taliban and al Qaeda—all on al Qaeda’s home turf, no less. Its goal is straightforward: to co-opt disaffected local militants in an effort to build influence and power in the region.

ISIS in South Asia, which it calls the Islamic State of Khorasan, is larger than most recognize, boasting between several hundred and several thousand fighters. And its push into the subcontinent has led to numerous skirmishes with the Afghan Taliban, the largest and best-organized militant group in Afghanistan. In early June, for example, ISIS and Taliban fighters engaged in pitched battles in Shinwar, Achin, and other districts in Nangarhar province.

Despite these developments, some analysts have dismissed the presence of ISIS in Afghanistan and Pakistan as fictitious at worst or grossly exaggerated at best. In a May article in Al Jazeera, for example, Aimal Faizi, a journalist and former spokesperson for Hamid Karzai, argued that ISIS’ presence in Afghanistan is largely a “manufactured myth,” used by Afghan and U.S. officials for political purposes.

There may be a kernel of truth to his assertion. Some Afghan officials, for instance, have likely exaggerated the presence of ISIS in Afghanistan as a way to pressure Washington to keep U.S. forces in the country or to blame Pakistan for meddling in Afghanistan’s internal affairs. Local authorities have certainly exploited concerns about ISIS to their own advantage: Earlier this year, The New York Times reported that officials in Afghanistan’s Ghazni Province had manufactured a story about ISIS beheadings in an attempt to draw military support from Kabul in 2014.

To be sure, it will be difficult for ISIS’ South Asia branch to dominate the other extremist groups in the region. A variety of competing jihadist organizations already exist there and ISIS’ ideology does not have strong local roots.

Even so, ISIS’ recruitment strategy in the region has already met with some success. As the group gains a toehold among Afghan and Pakistani militants, the region could be in store for more conflict, including between militant groups.

Setting Up Shop

In the spring of 2014, as ISIS was consolidating its hold on the city of Raqqa in Syria and expanding into Iraq’s Anbar Province, the group’s leaders contacted militants in South Asia. ISIS apparently hoped to gauge the possibility of expanding its influence in the region and recruiting fighters to come to Iraq and Syria.

ISIS had just been kicked out of al Qaeda following a series of personal, ideological, and command-and-control disputes. Yet its plan for expansion into Afghanistan and Pakistan followed a strategy its former ally had perfected: try to co-opt local militants. Al Qaeda had done so to great effect in Iraq, Somalia, Yemen, and North Africa, and had thereby avoided the inefficient, labor-intensive process of building foreign affiliates from scratch.

As ISIS leaders began a series of discussions with groups in Egypt (including Ansar Beit al-Maqdis), Libya (including factions of Ansar al-Sharia), and later in Nigeria (including Boko Haram), they also began to contact militants in Afghanistan and Pakistan. South Asia seemed promising for ISIS. The region had a long history of nurturing jihadist groups, dating back to the anti-Soviet wars in the 1980s; relatively weak governments, which provided the opportunity to secure safe havens in areas under limited state control; and ongoing wars against “infidel” regimes and their Western backers.

As they eyed expansion into the region, ISIS leaders also concluded that there were serious problems with the ideologies and strategic visions of several local groups, including al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban. In the December 2014 edition of its online magazine, Dabiq, the group’s propagandists published a blistering cover article (PDF) that outlined those concerns. The author accused al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban of selling out Islam by supporting tribal law over sharia, failing to effectively conquer and control territory, neglecting to target Shiite populations, and erroneously recognizing international borders. The article also brazenly criticized Mullah Muhammad Omar, the leader of the Afghan Taliban, for practicing and preaching a bankrupt, distorted version of Islam.

One of the few groups to escape ISIS’ excoriation was the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), formed in December 2007 as an umbrella organization of various militant groups in the region. The TTP “were upon great good,” the Dabiq article concluded. “They carry the Salafi creed and hope and strive to establish the laws of Islam in their region.” ISIS had matched its words with deeds. Around September 2014, ISIS sent representatives to Pakistan to meet with local militants, including some TTP leaders, following several months of discussions. Around the same time, Pakistani officials began receiving reports of pro-ISIS leaflets in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.

By January, Hafiz Saeed Khan, the former chief of the TTP’s Orakzai branch in Pakistan’s tribal areas, had been named leader of ISIS’ South Asia branch. His deputy was Mullah Abdul Rauf Khadim, an Alizai tribesman and former Taliban commander from Helmand Province who rose to prominence after his 2007 release from the U.S. facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

Saeed and Khadim’s established networks would become crucial to ISIS’ recruitment efforts. Saeed was particularly helpful in expanding the terrorist group’s footprint in Pakistan’s tribal areas and in the Afghan border provinces of Kunar and Nangarhar, where some TTP operatives had fled following Pakistani military operations. Khadim, on the other hand, helped develop ISIS’ network in Pakistan’s Baluchistan Province and in the Afghan provinces of Helmand and Farah.

By late 2014, U.S. and Afghan officials had become sufficiently alarmed about Khadim’s activity and threat to U.S. forces that they began to consider a strike against him. On February 9, 2015, a U.S. drone locked onto Khadim’s vehicle in Afghanistan’s Helmand Province and fired a missile at it, killing Khadim and several others.

Over the following months, ISIS focused on co-opting more fighters and expanding its networks in eastern, southern, and western Afghanistan, and in Pakistan’s Baluchistan Province and tribal areas.

Everyone Loves a Winner

ISIS’ expansion strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan includes three main components. First, ISIS has attempted to attract new members by exploiting personal and factional grievances within established jihadist networks. Indeed, the earliest leaders of the South Asian branch joined up following disputes within their former organizations. In Pakistan, Saeed had grown disenchanted with the TTP after he was passed over for the organization’s top spot, following the death of several leaders, including Hakimullah Mehsud, in 2013. In southern Afghanistan, Khadim had taken issue with what he claimed was an unbalanced tribal representation in the Taliban’s inner shura, or consultative council, according to interviews with his aide conducted by theAfghanistan Analysts Network. Khadim and other Afghan Taliban commanders had also grown disillusioned with Mullah Omar, whose unknown status and whereabouts has led to speculation about whether he is still alive.

Second, ISIS doled out money to encourage defections. ISIS was flush thanks to smuggling oil, selling stolen goods, kidnapping and extortion, seizing bank accounts, and smuggling antiquities in Iraq and Syria, among other activities. Its leaders were willing to spend money—perhaps as much as several hundred thousand dollars—to build networks in South Asia.

Third, ISIS used its victories in Iraq and Syria to attract some recruits. The group continues to hold substantial territory in the Middle East following its 2014 blitzkrieg campaign. “Some locals appear to be attracted to their battlefield success in Iraq and Syria,” a senior U.S. military official in Afghanistan said. “And everyone loves a winner.” ISIS has been quick to exploit these victories through a sophisticated social media campaign.

A Crowded Neighborhood

Despite these developments, ISIS leaders in Iraq and Syria do not appear to exercise operational or tactical control over commanders in Afghanistan and Pakistan. For now, ISIS in South Asia is closer to a loose affiliate than a direct arm of the organization.

What’s more, ISIS faces substantial hurdles in the region because of a crowded field of jihadist groups and its lack of an ideology with strong local roots. Populist militant groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan have generally latched on to extreme interpretations of locally established strains of radicalism, such as Deobandism. But ISIS’ ideas remain imports—and not necessarily popular ones.

Still, ISIS could benefit from progress on reconciliation discussions between the Afghan government and the Taliban. There are some Taliban factions that would almost certainly defect to groups like ISIS in the event of a peace deal. But if ISIS wants to expand in South Asia, it will likely need to recruit a more charismatic leader in Afghanistan who can attract more fighters and funding. ISIS commanders have expressed interest in Mullah Abdul Qayum Zakir, a hard-line former military commander of the Afghan Taliban who stepped down last year after an internal power struggle. ISIS will also need to continue co-opting local militants. In this respect, the allegiance of fighters of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), a group traditionally tied to the Taliban, could provide additional momentum.

Finally, ISIS will have to fight other groups, particularly the Afghan Taliban, to expand its market share. In early June, ISIS apparently suffered heavy losses during clashes with the Taliban in the western province of Farah, suggesting that it will be an uphill battle. Fighting the Taliban may be its most difficult challenge, and one that could have profound implications for violence in the region.

Iran’s Role in Iraq

Room for Cooperation?

by Alireza Nader

Источник: http://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE151.html

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The rise of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has led to arguments in favor of U.S.-Iran cooperation in combating the group, as immediate American and Iranian interests in Iraq are very similar: Both countries view ISIL and the broader Sunni jihadi movement as major threats to their national interests. American and Iranian military forces in Iraq are fighting the same enemy and, on the surface, U.S. air power seems to complement Iran’s on-the-ground presence in Iraq. While the United States and Iran ultimately have divergent long-term goals for Iraq, and face disagreements on many other issues, limited tactical cooperation in weakening ISIL in Iraq may be possible.

This paper examines Iranian objectives and influence in Iraq in light of ISIL’s ascendance. In particular, the paper focuses on Iran’s ties with Iraqi Shi’a parties and militias and the implications of Iran’s sectarian policies for U.S. interests. In addition, the paper examines the role of specific Iranian actors in Iraq, especially the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, in addition to the clergy and the Rouhani government. Finally, the paper concludes with policy recommendations for the United States.

Key Findings

Explicit U.S. cooperation with Iran in Iraq may help weaken ISIL, but it is unlikely to solve the region’s increasing insecurity, which is due in part to Iran’s sectarian politics.

Beyond tactical cooperation in the fight against ISIL, it is difficult to see a fundamental shift of behavior in Tehran that could lead to long-lasting U.S.-Iran cooperation.

  • For now, Iran’s fight against ISIL has short-term tactical benefits, but Washington should not expect a broader détente between the two countries as a result of common interests in fighting ISIL.

Recommendations

  • U.S. efforts to find a political solution to the multiple crises roiling the region must take Iranian influence into account. While the United States may find broad cooperation with Iran to be problematic, it nevertheless should explore discreet political agreements with Iran. Such agreements should be aimed not to fundamentally change the relationship with Iran, but help find ways to defuse and deescalate sectarian-driven warfare in Iraq, Syria, and the wider Middle East.
  • U.S. policy toward Iran should not be based on normalization of relations or alliance-building, as the two countries are likely to remain rivals for years, but instead should focus on finding spaces in which the two countries can tolerate each other’s respective influence while striving for some modicum of regional stability.

 

Iran’s Goals in Syria

by Alireza Nader

January 26, 2015

Источник: http://www.rand.org/blog/2015/01/irans-goals-in-syria.html

What is Iran doing in Syria? How important is Iran in the ground war?
Iran is playing a crucial role in buttressing President Bashar Assad, through military advice, provision of weapons, and funding of the cash-strapped Syrian government. The Assad regime might not survive without support of Iran and its allies such as Hezbollah.
Where are Iranian forces concentrated? How many are there? What are they doing exactly?
Some Iranians have been killed in Syria, including Iranian Revolutionary Guard General Mohammed Allahdadi in January 2015. But Iran does not appear to be committing major ground forces to the conflict. Tehran instead prefers to recruit Shiite militias from across the Middle East and even Afghanistan to fight in places like Damascus and Aleppo. Iran’s profile in Syria is lower than its profile in Iraq.
What are the stakes for Iran in Syria?
Iran has sought to protect the dozens of Shiite holy sites in Syria, especially the Zeinab Shrine near Damascus. Tehran used the holy sites to recruit fighters to aid Assad. More importantly, Syria is the geopolitical lynchpin for Iranian influence in the Levant and the wider Arab world. If the Syrian regime fell, the flow of arms and aid to Iran’s most important Arab ally — the Lebanese militia and political party Hezbollah — would be affected. Hezbollah, which has thousands of rockets aimed at Israel, is the main Iranian deterrence against Israel.
How does Iran’s role in Syria today differ from its earlier activities before the war?
Iran and Syria have been close allies since the 1979 Iranian revolution. Each has provided the other with critical assistance at various times. Syria was one of only two Arab nations (Libya was the other) to support Iran during the eight-year war with Saddam Hussein in the 1980s. It was an important conduit for weapons to an isolated Iran.

Over the last decade, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards have trained, equipped, and aided Syria’s security and military forces. Hundreds of thousands of Iranian pilgrims and tourists visited Syria before its civil war, and Iranian companies made significant investments in the Syrian economy.

But in the past few years, Iran has played an active role in Syria that few could have imagined before the civil war. “The deep, strategic and historic relations between the people of Syria and Iran … will not be shaken by any force in the world,” Iranian President Hassan Rouhani said shortly after his 2013 inauguration. Tehran appears to be willing to spend billions of dollars to prop up the Assad regime despite its own floundering economy. For now, Iran is fully committed to the fight.
How do Iran’s actions and goals in Syria differ from the United States?
Iran has opposed U.S. policies on Syria since the conflict broke out. In 2013, Tehran condemned the U.S. move to provide non-lethal aid to rebels for the first time. Iranian officials criticized U.S.-led airstrikes on Islamic State (ISIS) targets in 2014, despite a shared interest in defeating the militants. Rouhani said the bombardments were illegal because they had not been sanctioned by the Syrian government.

Tehran has also argued that the best way to defeat ISIS is to support the Assad government. It has challenged U.S. support for anti-government rebels. “You cannot fight ISIS and the government in Damascus together,” Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif said in reaction to the airstrikes.

Tehran generally opposes any type of foreign intervention in Syria. But officials have warned the United States in particular not to deploy its forces in the region again.

Tehran welcomed Assad’s reelection to the presidency in June 2014, while Washington dismissed the poll. “The elections are non-elections. A great big zero,” said Secretary of State John Kerry. But Tehran may not be fully committed to Bashar Assad as the only leader for Syria, although it wants a pro-Iranian regime in Damascus.
How are U.S. and Iranian actions affecting each other’s strategies?
The divide between Iran and the United States in Syria appears to be unbridgeable, but Iran may be flexible in Syria as long as its interests are protected. This may not be palatable for the United States and its allies, especially Saudi Arabia and Turkey, which have long sought to overthrow the Alawite-led regime.

Ukraine Crisis Is a Geopolitical Game Changer

by Ian Bond, Denis Corboy, William Courtney, Michael Haltzel, Richard Kauzlarich

April 17, 2015

Источник: http://www.rand.org/blog/2015/04/ukraine-crisis-is-a-geopolitical-game-changer.html

The Ukraine crisis is accelerating shifts in power. Russia is a net geopolitical loser; Europe is emerging stronger; NATO is starting to boost defenses; and China sees new openings. These changes are reshaping the international landscape.

Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 shocked the West, but its reaction was muted. Russian peacekeepers already patrolled the separatist areas of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Although evidence of Russia’s preparations for war was evident months before, Georgia contributed to the initiation of the conflict.

Ukraine is different. Russia’s seizure of Crimea and parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions has stirred outrage in the West. Moscow falsified unrest in Ukraine to justify an unprovoked assault, violating solemn international obligations. The Kremlin seeks to carve a coercive sphere of influence by destabilizing neighbors.

Russia is overplaying its hand, however, and losing ground on multiple fronts. Hobbled by corruption and high dependence on hydrocarbon exports, the economy suffers also from growing state interference, a steep oil and soon to be gas price drop, and Western sanctions. Yet, Europe is strengthening its relations with Russia’s western neighbors, NATO is being revitalized, and its defense budgets will grow. Russia’s nuclear saber-rattling is angering Europeans, not scaring them.

Meanwhile, Beijing is more welcome in anxious Central Asia. China is making huge infrastructure investments and pulling gas eastward via pipelines that redraw geopolitical boundaries. If a nuclear deal is sealed with Iran and economic sanctions eased, its energy exports will grow and compete on the world market against those from Russia and other producers.

Russia can take steps to recover from self-inflicted wounds but is not yet doing so. A full withdrawal from eastern Ukraine would end many crippling Western sanctions. The cessation of intimidating military maneuvers and the use of gas as a political weapon would improve ties with Europe. Allowing the new Eurasian Economic Union (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and soon Kyrgyzstan) to become a depoliticized, rules-based entity would bring economic benefit and boost land-based trade between China, Europe and the Middle East. Slashing state economic interference and corruption would boost Russian entrepreneurship and productivity.

Rather than seizing these opportunities, the current policies of Russia jeopardize its substantial interests in Europe. The European Union is Russia’s largest trading partner and accounts for three-quarters of Russia’s inward foreign direct investment stocks. EU competition policy is stopping Russia from building a gas pipeline via the Black Sea that could box in customers. An EU energy union would further reduce risks of undue reliance on Russian energy.

With the emergence of the Ukraine crisis, Germany for the first time is leading the West — not just Europe — in dealing with Moscow on a major security issue. The Minsk II accord reached in February is replete with ambiguities, suggesting that Berlin and Paris lack the necessary clout to manage prime-time security issues on their own. On the eve of the Minsk II talks German Chancellor Angela Merkel weakened her bargaining leverage by averring that progress in Ukraine could not be “achieved by more weapons.”Without meaningful Western military aid, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko acceded to unreasonable demands from Russian President Vladimir Putin. Partly as a result, Ukraine’s eastern front remains vulnerable.

On April 15 German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble beseeched America to do more to help Europe address the Ukraine crisis: “We know that we need the United States.” One way to do this is to fix the Normandy format used in the Minsk ceasefire talks (France, Germany, Russia, Ukraine). This format puts too much burden on Germany and France; it should be augmented with U.S., EU and perhaps Polish and U.K. participation.

Aggression in Ukraine has given NATO new relevance. It has launched a constant rotation of air, maritime and ground presence on the alliance’s eastern border. America is strengthening ground force presence in Poland and the Baltics. A number of European countries are increasing their defense spending and efficiency while focusing more on territorial defense. But recent calls for a European army ring hollow. Too many Europeans still think any crisis can be solved by diplomacy alone; history suggests that negotiating is more effective when backed by the willingness to use force if necessary. France understands this, but the U.K. ought to recover its will to fully engage and not act as if it is halfway out of Europe.

Many Europeans, especially in Central and East Europe, see the United States as a security guarantor, despite some popular anti-Americanism. U.S. reconnaissance and intelligence are essential to monitoring the Minsk II ceasefire. If Russia were sharply to expand aggression — heightened violence this week in eastern Ukraine is worrying — America and several European allies would likely rush military aid to Ukraine with the aim of improving defenses and raising the costs of aggression. Additionally, sanctions would be expanded. Regardless, Ukraine urgently needs more aid for governance and security sector reform.

Russia’s aggression abroad and repression at home have altered the basic assumptions of earlier Western policy. By misjudging the tolerance for aggression in Europe, Moscow is bringing on the encirclement it fears. The West is now better prepared to deal with any further aggression and more confident that Ukraine’s future will be as part of an enlarged Europe.

France Is Replacing the UK as America’s Top Ally in Europe

by Michael Shurkin and Peter A. Wilson

March 30, 2015

Источник: http://www.rand.org/blog/2015/03/france-is-replacing-the-uk-as-americas-top-ally-in.html

The combination of Western Europe’s continued disarmament and a rapidly evolving strategic situation —the return of Cold War-type tensions with Russia and the rise of ISIS (a.k.a. “The Caliphate”) and allied Islamist movements—has underscored an important development for the U.S. strategic approach toward the North Atlantic Alliance: The key ally in NATO Europe may no longer be the United Kingdom but France.

This is good news insofar as it means that the UK’s decline as a military power does not leave the United States bereft of a willing and able ally, and the U.S. relationship with France should be recognized and strengthened. The bad news is that the relationship’s stability is threatened by the rise of France’s Marine Le Pen and the far-right Front National party she leads.

France, alone among the big NATO powers, retains the military capability and the political moxie to contribute significantly and aggressively to collective responses to security threats to the Atlantic Alliance. Paris demonstrated this in 2013, when French President François Hollande launched a military intervention in Mali to save it from Islamist militants and effectively assumed responsibility for Europe’s “southern front” in the African Sahel.

Today, more than 3,000 French troops backed by fighter jets are engaged in a U.S.-backed regional “hot” war against Islamist groups in the Sahel, and the French are inching toward greater involvement in the war against the Nigerian Islamist group Boko Haram. In the Middle East, the French have joined the U.S.-led coalition against ISIS. There, as well as in Africa, Paris sees itself as doing what it can to prevent the various pieces of a potential Islamist caliphate from joining together.

Regarding Russia, the French have been firm in their opposition to Russian aggression at the diplomatic and economic levels, and Paris has gone so far as to block delivery to Russia of two highly capable amphibious assault ships. France also has the greatest ability of any of the European allies to rapidly contribute a significant force capable of handling a clash with Russia, if the need arises.

The French government’s recent decision to freeze defense-spending cuts even in the face of powerful financial pressure—unlike the British government, which appears committed to further defense reductions for an already diminished and shrinking UK defense establishment—indicates a desire to preserve that ability.

Moreover, France, which only recently returned to full integration with NATO, has been going to great lengths to ensure that French forces can fight effectively alongside Americans. For example, French Rafale fighter jets have been practicing operations off U.S. aircraft carriers, and in the first week of March, Rafales were operating off a U.S. carrier in the Arabian Gulf, participating in the anti-ISIS campaign.

The importance of the burgeoning Franco-American relationship makes the rise of Le Pen troubling. Reportedly tapping into post-Charlie Hebdo anti-Muslim sentiment, she now polls ahead of all other major French political leaders. But rather than cheering on Paris’s militarily robust actions abroad, Le Pen and her party advocate withdrawing from NATO and retreating from ongoing coalition operations into a stance of armed isolationism combined with admiration if not support for foreign strongmen.

Le Pen criticizes Hollande and his predecessor, Nicolas Sarkozy, for undermining Syrian President Bashar Assad and toppling Libya’s Muammar el-Qaddafi. Le Pen also has voiced support for Russian President Vladimir Putin and opposes Hollande’s alignment with the U.S. regarding the Ukraine crisis. Some of this support might have been bought: A Russian bank reportedly lent the Front National party $11 million, prompting speculation that Putin is supporting Le Pen covertly.

Whatever the case may be, it is clear that there is an alliance in Europe between Putin and populists on both the far right and far left who share antipathy toward the European Union and the U.S.-led liberal and military order. These efforts are not inconsistent with Moscow’s systematic attempts to develop “special relations” with acute European nationalists in Hungary, Serbia and Greece as it tries to damage the near-term cohesion of the European Union.

Although little can or should be done about Le Pen by the United States, it is in the United States’s interest to strengthen bilateral relations with France. Military cooperation is already taking place at an unprecedented scale and should be encouraged. The value of the French nuclear deterrent force should be openly acknowledged as part of the collective Alliance deterrent posture toward a Russian leadership that openly brandishes the prospect of limited nuclear weapon use in the event of a future severe political military crisis in Europe.

Finally, the time may have come to bring France into the exclusive intelligence-sharing club known as “the Five Eyes,” which includes long-standing U.S. allies Canada, the UK, Australia and New Zealand. The price of membership for France is high because Paris would be expected to give as well as to take. But in light of the strategic convergence between Paris and Washington, both Americans and the French would have much to gain.

Containing Middle East Terror

Measures to Reduce the Threat Posed By Foreign Fighters Returning from Syria and Iraq

by Brian Michael Jenkins

Источник: http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT427.html

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Testimony presented before the House Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security on March 17, 2015.

China and America’s Coming Battle for Southeast Asia

By Peter Chalk

Источник: http://www.nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/china-americas-coming-battle-southeast-asia-12427?page=show

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has declared its intent to establish a fully integrated Community that extends across the economic, political, security and social realms by the end of 2015. Such a regional arrangement would, for the first time, provide the countries of Southeast Asia with a single regime of intergovernmental collaboration that can be used to draft, implement and refine joint policies and courses of action. That would greatly facilitate future proactive planning and aid the development of comprehensive and codified forms of supranational cooperation and governance.

The main aim of those changes is to better situate ASEAN to achieve its core goal of “centrality”—a term coined to emphasize how internal cohesion can be leveraged to both advance economic progress and manage the Association’s relations with external partners.

One external variable that’s likely to bear heavily on the trajectory of the proposed ASEAN community is the influence of an increasingly assertive People’s Republic of China (PRC). The country is now the pre-eminent power in the Asia-Pacific and its ties with the Association have grown substantially over the past 25 years. Both factors imbue Beijing with a real potential to sway the future course of ASEAN integration.

In economic terms, the PRC’s overall impact is likely to be largely positive. Since the signing of a strategic partnership agreement in 2003, bilateral fiscal and commerce relations have boomed and over the past decade the two-way flow of goods and services has increased more than six-fold—topping $400 million in 2013. The growth and prosperity of ASEAN and China will be highly contingent on further expanding that mutually beneficial economic partnership, something the two sides no doubt fully appreciate.

In the political and security realm, there’s far less certainty in ASEAN perceptions of China. This is especially true with regards to the PRC’s strategic intentions in Southeast Asia. Concerns that anti-access/area denial platforms may be used to restrict access in the South China Sea or to institute a regional order that’s determined in Beijing could encourage ASEAN’s littoral states to look to Washington—rather than the Association itself—as the ultimate guarantor of national and wider defense in this part of the world.

Beijing’s soft power is also relevant for ASEAN’s social and cultural integration, although the extent of that influence is difficult to determine. On the one hand, China’s official emphasis on peaceful development and shared Asian values would seem to fit well with ASEAN’s own commitment to stability and unity. On the other, the PRC’s effort to position itself diplomatically as a non-threatening power has fallen foul of a central administration that in many ways lacks self-awareness—something that’s been especially true with regards to its uncompromising stance on territorial disputes in the South China Sea.

To be successful, the ASEAN Community will also require considerable backing from the U.S.—the other major power in Southeast Asia.

Washington has three main reasons to support the development of an ASEAN Community. First, economic integration will help to enhance growing and significant bilateral trade and investment ties. Second, promoting a more multilateral approach to security cooperation would directly contribute to burden sharing. Third, a fully integrated ASEAN would help to balance China and India, assure access to critical shipping lanes in the South China Sea and bring greater symmetry to important East Asian forums that involve American representatives.

There are several ways that the U.S. could help to support the institutional development of the ASEAN Community. Economically, it could deepen regional integration and buttress trade liberalization by expanding the Association’s membership in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). On the political and security front, the U.S. could provide input to the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting’s current deliberations by suggesting joint endeavours that support military interoperability. Finally, American soft power could be employed to promote programs that are designed to fully engage civil society across ASEAN.

Although the PRC and U.S. are both in a position to influence the process of ASEAN integration, ultimately it will be up to the Association itself to cement internal cohesion, achieve centrality and thereby remain a relevant player in the emerging Asian order. In this respect uncertainties remain, as in many ways the bloc’s member states continue to follow the age-old principles of unanimity, non-interference and informality that have traditionally shaped the manner by which they act and conducts business.

Now in its sixties, ASEAN sits at a critical juncture that could see it either occupying the driver’s seat in future regional cooperation or being marginalised as a relic of the past.

Blinders, Blunders, and Wars

What America and China Can Learn

by David C. Gompert, Hans Binnendijk, Bonny Lin

Источник: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR768.html

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The history of wars caused by misjudgments, from Napoleon’s invasion of Russia to America’s invasion of Iraq, reveals that leaders relied on cognitive models, or simplified representations of their worlds, that were seriously at odds with objective reality. Blinders, Blunders, and Wars analyzes eight historical examples of strategic blunders regarding war and peace and four examples of decisions that turned out well, and then applies those lessons to the current Sino-American case. Leaders’ egos, intuitions, unwarranted self-confidence, and aversion to information that contradicted their views prevented them from correcting their models. Yet advisors and bureaucracies can be inadequate safeguards and can, out of fawning or fear, reinforce leaders’ flawed thinking.

War between China and the United States is more likely to occur by blunder than from rational premeditation. Yet flawed Chinese and American cognitive models of one another are creating strategic distrust, which could increase the danger of misjudgment by either or both, the likelihood of crises, and the possibility of war. Although these American and Chinese leaders have unprecedented access to information, there is no guarantee they will use it well when faced with choices concerning war and peace. They can learn from Blinders, Blunders, and Wars.

As a general remedy, the authors recommend the establishment of a government body providing independent analysis and advice on war-and-peace decisions by critiquing information use, assumptions, assessments, reasoning, options, and plans. For the Sino-U.S. case, they offer a set of measures to bring the models each has of the other into line with objective reality.

Key Findings

Strategic Blunders Can Happen When Leaders Rely on Defective Cognitive Models of Reality and Have No One to Correct Them.

Strategic blunders can result from faulty intuition, egotism, arrogance, hubris, grand but flawed strategic ideas, underestimating the enemy and the difficulties and duration of conflict, overconfidence in war plans, ignoring what could go wrong, stifling debate, shunning independent advice, and penalizing dissent.
These conditions are especially dangerous when combined with excessive risk taking based on an overestimation of one’s ability to control events.
The Key to Bridging the Gap Between a Defective Model and Objective Reality Is Information, Amply Supplied and Well Used.

Decisionmakers may be more receptive to information that supports rather than threatens their beliefs, preconceptions, and models.
Institutions close to decisionmakers can be drawn into the same subjective perception of reality.
Government institutions are not dependable safeguards against strategic mistakes.
Improvements are needed in how leaders and institutions use information so that better cognitive models will enable them to make better choices.
Recommendations

Form a strategic advisory body within the National Security Council with access to all intelligence and the best possible analytic capabilities. This body would be obligated to provide the President and the rest of the National Security Council with impartial analysis of underlying beliefs, objectives, assumptions, estimates of the adversary, prospects for success, options, contingencies, and risks. The process would be covered by executive privilege, but the body’s output would be a matter of historical and eventually public record.
The strategic advisory body should set and insist on the highest standards of analytic objectivity and rigor. The entity would be responsible for reviewing the integrity of the analysis conducted by the institutions responsible for staffing the decisionmaker (such as the State Department, the Department of Defense, and the National Security Council).
The independent analysis performed for and by the strategic advisory body should make use of proven enhancements in analyst-computer teaming capabilities and methods.
The presidents of the United States and China should form the sort of relationship that goes well beyond occasional summits and having a hotline. The two need a facility for communication and a rapport.
Institutional connections between the United States and China should go beyond the existing U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue with the goal of mining information from institutional links that can correct errors in models of reality and prevent blunders.
Intellectual connectivity should continue to expand, especially as it involves Chinese and American strategic communities.

Improving Standoff Bombing Capacity in the Face of Anti-Access Area Denial Threats

by Jordan Rozsa

September 2015

Источник: http://www.rand.org/pubs/rgs_dissertations/RGSD363.html

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The threat environment of the 21st century consists of increasing numbers of advanced anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) defense systems which place significant pressure on the current United States Air Force (USAF) bomber fleet. In a scenario with A2/AD systems, conventional USAF bombers will likely be relegated to a standoff role. The ability of the current bomber inventory to handle the challenges of stressing combat scenarios remains in question. This research seeks to address the issue of whether or not there is a capability gap given certain threat scenarios and how the Air Force could allocate resources to alleviate this potential capability gap. The primary aircraft alternatives considered are commercial-derivative and military cargo-derivative arsenal aircraft. Demand for and effectiveness of arsenal aircraft alternatives are assessed through parametric and exploratory analysis. Costs are analyzed using multivariate regression analysis and cost analogies. These methods provide cost-effectiveness comparisons among a variety of USAF policy options. Meeting warfighting demands highlighted in this report would be well served by developing new types of cruise missiles and procuring them in sufficient quantities. Improving weapon effectiveness will significantly decrease target demand by a factor of up to 5.6, varying by target set. If arsenal aircraft are procured to deliver these standoff weapons, the C-17 is the most cost-effective option due to avoidance of development costs, although there would be penalties incurred for reopening the production line. The B-1 and B-52 aircraft should be replaced early to eliminate high operating costs associated with the aging fleet. Using existing cargo aircraft (C-130, C-17, and C-5) for these missions as dual role aircraft yields minimal costs compared to procuring new aircraft.

The Syrian Refugee Crisis and U.S. National Security

by Seth G. Jones

Testimony presented before the House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Immigration and Border Security on November 19, 2015

Источник: http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT444.html

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US Strategy in Africa

By Peter Pham, Bronwyn Bruton

February 4, 2015

Atlantic Council Africa Center Director J. Peter Pham and Deputy Director Bronwyn Bruton contributed essays to a French Ministry of Defense study on US strategy in Africa.

Источник: http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/articles/j-peter-pham-and-bronwyn-bruton-write-on-us-strategy-in-africa

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Pham, in his essay entitled «AFRICOM’s Evolution from Bush to Obama,» argues, «Under any circumstances, the birth of the new command would not have been easy. To many Africans with memories of liberation struggles still fresh in their minds, the very idea smacked of a neo-colonial effort to dominate the continent anew…To others who recall the cyclic nature of past U.S. engagements, it was a question of the long-term sustainability of the effort. Still others, noting the increased attention paid by U.S. analysts to the role in Africa being played by relative newcomers to the continent like China and India, worry about the possible polarization of the continent in some sort of new scramble between the great powers of the 21st century. To his credit, General Ward…allayed many of these concerns and laid the groundwork for General Ham and General Rodriguez, who have strengthened relationships with African partners to create a more operationally focused AFRICOM. The election of Barack Obama, an event which was met with genuine enthusiasm across the continent, likewise also helped. However, what has probably done the most to win AFRICOM a place and, indeed, at least grudging acceptance across Africa is perhaps the fact that African states and individuals discovered that it was not what they feared it to be, but rather it was both a continuation of already existent security engagements and the opportunity to enhance them in their own interests even as America pursued her own.»

Bruton, in the essay she co-wrote with Paul D. Williams entitled «The Hidden Costs of Outsourcing the ‘War on Terrorism’ in Africa,» writes «If the United States avoids the temptation to drag regional proxies into other countries’ wars, al Qaeda will have a much harder time convincing Africa’s rebels that their causes are part of the global jihad. In turn, the fight against terrorism in Africa will become easier to win.»

The study was published by the Institut de Recherche Stratégique de l’Ecole Militaire and edited by Maya Kandel.

Lead Mr. Obama, Please Lead

By Harlan Ullman

February 11, 2015

Источник: http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/articles/lead-mr-obama-please-lead

The White House’s National Security Strategy (NSS) was unveiled last Friday, the first since 2010. Against the backdrop of crises abroad and economic uncertainties at home, the NSS will attract little attention beyond Beltway policy aficionados. Despite the recurring mantra of American leadership, the NSS is long on ambition and citing lofty aims and very short on the substance of how to achieve them through well defined and thought out strategies.

Of course, other political time bombs dominate the agenda. At home, the President’s budget with about an 11% real spending increase landed on Capitol Hill, immediately declared by the Republican majority as dead on arrival. Overseas, Ukraine grabbed the headlines away from the latest horrors committed by the Islamic State (IS). German Chancellor Angela Merkel and France’s President Francois Hollande rushed to Moscow to confront President Vladimir Putin over the Ukraine crisis now that Washington is considering or threatening to arm Kiev with defensive weapons. Mr. Obama’s absence was palpable even though the visit so far has had no visible effect on Mr. Putin.

Returning to the NSS, the President’s strategy for destroying IS has been properly adjusted to the more achievable goal of «defeating» it. Likewise, the highly publicized «strategic pivot to Asia» has also been downgraded to «rebalancing» to the Pacific. But the crises that preoccupy the globe are almost entirely outside Asia. For the foreseeable future, that condition will not change meaning rebalancing must be for the longer term. The debate over Ukraine reinforces the need to focus on crises elsewhere.

Perhaps most surprisingly is the NSS’s elevation of four priorities. These include placing far greater attention on countering pandemics such as Ebola; the scourge of global poverty; climate change; and cyber threats. Each is a noble goal. But how each is to be integrated into American priorities and then fit into an overarching and well-resourced strategy is left to the NSS reader’s imagination.

The NSS however is loaded with assertions about U.S. leadership and «leading» is probably the most overworked word in the document. After taking great credit for rejuvenating the U.S. economy through job creation and massive reductions in unemployment, the NSS was a veritable advertisement praising American entrepreneurial, academic and innovative excellence all accelerated by White House policy. Reality is somewhat different for the middle and lower economic classes and the many millions who either left the job market or could only find part time work.

The impact of this document and indeed to the reaction to many of Mr. Obama’s major domestic and international initiatives from promoting tax and entitlement reform to shifting the Russian reset button to more «reassertive» policies provokes one to ask «where is the beef?» Setting lofty goals is fine. But creating effective solutions is a more important matter.

As Napoleon advised, if you are going to take Vienna, then damn well take Vienna. Do not pussy foot around. If the president is going to lead, then lead.

Here is some advice. A new version of the old Nixon Doctrine is needed. That doctrine held that the U.S. assumed responsibilities for strategic stability and security. Regional states would assume increasing burdens for local security. A 21st century version will demand more effort on partnerships—recognized in the NSS as vital. But these partnerships have not been well defined and in some cases invented.

In the Middle East, the Gulf Cooperation Council, relying on Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the UAE, must form the nucleus against IS, engaging Egypt and Turkey as well. To bring Turkey aboard, a no-fly zone over (parts of) Syria must be established. The real strategic value will be to increase pressure on Bashar al Assad to reach some form of political accommodation with the opposition and al Nusra/IS forces as the no-fly zone will clearly inhibit Damascus’ ability to wage the battle through the air.

Creating a pan-Arab-Sunni-GCC ground force is likewise essential as a signal and threat to IS as well as to encourage Iraq both to expedite the integration of Sunnis into and the retraining of its army. That means establishing a clear-cut chain of command and responsibilities for action in Washington and among the 62 state strong coalitions and establishing a specific headquarters in the region now. But real presidential leadership is the missing ingredient if any structure and discipline are to be imposed on the means to defeat IS.

If Mr. Obama can become the force for mobilizing coalition responses by leading both from the front and where necessary from behind with real rather than vague strategies and promises, IS is doomed. If not, this will be as a former secretary of defense famously mused «a long, hard slog.»

Dr. Harlan Ullman is Senior Advisor at both the Atlantic Council and Business Executives for National Security in Washington, DC whose latest book «A Handful of Bullets—How the Murder of Archduke Franz Ferdinand Still Menaces the Peace» advances these and other recommendations.

Artful Balance: The Future of US Defense Strategy and Force Posture in the Gulf

By Bilal Y. Saab And Barry Pavel

March 23, 2015

Источник: http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/reports/artful-balance-the-future-of-us-defense-strategy-and-force-posture-in-the-gulf

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A strategic review of US defense strategy and force posture in the Gulf is long overdue. In Artful Balance: Future US Defense Strategy and Force Posture in the Gulf, Bilal Y. Saab, Resident Senior Fellow for Middle East Security at the Atlantic Council’s Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, and Barry Pavel, Vice President and Director of the Scowcroft Center, analyze how historic changes and developing trends in Washington, the Middle East, and across the globe—along with Iran’s nuclear ambitions and asymmetric threat—are all affecting US defense strategy in the Gulf.

Saab and Pavel argue that it is more critical than ever that US defense strategy in the Gulf be designed around reassuring partners, deterring adversaries, continuing to conduct counterterrorism missions, and advancing needed political development to help dry up the sources of extremism and promote internal stability. Underwriting a new force posture in the region to support that strategy effectively is just as important. The authors propose a more flexible and dynamic force posture in the Gulf that can help protect US long-term interests and those of its partners. To achieve this, they recommend a series of incremental improvements to current US posture to increase its geographical distribution, operational resiliency, political sustainability, and tactical robustness.

Saab and Pavel’s recommendations include:

  • propose and then negotiate an offer of a mutual defense treaty with willing Arab Gulf states
  • reduce the visibility, predictability, and vulnerability of US forces in the Gulf by further dispersing them, diversifying patterns of deployment, and exploring new basing concepts
  • emphasize the maritime character of future US force posture in the Gulf by improving maritime defenses, anti-fast attack and craft capabilities, mine countermeasure capabilities, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities
  • intensify security cooperation with Gulf partners, in order for them to improve their self-defense capabilities and carry a greater share of the burden

Dynamic Stability: US Strategy for a World in Transition

By Barry Pavel, Peter Engelke, And Alex Ward

April 22, 2015

Источник: http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/reports/dynamic-stability-us-strategy-for-a-world-in-transition

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We have entered a new era in world history, a post-post-Cold War era that holds both great promise and great peril for the United States, its allies, and everyone else. We now can call this a «Westphalian-Plus» world, in which nation-states will have to engage on two distinct levels: dealing with other nation-states as before, and dealing with a vast array of important nonstate actors. This era calls for a new approach to national strategy called «dynamic stability.»

The authors of this paper—Atlantic Council Vice President and Scowcroft Center Director Barry Pavel and Senior Fellow Peter Engelke, with the help of Assistant Director Alex Ward—kick off the Atlantic Council Strategy Paper series by telling the United States to seek stability while leveraging dynamic trends at the same time. The central task facing America is «to harness change in order to save the system,» meaning the preservation of the rules-based international order that has benefited billions around the world, including Americans themselves, since 1945. Within its pages, the paper outlines the components of strategy in a swiftly-changing world.

Conflict and Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region: A Strategic Net Assessment

Michael D. Swaine, Nicholas Eberstadt, M. Taylor Fravel, Mikkal Herberg, Albert Keidel, Evans J. R. Revere, Alan D. Romberg, Eleanor Freund, Rachel Esplin Odell, Audrye Wong

April 2, 2015

Источник: http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/04/02/conflict-and-cooperation-in-asia-pacific-region-strategic-net-assessment/i560

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The Asia-Pacific region is undergoing enormous change, fueled by high levels of economic growth and deepening levels of integration. These and other forces are generating a shift in the distribution of economic, political, and military power across the region. This changing security environment poses a major challenge for the United States, the historically dominant power in maritime Asia. Efforts to enhance regional cooperation, reassure allies, and deter and shape potentially destabilizing behavior are demanding a more complex mixture of U.S. skills and understanding. An array of current and likely long-term forces will drive both cooperation and conflict across the Asia-Pacific region.

Key Findings

There are five different security environments that could emerge in the Asia-Pacific region over the next twenty-five years (in order of likelihood):

  1. Status Quo Redux: Constrained economic and political competition alongside continuing cooperation
  2. Asia-Pacific Cold War: Deepening regional bipolarization and militarization, driven by a worsening U.S.-China strategic and economic rivalry
  3. Pacific Asia-Pacific: Reduced tension and increased U.S.-China and regional cooperation
  4. Asian Hot Wars: Episodic but fairly frequent military conflict in critical hot spots, emerging against a cold war backdrop
  5. Challenged Region: A region beset by social, economic, and political instability and unrest separate from U.S.-China competition

Risks in the Evolving Security Environment

  • The primary risk: movement toward the conflictual side of the Status Quo Redux security environment due to an uncertain pattern of economic, political, and military multipolarity and a divergence in opinion concerning the proper distribution of power
  • A shift in resources toward security competition
  • Increased tests of resolve and political-military crises
  • A United States embroiled in third-party disputes
  • Greater challenges to the U.S. alliance system
  • Exclusionary political and economic arrangements
  • Domestic instability and regime collapse in North Korea
  • Domestic instability and ultranationalism in China
  • U.S. miscalculations in response to a more assertive China

Factors That Could Restrain or Eliminate Risks

  • Common support for sustaining economic growth
  • The absence of existential disputes
  • Enduring U.S. strength
  • The possibility of a more flexible China
  • Cooperation in dealing with North Korea
  • Collaboration in addressing transnational threats

Steps the United States Can Take to Avert Conflict

Identify U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific. U.S. agencies should identify the United States’ longterm primary, secondary, and tertiary strategic interests in the Asia-Pacific.

Conduct an unprecedented U.S.-China strategic dialogue. An ongoing, government-supported but unofficial track 2 effort could eventually feed into a more formal track 1.5 dialogue in the military and diplomatic realms.

Undertake a range of strategic assurances between the United States and China. A variety of specific reciprocal and joint actions should be considered as near- to medium-term initiatives to provide greater strategic reassurance between Washington and Beijing.

Clarify and strengthen the U.S. position on maritime disputes. In the South China Sea, Washington should encourage all sides to lower the perceived value of the disputed islands by delineating joint fishing, hydrocarbon, seabed minerals, and environmental protection zones. The United States should also encourage the disputants to enhance crisis management.

Coordinate a force for sea lines of communication (SLOC) defense. Washington should undertake a sustained effort to establish a joint maritime force involving the United States, China, and other Asian states in SLOC defense.

Provide greater support for crisis management mechanisms. These mechanisms could help avert or manage future political-military crises over maritime territorial disputes and other contentious issues.

Establish a forum for the discussion of energy security issues. Such a forum would be a vital channel for addressing tensions over the control of energy resources and transportation routes in the region.

Strengthen engagement with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and with individual member states. The United States should promote a U.S.-ASEAN free trade agreement and strengthen ASEAN institutions by endorsing their role as action-oriented bodies that are able to tackle regional issues.

 

U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress

Shirley A. Kan

October 27, 2014

Источник: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/index.html

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This CRS Report, updated through the 113th Congress, discusses policy issues regarding military-to-military (mil-to-mil) contacts with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and records major contacts and crises since 1993. The United States suspended military contacts with China and imposed sanctions on arms sales in response to the Tiananmen Crackdown in 1989. In 1993, President Clinton reengaged with the top PRC leadership, including China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Renewed military exchanges with the PLA have not regained the
closeness reached in the 1980s, when U.S.-PRC strategic alignment against the Soviet Union
included U.S. arms sales to China. Improvements and deteriorations in overall bilateral
engagement have affected military contacts, which were close in 1997-1998 and 2000, but marred by the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, mistaken NATO bombing of a PRC embassy in 1999, the EP-3 aircraft collision crisis in 2001, and the PLA’s aggressive maritime and air confrontations.
Issues for Congress include whether the Administration complies with legislation overseeing
dealings with the PLA and pursues contacts with the PLA that advance a prioritized set of U.S.
security interests, especially the operational safety of U.S. military personnel. Oversight
legislation includes the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY1990-FY1991 (P.L. 101-246)
and National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2000 (P.L. 106-65). A particular issue is
whether the President is required to issue waivers of sanctions. Skeptics and proponents of
military exchanges with the PRC have debated whether the contacts achieve results in U.S.
objectives and whether the contacts contribute to the PLA’s warfighting capability that might
harm U.S. and allied security interests. Some have argued about whether the value that U.S.
officials place on the contacts overly extends leverage to the PLA. Some believe talks can serve
U.S. interests that include risk-reduction or conflict-avoidance; military-civilian coordination;
transparency and reciprocity; tension reduction over Taiwan; weapons nonproliferation; talks on nuclear, missile, space, and/or cyber domains; counterterrorism; and POW/MIA accounting.
Policy makers could review the approach to mil-to-mil contacts, given concerns about potential
crises and conflicts. U.S. officials have faced challenges in gaining cooperation from the PLA.
The PLA has tried to use its suspensions of exchanges while blaming U.S.-only “obstacles”
(including arms sales to Taiwan, FY2000 NDAA, and air and naval reconnaissance operations).
The PRC’s harassment of U.S. ships and increasing assertiveness in maritime disputes showed
some limits to mil-to-mil engagement, similar views, and PLA restraint. The U.S. articulations in
2011-2012 of a strategic “rebalancing” to the Asia-Pacific raised an issue of how to deal with
China’s challenges. The Administration’s “rebalance” entails not only expanded engagement with the PLA, but also increasing exercises. The PLA Navy’s invited participation for the first time in the U.S. Navy-led multinational exercise, RIMPAC, based at Hawaii in summer 2014 raised
concerns in Congress and elsewhere. The U.S. Navy has increased some “interoperability” with
the PLA Navy. The Defense Secretary issued the latest required annual report on June 5, 2014,
concerning military and security developments involving the PRC, cooperation, and military-tomilitary contacts. The report noted that the PLA uses combined exercises to improve capabilities by learning from more advanced militaries and asserted that the Defense Department complies with the FY2000 NDAA in all military contacts with China. An issue concerns whether the U.S.
Air Force should send a C-17 transport aircraft to the Zhuhai Air Show in China in November.
Legislation in the 113th Congress includes the FY2014 NDAA (P.L. 113-66); FY2014 Defense
Appropriations Act (H.R. 2397); Asia-Pacific Region Priority Act, H.R. 4495 (Forbes); FY2015
NDAA, H.R. 4435 (McKeon), S. 2410 (Levin), and H.Res. 643 (Chabot).

Crux of Asia: China, India, and the Emerging Global Order

Ashley J. Tellis, Sean Mirski

January 10, 2013

Источник: http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/01/10/crux-of-asia-china-india-and-emerging-global-order/hhmj

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A close examination of Chinese and Indian perspectives reveals stark Sino-Indian differences on many of today’s most pressing international issues.

The rise of China and India as major world powers promises to test the established global order in the coming decades. As the two powers grow, they are bound to change the current international system—with profound implications for themselves, the United States, and the world. And whether they agree on the changes to be made, especially when it comes to their relationship with the West, will influence the system’s future character. A close examination of Chinese and Indian perspectives on the fundamentals of the emerging international order reveals that Sino-Indian differences on many issues of both bilateral and global significance are stark.

The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11

Amy Belasco

December 8, 2014

Источник: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/index.html

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With enactment of the FY2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act on January 1, 2014 (H.R.
3547/P.L. 113-73), Congress has approved appropriations for the past 13 years of war that total
$1.6 trillion for military operations, base support, weapons maintenance, training of Afghan and
Iraq security forces, reconstruction, foreign aid, embassy costs, and veterans’ health care for the
war operations initiated since the 9/11 attacks.
Of this $1.6 trillion total, CRS estimates that the total is distributed as follows:
• $686 billion (43%) for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) for Afghanistan and
other counterterror operations received;
• $815 billion (51%) for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)/Operation New Dawn
(OND);
• $27 billion (2%) for Operation Noble Eagle (ONE), providing enhanced security
at military bases; and
• $81 billion (5%) for war-designated funding not considered directly related to the
Afghanistan or Iraq wars.
About 92% of the funds are for Department of Defense (DOD), 6% for State Department foreign
aid programs and diplomatic operations, 1% for Department of Veterans Administration’s medical care for veterans. In addition, 5% of the funds (across agencies) are for programs and activities tangentially-related to war operations.
The FY2015 war request for DOD, State/USAID, and Veterans Administration Medical totals
$73.5 billion including $58.1 billion for Afghanistan, $5.0 billion for Iraq, $ 100 million for
enhanced security, and $10.4 billion for other war-designated funding. These totals do not reflect the new FY2015 request submitted in November 2014 to cover expenses for Operations Inherent Resolve (OIR) that began with airstrikes launched in late August 2014, to aid Syrian insurgents and the Iraq government to counter the takeover of territory by the Islamic State (IS). The Administration submitted a $5.5 billion FY2015 budget amendment for this operation that
Congress is considering. Including the new request, the FY2015 war funding now totals $79.0
billion.
In late May 2014, the President announced that troop levels in Afghanistan would fall from
33,000 to 9,800 by January 1, 2015 with the U.S. role focusing on advising Afghan security
forces and conducting counter-terror operations. A year later, by January 1, 2016, the President
stated that the number of troops in Afghanistan would halve to about 4,900 and then by the
beginning of 2017, settle at an embassy presence of about 1,000.
Overall U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan and Iraq began to decline with the withdrawal of all U.S.
troops from Iraq by December 2011. The troop decline continued with President Obama’s
announcement in February 2013 that the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan would halve from 67,000 to 34,000 by February 2014. Annual war costs also decreased from a peak of $195 billion in FY2008 to $95 billion enacted in FY2014. After the reversal of the 2009 Afghanistan surge, the President promised in the 2013 State of the Union address that “our troops will continue coming home at a steady pace as Afghan security forces move into the lead [and] our mission will change from combat to support.” He also stated that by “2014, this process of transition will be complete, and the Afghan people will be responsible for their own security.”
The FY2015 Continuing Resolution (H.J.Res. 124/P.L. 113-164) sets war funding at the FY2014
enacted level of $95.5 billion, which exceeds the FY2015 amended request (with OIR) by about
$16.5 billion. The CR expires on December 11, 2014, and Congress is expected to enact another
CR or an Omnibus appropriations act for the rest of the fiscal year.
Congress may face several budgetary issues about how to respond to the FY2015 war request and longer-term war cost issues including:
• assessing the amount, purposes, and level of funding to support U.S. troops
during the post-2014 drawdown;
• evaluating the Administration proposal for a new flexible funding account that
would provide $5 billion for a Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTFP) to
respond to unspecified “evolving threats from South Asia to the Sahel” by
“building partnership capacity” through Train & Equip programs;
• defining what is an appropriate war-related cost as opposed to what is in the base,
non-war budget, a choice made more difficult in part by the potential squeeze on
agencies’ base budgets that are subject to Budget Control Act spending limits
(P.L. 112-25);
• estimating the potential long-term cost of the war, including repairing and
replacing war-worn equipment and maintaining an “enduring presence” that
could entail a substantial footprint in the region; and
• responding to the November 2014 request for $5.5 billion for Operation Inherent
Resolve, the new operation to counter the Islamic State.
There are some indications that the FY2015 DOD war funding request may be more than is
needed in light of FY2014 experience when expenses for returning troops and equipment have
proven to be lower and the pace faster than anticipated. If expenses are lower and withdrawal is faster than anticipated, the FY2015 request may also include excess funds that could be used to pay for part or all of the new $5.5 billion request to counter the Islamic State. Savings in FY2015 could be partly offset by the recent announcement by Secretary Hagel that up to 1,000 U.S. troops could be kept in Afghanistan until the spring of 2015 to substitute for a delay in NATO troops being available to provide needed support.
Members have raised various concerns about the broad authorities requested for the new CTPF, which exceed current authorities for other Train & Equip programs. The conference version of the FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act, H.R. 3797, reduces the funding and rejects most of the new authorities requested. Other concerns include the lack of evidence of success in previous similar programs, particularly in situations like the complex political-military environment in Syria and Iraq.
Congress may wish to consider ways to restrict war-funding to exclude activities marginally
related to war operations and support, and to limit the use of ground troops in Operation Inherent Resolve.

Preview this publication China’s Military and the U.S.-Japan Alliance in 2030: A Strategic Net Assessment

Michael D. Swaine, Mike M. Mochizuki, Michael L. Brown, Paul S. Giarra, Douglas H. Paal, Rachel Esplin Odell, Raymond Lu, Oliver Palmer, Xu Ren

May 3, 2013

Источник: http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/05/03/china-s-military-and-u.s.-japan-alliance-in-2030-strategic-net-assessment/i85g

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The emergence of the People’s Republic of China as an increasingly significant military power in the Western Pacific presents major implications for Japan, the U.S.-Japan alliance, and regional security. But a comprehensive assessment of the current and possible future impact of China’s military capabilities and foreign security policies on Tokyo and the alliance, along with a detailed examination of the capacity and willingness of both the United States and Japan to respond to this challenge, is missing from the current debate. Such an analysis is essential for Washington and Tokyo to better evaluate the best approaches for maintaining deterrence credibility and regional stability over the long term.

Key Findings

    • The most likely potential challenge to the U.S.-Japan alliance over the next fifteen to twenty years does not involve full-scale military conflict between China and Japan or the United States—for example, one originating from Chinese efforts to expel Washington from the region.
    • ƒƒ The likeliest challenge instead stems from Beijing’s growing coercive power—increasing Chinese military capabilities could enable Beijing to influence or attempt to resolve disputes with Tokyo in its favor short of military attack.
    • ƒƒ An increase in the People’s Liberation Army’s presence in airspace and waters near Japan and disputed territories could also heighten the risk of destabilizing political-military crises.
    • ƒƒ Significant absolute and possibly relative shifts in the military balance between China and the alliance in Japan’s vicinity are likely.
    • ƒƒ In the most probable future scenarios facing these three actors, the U.S.-Japan alliance will either only narrowly retain military superiority in the airspace and waters near Japan or the balance will become uncertain at best.
    • ƒƒ A significant drop in the potential threat posed by China is also possible if the Chinese economy falters and Beijing redirects its attention and resources toward maintaining internal stability.
  • ƒƒ More dramatic shifts in the strategic landscape are unlikely in the fifteen- to twenty-year time frame. Such shifts include an Asian cold war pitting a normalized U.S.-Japan alliance against a belligerent China and a major withdrawal of U.S. presence that heralds either the dawning of a Sino-centric Asia or the emergence of intense Sino-Japanese rivalry with Japanese nuclearization.

U.S. and Japanese Policy Responses

There are no “silver bullets.” No regional or alliance response can single-handedly deliver a stable military or political balance at minimal cost to all parties involved. Each of the major conceivable responses to these future challenges in the regional security environment will likely require painful trade-offs and, in some cases, the adoption of radically new ways of thinking about the roles and missions of both the U.S. and Japanese militaries.

Three general political-military responses offer viable ways to advance allied interests over the long term.

    • Robust Forward Presence: This deterrence-centered response is designed to retain unambiguous allied regional primacy through either highly ambitious and forward-deployment-based military concepts, such as Air-Sea Battle, or approaches more oriented toward long-range blockades, such as Offshore Control.
    • Conditional Offense/Defense: This primacy-oriented response nonetheless avoids both preemptive, deep strikes against the Chinese mainland or obvious containment-type blockades and stresses both deterrence and reassurance in a more equal manner.
  • Defensive Balancing: This response emphasizes mutual area denial, places a greater reliance on lower visibility and rear-deployed forces, and aims to establish a more genuinely balanced and cooperative power relationship with China in the Western Pacific.

These responses could be complicated by a number of factors.

    • Limits on the ability of Japan or other nations in the Asia-Pacific region to advance substantive security cooperation or embark on major security enhancements
    • ƒƒ Unwillingness in the U.S. military to alter doctrinal assumptions in operating in the Western Pacific ƒƒ China’s own suspicions of alliance efforts that might constrain the use of its growing capabilities
  • Low tolerance among stakeholders for uncertainty and even failure during political or diplomatic negotiations over vital security interests

The status quo is likely to prove unsustainable. Despite the potential complications, Washington and Tokyo must seriously evaluate these possible responses. Current economic and military trends in China, Japan, and the United States suggest that existing policies and strategies might fail to ensure a stable security environment conducive to U.S. and Japanese interests over the long term.

Advance Praise

“The Asia century is well under way, and with it the emerging challenges of a region in transition…. Any sound future policy will require a thorough assessment of China’s evolving military and foreign security capabilities and of the capacity and willingness of Tokyo and Washington to sustain their historic cooperation. There are no guarantees that the future will resemble the recent past, and the best approaches for continued deterrence credibility and regional stability will require careful consideration and thoughtful analysis.

To this end, the Carnegie Endowment has offered up an extraordinary contribution: China’s Military and the U.S.-Japan Alliance in 2030: A Strategic Net Assessment. The future security and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region may very well be defined by the content of this assessment. But one thing is certain: the United States and Japan must recognize that in the future, status quo thinking is unlikely to guarantee a stable security environment that serves the long-term interests of the bilateral relationship or the region.”

—Governor Jon Huntsman Jr., former ambassador to China and former governor of Utah

“Michael Swaine and his co-authors have done an admirable job of thinking through the complex interactions of the U.S.-Japan-China relationship in the future. Using scenarios and trend projections, they go beyond simple predictions to examine the complex interactions of different developments and reactions among the three countries and different groups within them. While I do not agree with specific military and policy judgments in all the scenarios, I strongly endorse the effort to examine potential developments along with likely and possible reactions and counterreactions. The triangular interactive relations among these great Asian powers will determine both the overall future of the region and much of the futures of each of the individual countries.”

—Admiral Dennis Blair (U.S. Navy, retired), former director of national intelligence and former commander of the U.S. Pacific Command

“The U.S.-Japan alliance has long been crucial to the military balance in the Western Pacific. The balance of power in the region is now shifting toward China, and tensions between Asian states are rising concomitantly. Current trends suggest that the United States and Japan will not find it easy to sustain immunity from coercion as they seek to preserve stability, secure their national interests, and manage crises in the region over the coming years. This study is a remarkably timely, thoughtful, and meticulous examination of the drivers and choices the allies will face through 2030. It illuminates probable shifts in the strategic landscape of northeast Asia, their consequences, and the policy and resource allocation choices they pose. In this strategic net assessment, the scholars Carnegie assembled have given decisionmakers in Tokyo and Washington a uniquely insightful and thought-provoking policy-planning tool.”

—Ambassador Chas W. Freeman Jr. (U.S. Foreign Service, retired), former assistant secretary of defense

“There is nothing out there like this—a very important piece of work…. This is an elegantly framed study that systematically assesses the postures of China, Japan, and the United States and treats the dynamics between them. Obviously, this is tough to execute, but the authors have done an outstanding job. The report addresses a critical subject and offers empirically based suggestions…. There is nothing like it in terms of looking at the interactions between states to produce a set of possible future regional dynamics.”

—Eric Heginbotham, senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation

The authors would like to thank the Japan Ground Self Defense Forces Research and Development Command NAT Project for translating the executive summary into Japanese.

U.S.-China Security Perceptions Survey: Findings and Implications

Michael D. Swaine, Rachel Esplin Odell, Luo Yuan, Liu Xiangdong

December 12, 2013

Источник: http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/12/12/u.s.-china-security-perceptions-survey-findings-and-implications/gvqk#

Public and elite attitudes in the United States and especially China are exerting a growing influence on the bilateral security relationship.

Public and elite attitudes in the United States and especially China are exerting a growing influence on the bilateral security relationship. The U.S.-China Security Perceptions Project analyzes the content of these attitudes through original surveys and workshops conducted in both countries. The project’s findings have implications for policymakers seeking to reduce the likelihood of future bilateral conflicts.

Survey Findings

    • There is a low level of strategic trust between the United States and China, which could make bilateral relations more turbulent.
    • Despite this lack of mutual trust, only small minorities of all respondents in both countries saw the other country as an enemy. A majority of U.S. and Chinese elites and the American public as well as a plurality of the Chinese public viewed the other country as a competitor. Substantial minorities of all respondents saw the other country as a partner.
    • Majorities of all U.S. and Chinese respondents felt their own country should play a shared leadership role in the international system. Majorities of U.S. elites thought the world would be more stable if the United States remains the leading superpower, but Chinese elites felt that a balance of power between Washington and Beijing would be more conducive to global stability.
    • U.S. and Chinese elites prioritized strengthening the bilateral relationship, with an emphasis on improved economic cooperation.
  • Chinese respondents—especially government elites—cited U.S. arms sales to Taiwan as a major source of tension. U.S. elites—especially retired military officers and business elites—saw alleged Chinese cyberattacks and intellectual property infringement as particularly problematic.

Recommendations for U.S. and Chinese Policymakers

Emphasize cooperation over competition. Capitalize on support among elites in both countries for strengthening bilateral ties. Sustained top-level leadership is needed to build public support and provide a strong foundation for managing potential crises in the relationship.

Keep extremist views in perspective. Most respondents were not hawkish or adversarial toward the other country. Minority extremist perspectives, such as those often expressed in social media, should not be allowed to hijack policy.

Build mutual trust. Deepening official and unofficial exchanges, engaging in a more meaningful dialogue on strategies and interests, and keeping bilateral commitments will increase trust, as will explaining the intentions underlying policies like the U.S. rebalance to Asia and China’s military expansion.

Reconcile divergent views of global order. American and Chinese elites’ differing preferences for the global distribution of power could cause tension unless the two countries candidly discuss how to coexist and accommodate each other’s interests.

Prevent the Taiwan issue from derailing broader cooperation. Washington should not underestimate the significance China attaches to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. Beijing should not allow this issue to prevent it from recognizing Washington’s consistent support of the One-China policy. Both sides should understand fully the sensitivity of the Taiwan issue and avoid sending wrong signals that negatively impact bilateral relations.

Establish rules on cybersecurity. Mutual understandings will reassure both sides, especially business elites, who have historically constituted a stabilizing force in U.S.-China relations.

The U.S.-China Security Perceptions Project

Public and elite attitudes in both the United States and especially China are exerting a growing influence on the U.S.-China security relationship. The U.S.-China Security Perceptions Project seeks to obtain nonpartisan, policy-relevant data and insights on the evolving content and influence of such attitudes as policymakers strive to reduce the likelihood of serious future bilateral crises or conflicts. The project has several key objectives:

  • Conduct rigorous, detailed comparative surveys of Chinese and American elites and the general public on critical topics related to national security, including mutual trust and impressions of each country’s national character; the nature of American and Chinese power, both globally and in Asia; and the major specific threats, challenges, and opportunities faced by each country.
  • Produce thorough analyses of the meaning and implications of the survey results for Chinese and American foreign and defense policies and the U.S.-China relationship.Offer recommendations for policymakers in both countries on how to address the problems and opportunities revealed by the survey results.
  • Undertake the above activities on a regular basis and in response to specific security-related incidents occurring in the U.S.-China relationship.

This project involved two phases in both the United States and China. During the first phase, public and elite opinion surveys were conducted in both countries. Elites from five distinct categories—government, business, academia, the military, and the media—were surveyed. During the second phase, workshops of foreign affairs experts with backgrounds in these same five categories were convened in Beijing and Washington to discuss the survey results and their implications for U.S.-China relations.

Project Participants

The U.S.-China Security Perceptions Project is a unique collaborative undertaking between leading research institutions in Washington and Beijing launched in 2011. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington and the China Strategic Culture Promotion Association (CSCPA) in Beijing coordinated this project, in collaboration with the Pew Research Center, the Research Center for Contemporary China (RCCC) at Peking University, and the Kissinger Institute on China and the United States at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

The Pew Research Center, in consultation with the Carnegie Endowment and the Kissinger Institute, conducted the elite and public surveys in the United States. The RCCC and the CSCPA together performed the surveys in China. Funding was provided by the China-United States Exchange Foundation and the Ford Foundation as well as by the project partners.

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace is a unique global network of policy research centers in Russia, China, Europe, the Middle East, and the United States. Our mission, dating back more than a century, is to advance the cause of peace through analysis and development of fresh policy ideas and direct engagement and collaboration with decisionmakers in government, business, and civil society. Working together, our centers bring the inestimable benefit of multiple national viewpoints to bilateral, regional, and global issues. The Carnegie Asia Program in Beijing and Washington provides clear and precise analysis to policymakers on the complex economic, security, and political developments in the Asia-Pacific region.

The China Strategic Culture Promotion Association is a national, nonprofit civil society group composed of experts, scholars, and social activists who are engaged in studies of international issues, the Taiwan issue, and cultural issues. The association was founded in Beijing on January 5, 2011, aiming at promoting security and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and encouraging peaceful development on both sides of the Taiwan Strait through studies, dissemination, and exchange of Chinese strategic culture.

The Pew Research Center is a nonpartisan fact tank that provides information on the issues, attitudes, and trends shaping America and the world. A neutral source of data and analysis, it does not take policy positions and was not involved in developing any of the policy recommendations contained in this report. It is a subsidiary of the Pew Charitable Trusts. The center’s work is often cited by policymakers, journalists, and academics as well as advocates from across the political spectrum. Its Global Attitudes Project conducts public opinion surveys around the world on a broad array of subjects ranging from people’s assessments of their own lives to their views about the current state of the world and important issues of the day. More than 330,000 interviews in 60 countries have been conducted as part of the project.

Founded in 1988, the Research Center for Contemporary China at Peking University is a self-financed, nonprofit academic institution that conducts statistically rigorous interviews and polling in China on a wide variety of subjects, including issues related to China’s foreign relations. The RCCC focuses on promoting rigorous social science scholarship in China; generating systematic social and economic data for scholars, government agencies, and the business community; integrating Chinese social science into the international scholarly community; and providing institutional assistance for Chinese and international scholars conducting research in China.

The Wilson Center’s Kissinger Institute on China and the United States, inaugurated in 2008, is dedicated to promoting greater awareness of the U.S.-China relationship and its impact on both countries and the world. It does so by exploring the political, economic, historical, and cultural factors that underlie the respective behavior patterns and world views of China and the United States. The institute is nonpartisan and committed to improving American expertise about China as well as Chinese knowledge about the United States.

The project leaders from each organization include, on the U.S. side, Michael D. Swaine and Rachel Esplin Odell from the Carnegie Endowment, J. Stapleton Roy from the Kissinger Institute, and James Bell and Richard Wike from Pew Research. On the Chinese side, project leaders include Luo Yuan and Liu Xiangdong from the CSCPA and Shen Mingming and Yan Jie from the RCCC. Xu Ren, formerly of the Carnegie Endowment, and Meng Tianguang (“Max”) of the RCCC also provided invaluable assistance in processing the data and preparing materials for the workshops. The authors also wish to thank Alex Taylor, Han Yuxi, Hu Ran, Wang Yuhui, and Audrye Wong of the Carnegie Endowment for their vital assistance at various stages of the project, as well as Julia Judson-Rea, Ilonka Oszvald, Abby Arganese, Jocelyn Soly, and others in the Carnegie development, publications, and communications teams.

Phase I: Survey Research in the United States and China

In the United States, the general public survey was conducted April 30–May 13, 2012, among 1,004 adults. The elite survey was conducted March 1–May 20, 2012, among 305 elites, including 54 government officials in the executive and legislative branches; 52 retired military officers; 74 business and trade leaders; 93 academics, think tank experts, and nongovernmental organization leaders; and 32 reporters, editors, and commentators. Although not representative of all U.S. foreign affairs experts, the elite survey findings are indicative of attitudes among high-ranking individuals responsible for matters related to national security or foreign policy.

In China, the general public survey was conducted May 2–July 5, 2012, among 2,597 adults in urban areas. The elite survey was conducted May 22–August 22, 2012, among 358 elites, including 75 government officials (primarily retired officials with experience at the provincial and municipal levels); 73 scholars at military research institutions; 70 business and trade leaders; 76 scholars at nonmilitary academic research institutions; and 64 professionals working for the media.

For more details on the methodology used in the public and elite surveys in each country, see the accompanying reports on the survey results by the Pew Research Center and the RCCC.1

During the process of survey design and translation, extensive efforts were made to ensure that the results from the United States and China would be as comparable as possible. For the first iteration of the project, much progress was made toward this end. However, there are several important caveats that call for caution to be exercised in making certain comparisons among some of the elite categories in particular.

Military Elites in the U.S. and Chinese Data

The “military” categories in the Chinese and U.S. survey data are likely not directly comparable. The military category in the Chinese data only includes military scholars, not operational military personnel or retired officers. These military scholars very possibly do not represent the views of the broader People’s Liberation Army (PLA) on many issues. The military category in the American elite survey, by contrast, is composed of retired U.S. military officers. Future surveys will hopefully include at least retired Chinese military officers.

Government Officials in the U.S. and Chinese Data

The “government officials” categories are likewise not directly comparable. In the Chinese data, the government officials were primarily officials at the provincial and municipal levels. This survey did not include a large sampling of central government officials. Moreover, most of these officials, such as former ambassadors, were retired. Meanwhile, in the United States, the government officials were all current government officials at the national level—mostly from the executive branch, with some from the legislative branch. In future surveys, the goal is to make this category more comparable as well.

Comparisons Over Time

The project surveys conducted in 2012 are a snapshot in time and do not necessarily represent U.S. or Chinese views at present or in the future. In some cases, both quantitative and qualitative responses could change significantly; in other cases, perhaps not. One major objective of this project is to undertake repeated surveys to determine how attitudes in both countries change over time and in response to specific events. That said, the results of these surveys convey an important baseline or starting point for deepening understanding.

Phase II: Elite Workshops in China and the United States

The first elite workshop was held in Beijing on January 10–11, 2013. The workshop was attended by more than 20 Chinese experts from different elite categories (primarily academia, the military, and the media) in addition to the project partners from Carnegie, the CSCPA, the Kissinger Institute, Pew Research, and the RCCC. The second elite workshop was held in Washington on January 31–February 1, 2013. The workshop was attended by more than 20 U.S. participants from government, military, business, media, and academic circles in addition to the project partners. At both workshops, the participants engaged in a wide-ranging discussion of the U.S. and Chinese survey results and their implications for U.S.-China security relations.

Report Overview

The results of the surveys of elites and publics in the United States and China can be found in accompanying reports prepared by the Pew Research Center and the RCCC, respectively. These reports present the percentage of elite and general-public respondents that provided each response to each question. They also contain general statements identifying majority or minority views based on responses to specific questions.

The main body of this report, prepared jointly by the Carnegie Endowment and the CSCPA with input from the Kissinger Institute, goes beyond the initial analysis of the data by presenting in detail the policy-related significance of the findings and their implications for policy in both countries. These more qualitative assessments derive in large part from the views expressed by the project partners and American and Chinese elites at the workshops that were held to discuss the survey results.

This report is organized around three themes that were addressed by the elite and public survey questionnaires:

  • U.S.-China trust and cultural imaging
  • Global roles and threat perceptions
  • Specific security-related challenges and opportunities

In these first three sections, the most significant policy-relevant survey findings are summarized and the key observations made at the workshops are presented.

A fourth and final section presents a set of possible implications and recommendations arising from the survey and workshop findings for policymakers and other elites.

The project members intend to develop this undertaking into an increasingly rigorous, focused, and policy-relevant series of coordinated and collaborative survey efforts on vital security issues affecting the U.S.-China relationship. The findings will hopefully help deepen the understanding of scholars, policymakers, the media, and the general public in the United States and China about key aspects of the bilateral relationship, thereby helping to prevent miscalculations and facilitate the harmonious development of both U.S.-China relations and the world order.

U.S.-China Trust and Cultural Imaging

The first set of survey findings and workshop discussions revolved around the themes of mutual trust and cultural impressions. Attitudes toward these issues among each country’s elites and general public have important implications for the likelihood of effective U.S.-China cooperation, the ability of the bilateral relationship to endure strain and crises, and the propensity of the two sides to experience conflict.

Major Relevant Findings From Surveys

Mutual Trust
  • In both the United States and China, elites and the general public expressed low levels of trust in the other country (see figure 1)—below levels of trust U.S. and Chinese respondents reported feeling in most other countries.
  • Levels of trust were slightly higher among youth and scholars in both countries.
  • Despite this general lack of mutual trust, a majority of the public in both countries thought U.S.-China relations were “good.”
  • While the American public and U.S. elites alike expressed high levels of trust in Japan, Chinese respondents expressed extremely low levels of trust in their Asian neighbor. (And these surveys were taken before the current Sino-Japanese crisis over the Diaoyu [Senkaku] Islands that emerged in September 2012.)
  • Majorities of Chinese government elites, scholars, military researchers, and media professionals characterized their attitude toward the United States as mild rather than tough (only 44 percent of Chinese business elites said the same).
  • While a majority of the American public was more concerned about China’s economic strength (59 percent) than its military strength (28 percent), a plurality of the Chinese public (34 percent) was more concerned about U.S. military strength than U.S. economic strength (20 percent).
  • Clear majorities of U.S. elites in all categories expressed a belief that Chinese economic growth will lead to a more democratic China.

Public and elite attitudes in the United States and especially China are exerting a growing influence on the bilateral security relationship.

Partners, Enemies, or Competitors
  • In general, very low percentages of U.S. and Chinese publics and elites viewed the other country as an enemy.
    • Roughly equal percentages of each country’s public regarded the other country as an enemy (15 percent and 12 percent in the United States and China, respectively).
    • However, 27 percent of Chinese government elites regarded the United States as an enemy, while only 2 percent of U.S. government elites regarded China as an enemy.
  • Strong majorities of the U.S. public and elites in all categories viewed China as a competitor, while substantial minorities (16 percent of the U.S. public and a range of between 13 percent and 22 percent of U.S. elites, depending on the category of respondents) viewed China as a partner.
  • A plurality of the Chinese public viewed the United States as a competitor (45 percent), and clear majorities of Chinese elites in all categories viewed the United States as a competitor (see figure 2).

Public and elite attitudes in the United States and especially China are exerting a growing influence on the bilateral security relationship.

Culture and Characteristics
  • Three-quarters of the Chinese public either somewhat (48 percent) or very much (26 percent) agreed that Chinese culture is superior, while roughly one-half of the U.S. public responded that American culture is superior.
  • Clear majorities of the U.S. public and elites believed that the United States takes other countries’ interests into account in foreign policy. Only minorities of U.S. respondents felt that China does the same in its foreign policy.
    • The Chinese public and elites held nearly mirror-image views on this matter. Strong majorities believed that China takes other countries’ interests into account and that the United States does not.
  • Strong majorities of the U.S. public considered both Chinese and Americans to be competitive and nationalistic. Majorities of the Chinese public also saw both Americans and Chinese as competitive. But while a clear majority of the Chinese public (66 percent) described Chinese as nationalistic, only 45 percent believed Americans were also nationalistic.
  • The Chinese public’s images of Americans were more negative than the U.S. public’s images of Chinese. In addition, Americans tended to be more self-critical than Chinese.
    • Clear majorities of the Chinese public believed Americans are (in declining percentages) aggressive, competitive, violent, arrogant, and greedy, and 50 percent said they are selfish. In contrast, only minorities of the Chinese public said Chinese are aggressive, violent, arrogant, and greedy, although 51 percent did say Chinese are selfish.
    • Only minorities of the U.S. public viewed Chinese as (in declining percentages) aggressive, greedy, arrogant, selfish, rude, or violent. In contrast, majorities of the U.S. public regarded Americans as having all of these negative characteristics, with one exception—“only” 44 percent of the U.S. public said Americans are violent.
  • Respondents from the general public in both countries were generally more likely to assign positive traits to their fellow citizens than to their Chinese or American counterparts.
    • Strong majorities of the Chinese public saw themselves as hardworking, generous, honest, and tolerant, but only minorities saw Americans in those terms. However, majorities of the Chinese public saw both Chinese and Americans as inventive and modern.
    • Clear majorities of the U.S. public viewed American people as being modern, inventive, generous, tolerant, honest, and sophisticated. In each case, lower percentages of the U.S. public ascribed those same traits to Chinese people. There was one exception to this pattern; 93 percent of the U.S. public described Chinese people as being hardworking and only 78 percent of these respondents applied this term to Americans (see figure 3).

Public and elite attitudes in the United States and especially China are exerting a growing influence on the bilateral security relationship.

Major Observations and Conclusions From Workshops

Mutual Trust

Differentiate Between Abstract and Concrete Trust

Both American and Chinese elites raised the point that trust as an abstract measurement may not be that important, particularly in light of the fact that respondents are interested in building a stronger relationship. The general public in particular may not have formal mechanisms for measuring the trustworthiness of another country, whereas a government can evaluate trustworthiness based on its counterpart’s propensity to adhere to formal or informal agreements. Even “adversaries” can trust each other if they believe the other government will follow through on its commitments. Similarly, businesspeople can measure trustworthiness based on their counterparts’ propensity to uphold business contracts or respect intellectual property.

Concrete Cooperation Is More Important Than Mutual Trust

One American discussant with government experience emphasized that when official negotiators get caught up in the psychodrama of the U.S.-China relationship, including concerns about mutual trust, it becomes very difficult to do anything. But once they have unburdened themselves of these issues and can address specific, concrete issues, they are able to accomplish much more, even in the bilateral military-to-military relationship. Other elites agreed that working together on concrete practical cooperative efforts is critical to improving the bilateral relationship.

Trust Can Serve as a Buffer in Rough Times

Some American elites observed that although many indicators suggest relatively positive views of China among Americans, the low level of trust U.S. respondents reported having in China suggests that this positive opinion could be quite volatile and subject to swings if the relationship were to suffer a major setback. One elite noted that trust provides a baseline buffer in relationships. When a shock occurs, the larger the buffer, the better the relationship can handle it. U.S.-China relations have not experienced a major setback in a long time, so the relationship is relatively positive. But the thinness of the trust buffer could portend problems in the event of a future shock.

Media Reports May Affect Trust Levels

The media tends to report on conflict and tension between countries, which likely influences the levels of trust that many elites and especially the public in a country have in another country. This dynamic may contribute to the low levels of mutual trust between U.S. and Chinese respondents, some Chinese elites noted. The fact that countries like Pakistan and African nations, which receive comparatively little news coverage in the Chinese press, were more trusted by the Chinese public may be partly because the media is not regularly reporting on tensions with those countries.

Personal Relationships Influence Trust Levels

Some Beijing workshop participants suggested that Chinese military and nonmilitary scholars may have expressed greater levels of trust in the United States than Chinese government officials or the general Chinese public because these scholars are more likely to have developed personal relationships with Americans.

Understanding High Levels of Strategic Distrust in China

One American elite pointed out that the percentage of Chinese government elites that viewed the United States as an enemy was particularly high. This outlier could potentially suggest that the problem of strategic distrust is worse in China. However, it is also difficult to take this one data point from one moment in time as representative of government views—especially keeping in mind the caveat that the Chinese government sample was relatively limited.

One Chinese participant argued that distrust of the United States among Chinese elites and the general Chinese public can be traced to specific factors. These include political and ideological factors, such as a sense that the United States wants to Westernize and divide China; the U.S. return to the Asia-Pacific, which has not been sufficiently explained; economic and commercial disputes, including U.S. antidumping duties against Chinese companies; and propaganda in the media that misleads and negatively portrays the United States (a phenomenon also seen in U.S. media coverage of China).

Expounding upon the political and ideological factors, several Chinese elites speculated that the higher percentage of Chinese elites who identified the United States as an enemy compared to the percentage of U.S. elites who identified China as an enemy could be attributed to the way the United States is seen to threaten China’s domestic political system and internal security (for example, on issues such as Taiwan and Tibet). This could be particularly true of local and provincial Chinese government officials, who composed the bulk of the Chinese government elites sample, since they deal most directly with domestic and internal security concerns.

Another Chinese participant suggested that in addition to differences in ideology and political systems, U.S. military deployments in areas surrounding China have also created an impression that such efforts are intended to contain China, contributing to Chinese distrust of the United States. This participant also cited as a source of distrust the way in which the United States is perceived as taking the opposite side whenever China has friction with surrounding countries.

According to Some Americans, China’s Low Trust in Other Countries May Recommend a U.S. Multilateral Strategy

One American elite remarked upon the fact that Chinese respondents expressed less trust in other countries than American respondents did in general. Another U.S. participant speculated that this might reflect the fact that Washington has more formal allies than Beijing, and it could imply that multilateral strategies may at times be useful for the United States to adopt in its relationship with China.

Younger Americans Trust China More

When discussing why young Americans expressed higher levels of trust in China than older Americans, U.S. elites focused on a variety of factors. Some suggested that younger generations in general tend to be more trusting and open and that this was probably true historically as well. In addition, older generations today have had very different life experiences, such as living through the Vietnam and Korean Wars, which could shape their views toward China. Another elite pointed to the possibility that generations that lived through the Cold War may see China as filling the role that the Soviet Union played, whereas the younger generation has no memory of the Cold War and thus does not necessarily fit China into that box.

One U.S. elite felt that older Americans’ observation of the political incident of 1989 in Beijing could also influence how they viewed China. Another elite echoed this view and also pointed to the younger generation’s more limited knowledge of China’s ups and downs in general, including the Cultural Revolution and the Great Leap Forward.

Trust in China Among U.S. Business Elites Has Deteriorated

Some elites observed that, while American corporations used to be a stabilizing ballast in U.S.-China relations, during the past five years there has been a significant deterioration in the way U.S. business elites view China. Some American participants noted that this shift might reflect greater concerns among some U.S. businesspeople over alleged Chinese efforts to restrict U.S. market access and maneuver Chinese companies into a dominant position that will enable them to move up the value chain in direct competition with U.S. companies. Others added that it also reflects concerns over alleged cybertheft and intellectual property theft more generally.

Explaining U.S. Military Elites’ Low Levels of Trust in China

Some elites attributed the lower level of trust in China among U.S. military respondents primarily to uncertainty about China’s military, which in turn stems partly from a perceived lack of transparency in the PLA. One American elite clarified that this lack of trust has more to do with a lack of understanding and confidence in China’s policies, intentions, and future direction than it does with any real or imagined obfuscation regarding the raw capabilities of the Chinese military.

Another U.S. expert suggested that it may have to do with the fact that U.S. defense analysts tend to glean information about the PLA from unofficial writings by younger Chinese authors, who often emphasize China’s rise and growing capabilities. Thus, in a sense, the level of distrust of China among U.S. military elites could be driven less by what they do not know than by what they think they do know.

Some U.S. elites emphasized that it is the military’s job to prepare and plan for worst-case scenarios and that military elites would be derelict in their duties if they did not do so. This could predispose them to trust China less. However, some elites also observed that U.S. and Chinese military personnel often work well together when they do interact, implying that military-to-military contacts are particularly important to maintain—and illustrating why China’s tendency to cut such ties off whenever there is a bump in the relationship is so problematic.

However, one U.S. military elite pointed out that trust of China among U.S. military elites was not actually as low as he had expected and in fact was comparable to the level of trust among U.S. media elites (only 31 percent of U.S. military elites and 31 percent of U.S. media elites reported a great deal or fair amount of trust in China). Moreover, these levels were quite positive in comparison to Chinese military scholars, 85 percent of whom reported distrusting the United States.

Partners, Enemies, or Competitors

Competition Can Be Malicious or Benign

Chinese elites emphasized that viewing another country as a “competitor” could be positive or negative. While malicious competitors might become enemies, benign competition can be win-win, particularly in the business world. Whether partners or competitors or both, China and the United States can emphasize their shared interests as a means for overcoming distrust.

Containment and a New Type of Major-Power Relationship

One American participant noted that competitors do not “contain” each other like enemies do; while America and China are competitors, the United States is not engaging in a formal containment policy toward China and does not consider China an enemy. A Chinese elite responded by emphasizing that there is a great deal of confusion in China about the concept of containment, particularly among the general public. He stressed that containment is a concept associated with enemies. Both Chinese and U.S. interlocutors agreed that the “new type of major-power relationship” advocated by Chinese President Xi Jinping could not consist of containment or competition and rivalry alone.

Possible to Be Both Partner and Competitor or Something In Between

Some Chinese elites suggested that countries can simultaneously be partners and competitors and that this may be the case in the U.S.-China relationship. Similarly, there may also be something between the categories of partner and competitor. One Chinese elite commented on what he saw as the inappropriateness of the term “adversary,” which he noted had been used by U.S. President Barack Obama during a presidential debate in fall 2012.

General U.S. Public More Likely Than Elites to See China as an Enemy

One American participant hypothesized that the general public has less knowledge about China and thus may be more inclined to be influenced by negative media coverage about China. Meanwhile, elites have a more subtle view of the bilateral relationship and of China’s history and contemporary political culture. A Chinese elite made a similar observation about the Chinese public, noting that it tends to be more emotional, which may make it more likely to view the United States as an enemy while elites will tend to see America more objectively as a competitor.

Another U.S. discussant argued that in fact the general public tends to take its cues from elites on matters of foreign policy, including China. If there is an elite consensus on an issue, then the public will coalesce behind that view. But if there is not a consensus, then the public will divide along partisan lines. Another American participant responded by suggesting that U.S. elites, including the media, need to speak of the U.S.-China relationship in more positive terms. For example, this individual suggested that elites should avoid painting the U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific as containment of China.

Americans View China Quite Positively

One American discussant interpreted the findings on the American public’s view of China optimistically, indicating that several survey data suggested a rosier picture than was indicated by the 2012 U.S. presidential election campaign ads about China, which were generally quite negative. First of all, Americans generally saw U.S.-China relations as positive, something that would not have been said of U.S.-Soviet relations during the Cold War. This suggests that China has not taken the place of the Soviet Union as the United States’ geopolitical enemy. This elite felt that the percentage of the public who viewed China as an enemy was surprisingly low (15 percent) and that the larger percentage who saw China as a competitor (66 percent) is not worrisome as it is not inaccurate and even allies can be competitors.

Moreover, while the percentage of the public who expressed trust in China was not particularly high, the American people tend to be reluctant to express trust in general—for example, their trust in government and especially Congress is lower than their trust in China. Finally, in comparison to other challenges, Americans viewed China’s emergence as about as threatening as climate change—that is, rather low on the list of perceived challenges.

One Chinese participant responded by saying that while he also felt optimistic about the results, he was concerned over the way Obama and former U.S. presidential nominee Mitt Romney had discussed China in the 2012 presidential campaign. In particular, he wondered whether or not Obama’s remarks identifying China as an adversary reflected elite views.

Culture and Characteristics

Cultural Exceptionalism Is a Challenge to U.S.-China Relations

Both American and Chinese respondents perceived their country’s culture as being superior to that of others, although the percentage of Americans who feel this way has been declining in recent years, particularly among the younger generation. Such feelings of cultural superiority can present a challenge to U.S.-China relations. In order to confront this challenge, a Chinese participant suggested that the two sides need to do more than foster cross-cultural initiatives such as student exchange programs and tourism; they also need to engage in deeper discussion and debate on what these two great civilizations (not just nations) have to offer each other and the world.

One Chinese elite suggested that while China is proud of its long history, the United States is proud of its human rights and values. An American participant concurred, arguing that while Americans tend to see China as a country with a great culture, they take more pride in their own values than their culture. However, value superiority as well as cultural superiority can interfere with inter-country relationships. In fact, this U.S. elite suggested, one of the big deficiencies of American diplomacy is the tendency to moralize and preach about U.S. values and how other countries should behave—something that causes resentment in other nations.

Chinese Self-Criticism May Be Increasing

American survey respondents ascribed negative traits to themselves at a significantly higher level than Chinese did. One Chinese media elite commented that one of the things that is great about Americans is this self-awareness regarding their own shortcomings. However, this individual argued that although it was not necessarily reflected in the survey results, there has also been a growing degree of self-criticism in Chinese social media and culture in recent years, with satirical essays proliferating online that emphasize shortcomings in Chinese culture. This participant felt that such a trend suggests many Chinese recognize they are not perfect.

Features of Culture Change Over Time

Another Chinese participant observed that the perceived features of Chinese culture have arguably changed over time. For example, when he was young, he was taught in school that China had a long history of constant revolution and violence, in contrast to Europe, where religion had been used as an opiate to control the masses and prevent such wide-scale conflict. This supposed Chinese cultural proclivity was seen as dovetailing with the call at that time for continual proletarian revolution and struggle. In recent years, however, “harmony” has become China’s new watchword. The culture of the West—and the United States in particular—is perceived as the more aggressive and competitive, while China prefers to see its own culture as harmonious and peace-loving.

Along similar lines, one Chinese elite suggested that the United States is perceived by Chinese as more aggressive because of its history of nearly continuous warfare since World War II. In response, a U.S. participant suggested that Americans’ perception of themselves as aggressive is likely shaped by the fact that the United States has been engaged in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan for the past decade, conflicts that are increasingly unpopular among Americans.

National Confidence Affects a Country’s Role in the World

Some Chinese participants suggested that a country’s national confidence in its culture shapes the role it plays in the world. One Chinese elite suggested that China lacked confidence, as evident by the extensive Chinese coverage of Mo Yan’s Nobel Prize for Literature. Another participant remarked that low levels of confidence can make a country more sensitive to external influence. Yet another Chinese elite suggested that the lower percentage of American youth (as compared to older Americans) who expressed confidence in American culture indicates that the United States’ confidence in itself and its role in the world may be declining.

Cultural Characteristics Can Translate Into National Policies

One Chinese elite remarked that cultural perceptions are key to analyzing decisionmaking because how people think and behave will translate into national policies. For example, pointing to cultural depictions in American movies, this participant observed that American children are more independent. In contrast, Chinese culture focuses on tradition, family, and community, which he suggested might make China relatively more inward-looking. However, this participant also observed that the two cultures’ differing characteristics can be complementary in a way that enhances cooperation between the two sides.

The Complexity of Cultural Views May Lessen Their Impact on Bilateral Ties

Conversely, some Chinese elites argued that simply asking respondents if they believed their culture was superior was likely to produce artificial results. More nuanced conclusions could be drawn from questions about whether the respondents would prefer to study in or become citizens of the other country.

Similarly, one elite argued that the pluralism in Chinese culture means that the implications of Chinese culture for foreign policy are highly complex. In fact, one Chinese discussant suggested that the issue is likely so complex that it may not have much of an impact on the level of cooperation countries can achieve, since there is a great difference between the operational and conceptual levels. Another Chinese elite countered this perspective, arguing that although culture is difficult to define and cultural attitudes are difficult to measure, narrow factors such as trade volume are inadequate measures for explaining the complex variables shaping bilateral relations.

Perceptions of Cultural Difference Can Portend Conflict

One American elite noted that social science research has shown that people who perceive a large degree of difference between their own social group (the “in-group”) and another social group (the “out-group”) will be more prone to favor conflictual postures toward the out-group. The questions asked of each country’s public about whether or not they perceive a range of character traits as applying to Chinese and Americans could be instructive when placed in this context.

In the general public survey results, there were an average of 20.5 percentage points separating the percentage of U.S. respondents who viewed a given trait as describing Americans and the percentage of U.S. respondents who saw that trait as applying to Chinese. Meanwhile, there was on average a 26.7 percentage-point spread between the share of Chinese who ascribed a given trait to Chinese and the percentage who ascribed that same trait to Americans.

Viewed through the lens of social identity theory, this gap in perceptions on both sides could make each side more likely to view the other in conflictual terms. This effect may be somewhat stronger in the Chinese case given the larger difference in perceptions among Chinese respondents.

Global Roles and Threat Perceptions

The second set of survey findings and workshop discussions focused on questions of global leadership, world order, and international threats. Points of convergence and divergence in American and Chinese elite and public attitudes toward these questions shed light on the underlying sources of amity and tension in U.S.-China relations and can guide decisionmakers in both countries as they work to build a “new type of major-power relationship.”

Major Relevant Findings From Surveys

Assertiveness
  • Very low percentages of the U.S. public and American elites thought the United States should be the single world leader.
  • Similarly low shares of China’s public and elites felt that China should be the single world leader.
  • However, strong majorities of elites from both the United States and China felt that their own country should play a shared global leadership role.
    • While 74 percent of the U.S. public shared this attitude, only 45 percent of the Chinese public did.
  • Sizable minorities of China’s public and elites (ranging from 12 percent among scholars and military researchers to 19 percent among the public and 21 percent among government elites) felt that China should play no leadership role at all in the world.
    • In contrast, not a single U.S. elite respondent in any of the five categories felt the United States should play no leadership role in the world. However, 12 percent of the American public did reject a leadership role for the United States (see figure 4).
  • Among those Americans who felt Washington should play a shared leadership role in the world, clear majorities in most categories of U.S. elites thought the United States should be the most assertive among leading nations (only a plurality of media elites held this view).
    • However, only one-third of the U.S. public who favored a shared leadership role agreed with that notion while two-thirds said that America should be no more or less assertive than other leading nations.
  • In partial contrast, among those Chinese who felt Beijing should play a shared leadership role in the world, a strong majority of both China’s elites and public said China should be neither more nor less assertive (qiangshi, 强势) than other leading nations.

Public and elite attitudes in the United States and especially China are exerting a growing influence on the bilateral security relationship.

Global Order and Stability
  • Clear majorities in every U.S. elite category believed that global stability is best served by American dominance (that is, “the U.S. remaining the leading superpower”).
    • Not a single U.S. elite respondent favored China replacing America as the leading superpower.
    • Nonetheless, sizeable minorities of American elites (including as high as 45 percent of business elites) favored a balance of power between the United States and China.
  • In contrast, strong majorities of Chinese elites in all five categories favored a U.S.-China balance of power for world stability, ranging from 58 percent among scholars to 76 percent among government elites.
    • Very few Chinese elites believed that Chinese dominance would produce more stability, ranging from only 3 percent among military scholars to 12 percent among government elites.
    • Sizable minorities of Chinese elites in most categories felt that U.S. dominance would be more conducive to global stability. Nearly one-fourth of nonmilitary and military scholars espoused this view, but only 8 percent of government elites shared this attitude (see figure 5).

Public and elite attitudes in the United States and especially China are exerting a growing influence on the bilateral security relationship.

Mutual Threat Perceptions
    • Far smaller percentages of the U.S. public and American elites viewed China as the country posing the greatest overall danger to the United States than percentages of Chinese who viewed the United States as the country posing the greatest threat (weixie, 威胁) to China.
      • Strong majorities of China’s public and elites identified the United States as the country that posed the greatest threat to China, ranging from 63 percent among the public to 81 percent among business elites.
      • Chinese viewed Japan as the next-most threatening country after the United States, but far fewer Chinese pointed to Japan than America. However, the most recent Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands flare-up, which occurred after the survey was conducted, may have altered this perception.
    • America’s public and elites generally viewed China’s emergence as a world power as a far less serious threat to the well-being of the United States than other enumerated threats, such as international financial instability, Iran’s nuclear program, Islamic extremism, and North Korea’s nuclear program.
      • While a slim majority (52 percent) of the U.S. public saw China’s emergence as a world power as a major threat, only minorities of all elite categories espoused that view.
    • Meanwhile, the Chinese public and elites in most categories viewed the U.S. military presence in East Asia as the most significant among a similar list of enumerated threats, although in general they were less worried than their American counterparts about the other threats.
      • The exception was Chinese nonmilitary scholars, 55 percent of whom described international financial instability as a major threat and only 46 percent of whom said the same of the U.S. military presence in East Asia.
    • The U.S. public was more concerned about China’s economic strength than its military strength by a wide margin (59 percent versus 28 percent).
      • College graduates were four times more likely than those who had not graduated from college to express more concern about China’s economic strength than its military strength (70 percent versus 16 percent).
  • In contrast, the Chinese public was more concerned about U.S. military strength (34 percent) than U.S. economic strength (20 percent). Sixteen percent of the Chinese public expressed concern over both these issues, while 21 percent expressed concern over neither (see figure 6).

Public and elite attitudes in the United States and especially China are exerting a growing influence on the bilateral security relationship.

National Direction and Policies
    • When the surveys were taken in mid-2012, clear majorities of the U.S. public were dissatisfied with the United States’ direction and current economic situation, while most of the Chinese public expressed satisfaction with China’s current situation.
    • Majorities in most categories of U.S. elites expressed overall approval of Obama’s foreign policy, with the exception of retired military elites. Only 38 percent of retired military elites approved of Obama’s foreign policy, while 56 percent disapproved.
    • Similarly, most American elites felt that Obama’s China policy struck the proper balance between being too tough and not tough enough, but a plurality of retired military elites felt that it was not tough enough.
      • Very few elites in any category saw Obama’s China policy as being too tough.
      • The American public was split between those who felt Obama’s China policy was not tough enough (45 percent) and those who felt it was just about right (39 percent); very few (2 percent) felt that it was too tough.
    • Notably larger percentages of U.S. elites than Chinese elites believed their country relies too much on military force.
      • Only 10 percent of the American public and an even smaller percentage of U.S. elites said the United States relies on military might too little.
  • Fairly large percentages of China’s public and elites (ranging from 36 percent of the public to 56 percent of military scholars) believed China relies too little on its military power; a large share (20 percent) of the Chinese public responded “don’t know.”
    • Only small percentages of China’s public and elites, ranging from 3 percent of nonmilitary scholars to 16 percent of the public and of media elites, thought China relies too much on military strength (see figure 7).

Public and elite attitudes in the United States and especially China are exerting a growing influence on the bilateral security relationship.

Major Observations and Conclusions from Workshops

Assertiveness

“Shared Leadership” Refers to a Multipolar System

Chinese and American elites concurred that the term “shared leadership” did not necessarily refer to a “Group of 2” arrangement wherein China and the United States form a dual partnership of global leadership. Rather, it refers to a more multipolar distribution of power and leadership.

China Has Traditionally Been Reluctant to Engage in Shared Leadership

Some Chinese elites emphasized that China has traditionally been rather self-centered and reluctant to exercise global leadership, whereas the United States has long been accustomed to being a leader in the world and is generally expected to fulfill that role. The survey results demonstrated these phenomena, with very few Chinese favoring sole Chinese leadership in the world—and a notable minority favoring sole U.S. leadership. As a specific example, one Chinese elite pointed to China’s cautious behavior as part of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and its hesitance to impose its will on Central Asian countries, which contrasts to the way Russia and the United States interact with the region.

Chinese Attitudes Toward Global Leadership May Be Changing

Several Chinese elites agreed that China’s traditional reluctance to engage in shared leadership may be changing as its interests grow, increasing the incentives for Beijing to cooperate and contribute internationally—particularly on nontraditional security issues. One elite pointed to the fact that a majority of Chinese survey respondents wanted China to play a shared leadership role in the world as evidence that the Chinese people are willing to play by the rules of the current system.

One American elite agreed that Chinese attitudes toward global leadership seem to be changing, recalling that during bilateral U.S.-China negotiations in 2006, Beijing balked at the use of the term leadership and did not even want to discuss the concept. Thus, the substantial proportion of Chinese survey respondents who expressed a belief that shared leadership is a good idea seemed like a major change in a short period of time. More broadly, one American elite interpreted the data to suggest that the Chinese clearly favor a change from the status quo in which the United States is dominant, while Americans—particularly elites—oppose any diminution in U.S. power and any rise of a peer competitor.

However, a Chinese participant noted that there was still a sizable minority of Chinese elites who felt that China should not play any leadership role, whereas there were no American elites who felt the same about their country. One American media elite wondered if the example of U.S. fatigue after a decade of war and nation building, with all of the attendant public relations fiascoes, might have contributed to the reluctance of some Chinese to embrace a global leadership role.

One discussant further emphasized that it will still be a long process to persuade China to join fully in a shared global leadership role. He pointed to sayings from former Chinese leaders Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping—such as Deng’s famous maxim “taoguang yanghui, 韬光养晦,” frequently understood as “to hide one’s capabilities and bide one’s time”—suggesting that even when China becomes powerful, it will not be ready to become a world leader.

But another elite responded by reiterating that many Chinese want China to play more of a leadership role in the world. This elite argued that the phrase taoguang yanghui is often misunderstood; its true meaning is that China should avoid confrontation with the United States, not that China should avoid shared global leadership.

Political Philosophy Shapes Attitudes Toward Leadership

One Chinese participant observed that China eschewed global leadership in the past partly because of its political ideology; Chairman Mao was critical of superpower competition. Today, political ideology continues to drive, at least in part, China’s opposition to interference from other countries in its internal affairs. Conversely, the United States believes that it has the best values and political philosophy in the world and thus feels that it should be a global leader.

Shared Leadership Means Cooperation in Making the Rules

One Chinese elite emphasized that one of the reasons China is increasingly seeking a shared leadership role is that it wants to have more influence in making rules in the international system, a process that has been dominated by the United States in the past. Another Chinese discussant pointed to a concept called idiosyncrasy credits in the social psychology literature. This concept describes how newcomers to an institution will abide by the rules in order to build up credit and eventually seek to use that credit to be involved in shaping the rules of the system themselves.

Potential Future Changes in Chinese Attitudes

Some American elites wondered how Chinese responses to questions about leadership and global power distribution might change in coming years as China continues its rise. In particular, some observers pointed to the traditional structural realist belief that states will seek to maximize power and thus current intentions cannot be taken as sure indicators of future objectives. (This suggests that long-term surveys are necessary to track how people’s expectations change as their country’s power grows—or diminishes.)

As evidence of this phenomena, one U.S. elite pointed to the fact that many Chinese feel Deng Xiaoping’s taoguang yanghui maxim was appropriate for his time but is no longer applicable. This elite also proffered an anecdote from a high-level Obama administration official, who recounted that when he asked the Chinese why they reacted so strongly to Taiwan arms sales that were less than they had been in the past, the Chinese responded, “Well, we’re stronger now.”

Need to Focus on Regional Roles

Several American and Chinese elites emphasized the need to focus more in the future on regional leadership than global leadership and to analyze what roles elites and the general public think China and the United States should play in the Asia-Pacific. For example, one American discussant speculated that although few Chinese favored sole Chinese global leadership, a much higher proportion of Chinese might favor sole Chinese regional leadership. In fact, this discussant suggested that a significant number of American elites believe that China desires to be the dominant power in Asia. Although some of the survey findings seem to contradict that belief, they do not specifically address regional leadership. (This topic could be examined further in future surveys.)

Leadership as a Hierarchical Term in Chinese

One Chinese elite observed that the term “leader” in Chinese (lingdaoren, 领导人) has a more hierarchical and exclusive connotation than it does in English, which could raise some questions among Chinese respondents. Why, for example, would the United States want China to become a leader when it is the primary world leader? In other words, the Chinese people may be more inclined to conflate hegemony with leadership.

Connotations of “Assertive” in Chinese and English

Several elites agreed that the terms “assertive” and “qiangshi (强势),” used as parallel concepts in the survey, are actually not quite equivalent. An American elite argued that assertiveness is not about power but is rather a term that contrasts with passivity. However, qiangshi does have a connotation that implies the assertion of one’s power.

Global Order and Stability

Different Meanings of “Shared Leadership” and “Balance of Power”

One U.S. discussant noted that the terms “shared leadership” and “balance of power” do not necessarily mean the same thing. Balance of power may seem like it has a Cold War connotation, but it in fact has many meanings—among other things, it could refer to an unequal balance of power or a regional balance of power. Another American participant commented that a “concert” of powers is different still from a balance of power. A concert of powers connotes a greater level of mutual agreement and cooperation between states and may be what some elites think of when they hear the term “shared leadership.”

Furthermore, one Chinese elite noted that there are two types of balance of power. One is a peaceful balance, and the other involves confrontation, as in the Cold War. The latter is far more dangerous and unstable. It is unclear which type of balance of power respondents to this survey had in mind.

U.S. Elites Favor Unipolarity Over Balance of Power

One American participant observed that the majority of U.S. elites considered a unipolar system more conducive to global stability while many Chinese favored a multipolar balance of power. Another U.S. discussant speculated that these numbers among American elites may have been even more lopsided in this direction a decade ago, during the administration of then U.S. president George W. Bush, when unipolar U.S. leadership was an explicit part of the U.S. national security strategy. A Chinese discussant stressed that if Americans cling to this old mentality of favoring unipolar American power, they will be more likely to think that China’s rise will be unstable.

Avoid a Binary Approach When Considering Global Roles and Power Structures

One American academic elite stressed the need to avoid a strictly bilateral approach to these questions. Viewing global power distribution in terms of hegemony versus bipolarity is an American mindset that belies the complexity of the international system. Various actors other than the United States and China will play important roles in both U.S.-Chinese relations and the global political arena in coming years.

Another U.S. elite agreed, suggesting that particular issues—for example, financial stability and climate change—will likely necessitate cooperation from several major countries and nonstate actors, and thus different structures of power may be relevant for each issue. In any event, according to this discussant, viewing the international system in terms of dominant leadership or balance of power is an overly binary approach to complex global realities.

Mutual Threat Perceptions

Why Many Chinese Business Elites See the United States as a Threat

A relatively high proportion of Chinese business community elites in the survey reported seeing the United States as a threat. The workshop discussants expressed some surprise at this finding, since businesspeople are generally thought of as more internationally minded. One Chinese elite emphasized that U.S. antidumping duties imposed on Chinese companies are a specific threat that may increase their tendency to see the United States as a threat in general. A U.S. participant also speculated that this phenomena may be because Chinese business elites see the U.S. domestic market as an inhospitable investment environment and perceive the United States as hostile to Chinese business interests around the world.

U.S. Media Elites’ Views of China Not as Negative as Media Coverage Would Suggest

According to one American discussant, many U.S. government officials complain that the media portrays the U.S.-China relationship as highly conflictual, thus affecting public perceptions. In particular, many have faulted the media for painting the U.S. pivot or rebalance to Asia as an effort to “contain” Beijing. However, U.S. media elites in the survey did not themselves view China or the relationship in a particularly negative light.

In response to these observations, one media elite at the workshop recounted a time when he was reporting on a train crash in India and someone said, “There are hundreds of trains every day that don’t crash; why don’t you report on those?” He used this anecdote to demonstrate that journalists report on news-making events and developments because that is the nature of news media. More specifically, this discussant argued that while the U.S. pivot is not entirely about China, it is part of the story. Another media representative emphasized that journalists have to give a range of perspectives in their reporting, even if it may not reflect their personal views.

Translation of “Threat” Versus “Danger”

In the open-ended question about which country presented the greatest danger, one Chinese discussant suggested that “weixian (危险)” may have been a more appropriate translation of the word “danger” than “weixie (威胁),” which means “threat.” This could potentially explain why a higher percentage of Chinese felt the United States was a threat to China relative to Americans’ views of China.

National Direction and Policies

Chinese Public Writ Large Is Not as Hawkish as Netizens

Both American and Chinese participants expressed surprise that only 36 percent of the Chinese general public felt that China should rely more on military strength. One Chinese elite speculated that these numbers among netizens, or citizens active in the online community, would be more like 80 or 90 percent. One American participant suggested that this may indicate that relying upon netizen opinion to measure public opinion writ large may be problematic, as the latter may not be as hawkish as the former. Another U.S. discussant suggested, however, that Chinese decisionmakers may be more influenced by the 80–90 percent among the netizens than the 36 percent among the general public.

Moreover, discussants from both countries agreed that it is likely that the share of the general public that felt this way would have been greater if the survey had been conducted after the recent flare-up in tensions over the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands.

On this same question regarding China’s reliance on military strength, one Chinese discussant pointed to the large numbers of “don’t know” responses among the general public (over 20 percent) as a complicating factor in interpreting this data and to the “don’t know” responses among elites, which ranged from 5 to 14 percent, as evidence that many elite respondents may have felt the question was too sensitive.

Explaining Retired U.S. Military Elites’ Disapproval of Obama’s Foreign Policy

When asked why a majority of U.S. military elites disapproved of Obama’s foreign policy, one U.S. government elite suggested that three major issues over the past four years—the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy toward gays in the military—created significant tension between the military and the White House. These issues could have translated into greater dissatisfaction among retired officers, who are able to express their views more freely than active-duty military personnel.

Another American elite with military experience suggested that the cuts that have been made to the defense budget were also a major factor that may have led retired military elites to disapprove of Obama’s foreign policy. However, this discussant did observe that the military appreciates that Obama has been more reluctant to militarily intervene in foreign countries. This relates to the question about use of military force and the fact that a majority of U.S. military elites felt that the United States relies too heavily on the use of military force in its foreign policy.

Political affiliations may also account for at least some of this disapproval, as retired military elites were more likely to be Republican than elites in the other categories.

Specific Challenges and Opportunities

The final set of survey findings and workshop discussions dealt with pressing practical issues in the bilateral U.S.-China relationship, ranging from U.S. arms sales to Taiwan to cybersecurity and intellectual property protection. Elite and public attitudes toward these specific topics can suggest directions for Washington and Beijing to pursue as they seek to strengthen cooperation and minimize conflict.

Major Relevant Findings From Surveys

Priorities for the U.S.-China Relationship
    • Strong majorities of U.S. elites (ranging from 81 percent of government officials to 94 percent of media elites) cited building a strong relationship with China as a very important U.S. policy priority (see figure 8).
      • Far smaller percentages cited economic and trade issues, human rights, Taiwan arms sales, and freedom for Tibet as very important.
    • Clear majorities of the U.S. public stressed the importance of being tough with China on economic and trade issues (56 percent); building a strong relationship with China (55 percent); and promoting human rights (53 percent).
      • Much smaller percentages of the U.S. public said the same about advocating more freedom for Tibet (36 percent) and continuing to sell arms to Taiwan (21 percent).
    • In response to an open-ended question about policy priorities, some U.S. experts considered managing the international balance of power between the two nations to be a top priority, though they were divided on the best approach.
      • While some said it was important to contain China by preventing a buildup of its military and countering its growing military power in Asia and the South China Sea in particular, there was also a desire to avoid conflict between the two countries by increasing military-to-military communication and learning to accommodate China’s growth as a world power.
  • Certain economic issues were also mentioned as priorities by U.S. elites—especially protecting intellectual property, improving cybersecurity, and opening up Chinese markets to U.S. exports.
  • Clear majorities of all Chinese elites cited building a strong relationship with the United States as a very important policy priority. This ranked higher than any other policy priority among all elite categories except government elites, who most frequently cited the need to strongly oppose U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.
  • Slightly more than one-third of the Chinese public cited building a strong relationship with the United States as an important Chinese policy; 32 percent said it was the most important priority. A larger share (45 percent) identified opposing Taiwan arms sales as the most important priority.
  • In response to an open-ended question about policy priorities, Chinese elites most frequently stated that mutual trust and balance should be the highest priority in U.S.-China relations, followed by the economy and mutual benefit and cooperation.
    • Relatively few Chinese elites cited the need to increase China’s strength and counter threats as the most important policy priority vis-à-vis the United States.

Public and elite attitudes in the United States and especially China are exerting a growing influence on the bilateral security relationship.

Potential Sources of Collaboration
    • In response to an open-ended question about potential sources of cooperation, U.S. elites cited the economy as the primary area for collaboration—for example, fostering global economic stability and developing equally beneficial interdependence.
      • American elites also mentioned the potential to collaborate to confront common threats (climate change, terrorism, pandemics, and hot spots on the Korean Peninsula and in the Middle East) and to engage in cultural and scientific exchanges.
  • Similarly, Chinese elites most frequently pointed to the economy as the most helpful way to improve U.S.-China cooperation—more than collaboration in science and technology, cultural exchanges, or other issues.
Greatest Concerns and Potential Sources of Conflict
    • U.S. elites generally expressed less concern than the U.S. public about China’s emergence as a world power (see figure 9).
      • Out of eleven potential sources of concern in U.S.-China relations included in the survey, only alleged cyberattacks from China were considered a very serious problem by at least half of the respondents in all five U.S. elite groups.
      • Relatively small minorities of U.S. elites saw China’s alleged human rights problems, China-Taiwan tensions, or China’s exchange rate policy as a very serious problem.
    • Clear majorities of the U.S. public regarded the U.S. debt held by China, loss of jobs to China, and the trade deficit with China as very serious problems.
      • Among the general public, Republicans were more concerned than Democrats about these three economic issues and about cyberattacks.
      • In contrast, U.S. elites did not express nearly as much concern over U.S. debt held by China, the trade deficit with China, or the loss of jobs to China. In only one case did more than 50 percent of any elite group view one of these issues as a very serious problem (53 percent of media elites saw U.S. debt held by China as a very serious problem).
        • Alleged intellectual property theft, however, was viewed as a very serious problem by U.S. elites, especially businesspeople (62 percent) and retired military elites (60 percent).
    • In response to an open-ended question about potential sources of conflict, U.S. elites most often pointed to regional territorial disputes, economic issues (especially intellectual property and currency), competition for regional dominance, and disagreements over North Korea and Iran.
      • Retired military and business elites also often cited competition over scarce natural resources.
    • There were no problems in the list of eight potential bilateral U.S.-China concerns that a majority of the Chinese public viewed as very serious. U.S. arms sales to Taiwan were regarded by a significant share (45 percent) of the Chinese public as a very serious problem for China, followed by U.S. hegemony (39 percent), curbing China’s rise (that is, containment—37 percent), U.S. support for Tibet (33 percent), U.S. reconnaissance along China’s coast (32 percent), the U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific (28 percent), China-U.S. trade (18 percent), and Internet security (last, at 17 percent).
    • Chinese government elites cited the U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific as the most serious problem for China (57 percent), followed by U.S. efforts to contain China and U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.
      • Chinese media professionals, nonmilitary scholars, and military scholars identified U.S. containment of China as the most serious problem, while business elites pointed to U.S. hegemony.
  • In response to an open-ended question about potential sources of conflict in the relationship, Chinese elites mentioned military issues, followed by the economic realm and then Taiwan.
    • In response to a similar closed-ended question, China’s public and elites viewed Taiwan and then the South China Sea as the most likely among a list of potential sources of conflict over the next two to three years.

Public and elite attitudes in the United States and especially China are exerting a growing influence on the bilateral security relationship.

Taiwan Issue
    • Ten percent of the U.S. public indicated that they had heard a lot about China-Taiwan relations; a majority (54 percent) had heard a little, and a third had heard nothing.
      • The members of the U.S. public who had heard a lot about China-Taiwan relations were split between those who said the United States should use military force to defend Taiwan if China were to use force against the island (48 percent) and those who said the United States should not do so (43 percent).
      • While a strong majority of American elites favored U.S. use of force if China were to attack Taiwan without Taiwan having made a unilateral declaration of independence, a strong majority opposed the use of force if Taiwan were to make such a declaration.
  • More Chinese elites (61 percent) thought the United States would use force to intervene against a Chinese attack on Taiwan without a unilateral declaration of independence than thought the United States would do so if such a declaration were declared (46 percent).

Major Observations and Conclusions From Workshops

Priorities for the U.S.-China Relationship

U.S. Elites Prioritize Building Strong U.S.-China Relations

The majority of American elites surveyed prioritized building a strong U.S.-China relationship above all else. (This is also largely true of Chinese elites, though not to the same extent as American elites.) One U.S. discussant speculated that this could signify that U.S. elites feel that the United States and China are at a critical time when bilateral cooperation could be very positive and beneficial but that tensions could worsen down the road. Therefore, according to this discussant, U.S. elites could believe now is the time to take action and implement confidence-building measures to prevent the relationship from deteriorating.

One elite noted, however, that this does not necessarily mean elites are optimistic about the prospects for a positive relationship. Another discussant commented that although a wide range of elite respondents favored strong relations with China, there is likely wide variation in the policy measures they see as necessary for forging that kind of relationship.

Chinese Government Elites Prioritize a Strong U.S.-China Relationship

Although Chinese government elites in the survey indicated that they strongly endorsed opposing U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, when they were asked to choose one policy priority for the bilateral relationship, the highest priority they identified was building a strong relationship with the United States.

However, one Chinese elite observed that if one of the options on the list of policy priorities had been to increase Chinese capabilities to constrain American actions and defeat the United States if necessary, many Chinese would have likely also supported that priority. Another discussant emphasized that the Chinese government and people have a two-sided policy and perspective on the United States. While they want to build a strong relationship, they also want to deter American behavior that they deem threatening, including nearby naval reconnaissance and Taiwan arms sales.

Another Chinese elite agreed, arguing that the Chinese people view America with both admiration and animosity, much as did Mao Zedong with his “American complex.” In policy terms, then, the areas of tension need to be brought under control and the areas of potential cooperation need to be prioritized.

Taiwan Issue

Taiwan Seen as Most Likely Source of U.S.-China Conflict

One survey question asked Chinese respondents what they saw as the most likely source of conflict between China and the United States in the next two to three years. One American elite expressed surprise that even though the question focused on such a short time horizon, most respondents still identified Taiwan, despite the positive state of cross-strait relations at present and the fact that the Kuomintang Party, which favors eventual reunification with the Chinese mainland, is in power.

Some of the Chinese discussants suggested this may have been because the respondents did not pay particularly close attention to the time frame attached to the question and instead focused on general sources of conflict. They also emphasized that this question was asking not about the likelihood of such a conflict in the next few years but rather what the cause would most likely be were such a conflict to occur. In particular, the question focused on conflict between the United States and China, and the Chinese discussants at the workshop felt it highly unlikely that any of the other factors besides the Taiwan issue would bring the United States into armed conflict with China. One Chinese participant explained that this is because China has not renounced the use of force on the Taiwan issue, but it has sworn off firing the first shot in other disputes. Another Chinese elite pointed to the fact that the United States would likely be unwilling to commit military force in other potential conflicts besides Taiwan, for example, with the Philippines over disputed islands in the South China Sea.

One Chinese elite emphasized that the finding shows how seriously the Chinese people take the Taiwan issue. Another Chinese discussant speculated that the percentage of Chinese identifying Taiwan as the most likely source of conflict may have been even higher had this survey been done when the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party was in power in the early to mid-2000s.

Recent Disputes Over Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands Would Have Likely Changed Perceptions

This survey was conducted in spring–summer 2012. However, some Chinese elites suggested that the results to some of the questions on specific issues may have been different if the survey had been conducted after the flare-up in tensions over the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands that began in September 2012. In particular, this dispute may have been seen as a more likely source of tension and conflict in the U.S.-China relationship even relative to the Taiwan issue.

Mismatch Between Chinese and Americans in Importance Attached to Taiwan Arms Sales

Chinese respondents viewed U.S. arms sales to Taiwan as a much larger issue than Americans did. The Chinese saw it as a major impediment to U.S.-China relations, whereas the Americans placed it very low on a list of bilateral priorities. When a Chinese elite queried why the United States, then, continued this policy, an American discussant responded by pointing to a variety of factors, including the pressures from the U.S. military-industrial complex and its interests in selling arms to Taiwan, a desire to prevent Congress from intervening too much in the matter, and a genuine effort to deter a military solution and maximize the possibility of a peaceful resolution.

However, this U.S. elite emphasized that the level of arms sales should be related to the cross-strait situation based on objective criteria and the larger political context, particularly since the United States will not be able to maintain the cross-strait balance for the next thirty years in the way it has for the last thirty years because China will continue to build its military for other reasons besides Taiwan.

Another American participant expressed his opinion that arms sales to Taiwan are not viewed as a serious threat to the relationship, even in China, unless they were to grow to a level far above what has been seen previously. Thus, Americans in particular look at this problem and see it as far from the most important issue in the relationship.

Public Opinion on Military Intervention in Taiwan Issue May Not Affect U.S. Policy

American elites noted that although the general public does not strongly favor U.S. military intervention in a Taiwan conflict, this would not necessarily dictate U.S. decisionmaking in the event of a conflict.

Suggestions for Framing the Question of Intervention in a Taiwan Conflict

Several Chinese elites believed the questions asked of the American public about whether the United States should use military force to intervene in a conflict over Taiwan should have been framed with a hypothetical scenario of some sort (similar to that used in parallel questions posed to the elites, which posited Chinese use of force with and without a declaration of independence from Taiwan).

However, American discussants responded by explaining that most of the American public was ignorant of the complexities involved in this issue and such a framing would not necessarily reveal much beyond how Americans feel about foreign military intervention in general. In fact, because of this concern, this question was only asked of those 10 percent or so U.S. respondents who indicated that they had heard “a lot” about the Taiwan issue. Some of the Chinese participants felt strongly, however, that the question should have been posed to the entire general public sample, not solely those familiar with the issue.

Cyberattacks and Intellectual Property Theft2

Distinction Between Military Cyberespionage and Cyberattacks and Commercial Cybertheft

American elites emphasized the distinction between cyberespionage and cyberattacks conducted against military and governmental targets on one hand and commercial cybertheft on the other. The former is to be expected and is conducted by the U.S. security apparatus as well, although the U.S. government is loath to acknowledge or discuss this. However, according to these elites (and U.S. government statements), the latter is supposedly not conducted by the U.S. government for a variety of reasons. In contrast, these elites believe, rightly or wrongly, that commercial cybertheft is being carried out by official Chinese government- and PLA-affiliated organs.

One American elite noted that military cyberattacks and cyberespionage may become a greater irritant in the future if the U.S.-China relationship becomes more zero-sum and conflictual. For the moment, however, intellectual property theft is front and center in the minds of elites.

Why U.S. Elites See Cyberattacks and Intellectual Property Theft as Such Serious Issues

One American elite speculated that at present it would be irrational for China not to steal American intellectual property because there is no cost to doing so. Thus, according to some U.S. participants, American elites are struggling with how to make alleged commercial cybertheft more costly for China. Whether this viewpoint is based on an accurate assessment of the actual situation or not, there is a sense of anger about alleged Chinese commercial cybertheft in large parts of the community of people who pay attention to this, even some of those sympathetic to China. Although this issue did not register as much among the American public respondents, it did register high among all five U.S. elites as a serious irritant in the relationship.

The American discussants offered several possible explanations for why alleged Chinese cyberattacks and cybertheft of intellectual property rank so high among elites’ concerns. One participant observed that although there has always been intellectual property theft, cybertheft from China is now supposedly taking place on an unprecedented scale. Another discussant pointed to the sense of vulnerability that cyberattacks induce (regardless of the source of such attacks), as they present a new type of threat that elites may not feel prepared to confront.

In addition, one participant noted that the threat of cyberattacks is immediate rather than latent, which elevates its importance for many elites. Furthermore, many elites have themselves been targeted by what they view as supposed cyberattacks from Chinese sources in a way that the general public has not, so it can become more of a personal issue for them. Finally, elites argue, rightly or wrongly, that American industrial superiority is not always guaranteed and that intellectual property theft is one way China could supposedly gain a competitive advantage over the United States.

Chinese Concerns About U.S. Capabilities in Cyberspace and the Need for Rules

A Chinese elite chimed in during the discussion on cybersecurity issues to argue that China too has its own concerns related to these matters. Not only is China also victimized by cybercrimes, but many Chinese also fear that U.S. computer companies insert malicious technologies into their hardware and software. In the event of a U.S.-China conflict, Chinese fear those technologies could be activated and could wreak havoc on Chinese infrastructure. China also feels that the United States is generally far more advanced in computer and Internet technology. This Chinese elite argued that this sense of mutual victimization and vulnerability suggests the need for the two sides to sit down together and work through rules and mutual agreements on issues of cybersecurity.

Taiwan Issue for Chinese Comparable to Cybersecurity Issue for Americans

Chinese and American discussants thought that, in some ways, the cybersecurity issue is to Americans what the Taiwan issue is to the Chinese. American elites take the matter of cybersecurity very seriously but tend to discount the importance of Taiwan arms sales. Meanwhile, Chinese elites express major concern over U.S. arms sales to Taiwan but are less sensitive to U.S. complaints over cyberattacks. Each side feels that the other has cheated on these two issues. Thus, one Chinese elite suggested that if the two sides can make progress on both these matters, the relationship could be greatly improved.

Economic Issues

Partisan Difference in U.S. Concern Over Economic Issues Vis-à-Vis China

Among U.S. respondents, the top three issues for the general public—debt, jobs, and trade—were economic. Republicans were particularly concerned about these issues. One Chinese elite observed that he would have expected Democrats to be more concerned about these economic issues given their traditional skepticism toward free trade and outsourcing. American discussants responded by speculating that the timing of the survey was probably important in shaping the results. In particular, this survey was conducted in the midst of a presidential campaign wherein these issues were frequently raised, especially in the Republican primary, which may explain the partisan difference.

Economics Seen as Source of Both Conflict and Cooperation

In the open-ended questions asked of elites, economic matters were mentioned most frequently as a source of both potential conflict and potential cooperation. One American participant pointed to former U.S. secretary of state Henry Kissinger’s statement that economics is the backbone of the U.S.-China relationship. However, if the business community were to sour on China, that could pose a serious challenge going forward. (This is one reason why this survey should be repeated in the future, so such attitudes can be tracked longitudinally.)

Another U.S. discussant provided examples of how the economic relationship between the United States and China exhibits a certain duality and how it has cooled in recent years. For instance, there were expectations five to six years ago that clean energy would be a major area of cooperation between the United States and China (and there still are such expectations to some extent). But in reality, clean energy has become an area of significant tension and conflict, with antidumping battles and competitive tensions over issues such as photovoltaics and wind towers.

In another example, although there was effective U.S.-Chinese cooperation through the Group of 20 in the immediate aftermath of the global financial crisis, that collaboration waned significantly. And even though the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which aims to create a unified free-trade area across the Pacific, was originally not targeted at China and is still by and large not about containing China (though China is not a negotiating party), there is now a competing process—the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, which is based on a framework that includes countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations plus China, Japan, and South Korea but excludes the United States.

Policy Implications and Suggestions3

While the survey data could be interpreted in many ways, what follows are some possible implications for decisionmakers and leaders in each country.

  • Take Advantage of the Political Room for Cooperation: Among elites and the general public in both countries, there is strong majority support for strengthening U.S.-China relations. There are also relatively small proportions of the public on both sides that see the other country as an enemy. This should encourage policymakers to enhance bilateral cooperation.
  • Move Away From Military Solutions: Arms buildups and military-oriented solutions to foreign policy challenges and bilateral conflicts were not strongly favored in either country, suggesting support among both publics and elites for decisionmakers to pursue policies designed to reduce such activities.
  • Top Leaders Need to Set the Example: Elites in particular emphasize the need to strengthen bilateral relations. However, there are a range of specific issues that could derail positive relations if they are not given effective policy attention (most importantly, military competition, cybersecurity and intellectual property concerns, and the Taiwan issue, among other topics). Sustained top-level leadership, including at the presidential level, is needed to guide and strengthen public opinion in support of a positive U.S.-China relationship. This will help give the relationship a stronger foundation that can withstand crises or tensions on certain issues.
  • Emphasize Cooperative Elements: The surveys clearly confirm the existence of both highly competitive and highly cooperative elements in the bilateral relationship. Some specific issues, especially in the economic realm, also contain both competitive and cooperative dynamics, likely reflecting mixed sentiments among elites and publics in both countries. This confirms the need for policymakers in the United States and China to better understand how and why specific policy issues generate competitive or cooperative behavior (or both) and to develop more effective policies designed to minimize competition and maximize cooperation. This is especially important given the possibility that the U.S.-China relationship could be entering a period of growing tension over a wide range of issues, from cybersecurity to maritime territorial disputes in East Asia.
  • Build Mutual Trust Through Cooperation, Exchange, and Dialogue: There are relatively low levels of trust between the United States and China, even though the relationship is generally seen as positive and both countries’ publics and elites alike favor strong ties. This could be problematic, as it suggests that there is only a thin buffer to protect the relationship when crises or acute tensions arise. To some extent, it may be that some of the most important ways to build trust are through implementing specific measures of policy cooperation and keeping bilateral commitments. However, these policy measures can encounter difficulties when trust is lacking (for example, the Chinese are very suspicious of the U.S. rebalance in part because they do not trust U.S. assurances that it is not about containing China). Thus, in order to build trust as a basis for cooperation, the two sides should work to deepen official and unofficial exchanges—especially in areas relating to security issues, such as military-to-military contacts—and engage in a more meaningful, deeper dialogue about long-term strategy and interests.
  • Explain Policy Intentions: Many Chinese elites express concern that the United States is seeking to contain China. Likewise, on the part of U.S. elites, there is concern over the uncertainty of China’s long-term intentions. Both sides need to do more to explain their intentions, particularly regarding the U.S. rebalance and China’s military growth.
  • Reconcile Divergent Views of Global Order: In particular, there is a clear divergence between American and Chinese elites on what distribution of power will best serve the interests of both sides and ensure global peace and stability. U.S. elites tend to favor a continuation of dominant or sole U.S. leadership in the world, whereas Chinese elites favor a more multipolar system. This difference could present a serious challenge to the relationship, especially in the Western Pacific, where Beijing is increasing its economic and military capabilities at a significant rate. The two countries would benefit from a much more far-reaching and in-depth discussion of how they intend to coexist and accommodate each other’s interests in the medium to long term in this vital region.
  • Rethink the Taiwan Issue: Elites and the public in the United States tend to underestimate the importance that the Chinese attach to the Taiwan issue (both American groups rank arms sales to Taiwan as a low priority while the Chinese attach strong importance to opposing these arms sales). At the same time, the Chinese do not sufficiently recognize the balance present in U.S. policy when they focus so heavily on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and apparently undervalue U.S. support for the One-China policy. This leads them to allow the issue to damage the overall U.S.-China relationship and military-to-military relations in particular. Both sides should rethink their understanding of this issue to enhance mutual trust.
  • Do Not Treat the Taiwan Issue as an Insurmountable Obstacle: At the same time, the data suggest that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan need not be an automatic and insurmountable impediment to the relationship. On one hand, U.S. elites and the public do not strongly prioritize this issue. On the other, while the Chinese do emphasize the need to oppose U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, they place an even higher priority on building strong relations with America. These data suggest that there may be room for the two sides to work together to reach an understanding on the Taiwan issue—or at least that it does not have to derail the broader relationship.
  • Establish Bilateral Rules on Cybersecurity: Elite opinion in the United States suggests that supposed Chinese intellectual property theft and cyberattacks are seen as the greatest sources of conflict and tension in the bilateral relationship at present. These views are particularly acute among business elites, who have historically been a stabilizing constituency in the U.S.-China relationship. Thus, these issues urgently need to be addressed by the two governments, with mutual rules and procedures to ensure better protections for commercial interests on both sides.
  • Media Should Emphasize the Positive: Representatives from the media in each country do not necessarily espouse more negative views toward the other country than other elite groups or the public. In fact, in some cases, their attitudes are more positive. This suggests that there may be room for them to do more positive reporting on the U.S.-China relationship, particularly since elites who might provide commentary and expert opinion tend to favor stronger bilateral relations. The media should reach out to experts who will provide positive commentary, not only those who are inflammatory. Likewise, governmental, business, and scholarly elites should reach out to the media to help guide the conversation in a positive direction.
  • Keep Social Media Opinion in Perspective: The Internet and social media tend to amplify and reward extremist viewpoints. Much of the data in this survey reveal a general public in both countries that is less extreme, less hawkish, and less adversarial than the tone of social media (or the media in general) might suggest. Chinese and American policymakers should keep this in mind and not let extremist views expressed online or in the broader media hijack the relationship or force their hand on policy decisions.
  • Engage in Cultural Exchanges: There is an appreciation in both countries of various positive characteristics associated with the other country’s people. This suggests that there may be room for more cultural exchange and that people on both sides may be open to learning from each other’s culture.

Notes

1  For the report on U.S. survey results, see “U.S. Public, Experts Di¬ffer on China Policies,” Pew Research Center, September 18, 2012, www.pewglobal.org/2012/09/18/u-s-public-experts-differ-on-china-policies. For the report on Chinese survey results, see “Report on 2012 China-U.S. Security Perceptions Project,” Research Center for Contemporary China, December 2012, available at www.for-peace.org.cn.

2  These workshops took place in early 2013, prior to the revelations by former U.S. National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden about the agency’s cyberespionage activities. As those activities have come to light, many Chinese have expressed their feeling that the revelations blunted the force of U.S. complaints about China in this area.

3  The Pew Research Center does not take policy positions and was not involved in developing any of the policy recommendations contained in this report.

Balancing Without Containment: An American Strategy for Managing China

Ashley J. Tellis

January 22, 2014

Источник: http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/01/22/balancing-without-containment-american-strategy-for-managing-china/i0lq

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China is poised to become a major strategic rival to the United States. Whether or not Beijing intends to challenge Washington’s primacy, its economic boom and growing national ambitions make competition inevitable. And as China rises, American power will diminish in relative terms, threatening the foundations of the U.S.-backed global order that has engendered unprecedented prosperity worldwide. To avoid this costly outcome, Washington needs a novel strategy to balance China without containing it.

Key Themes

  • The loss of American primacy to China would pose unacceptable risks to the security and interests of the United States and its allies.
  • China’s power—unlike that of previous U.S. competitors—stems from Beijing’s deep integration in the U.S.-led global economy.
  • The containment strategy that the United States used to great effect during the Cold War cannot succeed today. Cutting off ties with Beijing and urging China’s neighbors to do the same is politically, economically, and practically unthinkable.
  • Washington should balance Beijing’s growing capabilities by pursuing policies that simultaneously increase China’s stake in the existing global system and raise the costs of abusing its power.

Recommendations for U.S. Policymakers

Bolster Regional Actors. By increasing the national power of China’s neighbors, the United States can constrain Beijing’s behavior and limit its capacity for aggressiveness. This investment is in Washington’s best interest irrespective of whether it is repaid in kind because it will diminish China’s ability to misuse its growing strength and increase American geopolitical maneuverability in the Indo-Pacific. But the United States must be wary of Chinese tactics to subvert these efforts.

Selectively Deepen Globalization. The United States should make trade liberalization a top priority. Since comprehensive global liberalization remains a distant goal, Washington should work to quickly conclude key regional trade pacts, including the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, which promise increased relative gains to the United States and its allies vis-à-vis China.

Bolster U.S. Military Capabilities. To preserve its military superiority in the face of growing Chinese power, Washington should invest in improving U.S. power projection capabilities that will allow it to defeat challenges posed by China’s new strategic denial systems and regain U.S. freedom of action in the Indo-Pacific.

Reinvigorate the U.S. Economy. Revitalizing the domestic economy is imperative to sustaining American hegemony. To maintain its global economic dominance, the United States must emphasize labor force renewal, promote disruptive technological innovations, increase efficiency in production, and resolve the political squabbles that prevent Washington from fixing the country’s public finances.

Defense: FY2015 Authorization and Appropriations

Pat Towell

January 28, 2015

Источник: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/index.html

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In contrast with the debate over the FY2014 defense budget, congressional action on the FY2015
Department of Defense (DOD) “base budget” (that is, the part of the budget not associated with
operations in Afghanistan or other situations designated by the President as emergencies) was not
complicated by disputes over the total amount at issue. For both the FY2015 National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) and the FY2015 Defense Appropriations Act, President Obama’s
request, and versions of the legislation that were passed by the House, approved by the relevant
Senate committees, and finally enacted, varied by amounts that amounted to a small fraction of
1%. The narrow range of disagreements reflected the fact that, in each case, the request and all
versions of the legislation were consistent with the binding cap on defense spending in FY2015
that had been established by the Balanced Budget Act of 2013 (P.L. 113-67).
For the FY2015 NDAA, the President requested base budget authorizations for DOD totaling
$495.5 billion. The version of that bill passed by the House (H.R. 4435) would have authorized
$495.8 billion, the version reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee would have
authorized $496.0 billion, and the enacted bill (H.R. 3979/P.L. 113-291) authorizes $495.9
billion. (See Table 11.)
For base budget programs covered by the FY2015 Defense DOD Appropriations Act (which does
not cover the military construction budget), the Administration requested $484.3 billion. The
version of the bill (H.R. 4870) passed by the House would have added $166.3 million to that total
while the version of H.R. 4870 reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee would have cut
$1.1 billion. The final version of the Defense Appropriations Act (Division C of H.R. 83/P.L. 113-
235) provides $$483.7 billion. (See Table 19.)
Within those similar gross totals, however, the Administration’s budget request and the enacted
DOD funding legislation have some significant differences. Both bills either reject outright or
defers a decision on several cost reduction initiatives proposed by the Administration. At the same
time, both add to the budget billions of dollars for weapons programs and “readiness”
improvements that were not included in the budget request. Those added costs, are offset, in part,
by reductions which, according to the congressional defense committees, will have no adverse
impact on DOD programs. The cost of the congressional additions (in the base budget) is further
offset by the fact that some other costs are shifted into the part of the bill that funds war costs (or
Overseas Contingency Operations – OCO), and thus are exempt from the statutory cap on
discretionary spending. (See “NDAA Highlights” and “DOD Appropriations Overview”,
below.)
The Administration amended its FY2015 budget request for Overseas Contingency Operations
(OCO) three times in the course of 2014, each time expanding its scope to fund other emergent
DOD activities in addition to combat and post-combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.
The final version of the NDAA (H.R. 3979/P.L. 113-291) addressed an OCO request totaling
$63.7 billion from which it cut $1.5 million. Additions, including $1.25 billion to fund equipment
for the National Guard and reserve components and $351.0 million for the Iron Dome anti-rocket
system were offset by a cut to the amended request for the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund
(CTPF) for which the act authorizes $1.3 billion of the $4.0 billion requested.
Defense: FY2015 Authorization and Appropriations
Congressional Research Service
The final version of the FY2015 Defense Appropriations Act (H.R. 83, Division C/P.L. 113-265)
adds $1.54 billion to a $63.7 billion OCO request (which included $112.0 million in emergency
appropriations for DOD activities to combat the Ebola virus).

Train and Equip Program for Syria: Authorities, Funding, and Issues for Congress

Christopher M. Blanchard

Amy Belasco

June 9, 2015

Источник: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/index.html

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In 2014, Congress for the first time provided the President with authority and funds to overtly

train and lethally equip vetted members of the Syrian opposition for select purposes. These

purposes include supporting U.S. efforts to combat the Islamic State and other terrorist

organizations in Syria and setting the conditions for a negotiated settlement to Syria’s civil war.

The FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, P.L. 113-291) and the FY2015

Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (P.L. 113-235) provided that up to

$500 million could be transferred from the newly-established Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund

(CTPF) to train and equip such Syrian forces. Additional funding could be provided from other

sources for the Syrian Train and Equip Program, including from foreign contributions, subject to

the approval of the congressional defense committees.

As of June 2015, the defense committees have approved the transfer of $500 million in FY2015

CTPF funds for the program and an additional $80 million in Defense Working Capital Funds for

related U.S. government operations. Several hundred U.S. military training personnel and a

similar number of support personnel have deployed in support of the program. According to

Administration officials, the intention is for the program to field a force of approximately 3,000

vetted Syrians in 2015 and 5,400 others per year in 2016 and, if authorized, in 2017. The

authority provided in the FY2015 NDAA expires after December 31, 2016.

In FY2016, the Administration is requesting $600 million in a new, separate Syria Train and

Equip account that, if authorized and appropriated as requested, would not require advance

notification and approval by the four defense committees.

Current debate over the program—as expressed in congressional consideration of proposed

FY2016 defense authorization and appropriations legislation (H.R. 2685, H.R. 1735, S. 1376)

centers on:

  • The amounts, alignment, and terms associated with FY2016 funding for the

program.

  • The extent and type of U.S. support or protection, if any, that may be provided to

Syrian trainees upon their return to Syria, especially in the event of attack by pro-

Asad or other forces in Syria.

  • The size, scope, and effectiveness of the Syria Train and Equip Program as

currently implemented; its purposes relative to overarching U.S. strategy toward

Syria; and its integration with U.S.-led coalition efforts to combat the Islamic

State organization.

  • The content and scope of requested strategy and reporting requirements.

A Way Forward for Obama and Putin in Syria

Eugene Rumer

October 7, 2015

Источник: http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/10/07/way-forward-for-obama-and-putin-in-syria/iin7

With no solution to the Syria crisis in sight, it is time to resort to what has worked in other seemingly unsolvable crises: the P5+1 mechanism.

The crisis in Syria has become a standoff between the U.S. and Russia. Each side is blaming the other for it. Moscow charges the Syrian tragedy is the direct consequence of U.S. unilateral, delusional pursuit of democracy in the Middle East. Washington insists that Russian support for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is the cause. The most the two seem to be able to agree on is to talk about de-conflicting their air operations to avoid a mid-air collision between their planes. With no solution in sight, it is time to resort to what has worked in other seemingly unsolvable crises: the P5+1 mechanism.

The P5+1—the U.S., Russia, France, Great Britain, China, all U.N. Security Council permanent members joined by Germany—is a unique forum where the key parties can come together to seek a way to solve the Syrian crisis. In addition to the major powers, the P5+1 format has the advantage of being able to engage Iran, a critical actor in Syria without whom no solution can be found. The trust built up between the P5+1 countries and Iran in the course of the negotiations about Iran’s nuclear program, and the success of those talks make for a unique basis to address the Syrian crisis. The U.S. and Russia can ill afford to squander it.

For Russia, President Vladimir Putin’s deployment of air assets to Syria was a clever tactical move that reasserted Russia’s power. Getting into Syria was easy for Putin. Getting out of it may be harder. Air strikes alone will not end the conflict. Even though some in Moscow have hinted that Russian “volunteers” may go to Syria to fight ISIL and other enemies of Assad, Putin said he has no plans to put Russian boots on the ground in Syria. The Russian public is opposed to sending troops there. Many voices in Moscow have sounded the alarm about getting bogged down. P5+1 talks on Syria would offer Putin a way out. And as in nuclear talks with Iran, this format guarantees Putin a seat at the big powers’ table.

Unlike other powers, Iran, an important Russian ally, has boots on the ground in Syria. Iran’s client Hezbollah has been deeply involved in the war, and Iranian troops have been reported fighting in Syria as well, backing Assad. Through its involvement in Syria, Iran, too, has positioned itself as a key party to any future resolution of the Syrian war. It has the ability to undermine any agreement reached without it. It should have a seat at the table.

For Europe, scrambling to deal with Syrian refugees, ending the conflict is top priority. European leaders have yet to offer any comprehensive solution to the crisis other than appealing for all parties to end the fighting. Anything that offers a way out of the crisis is better than nothing.

For the U.S., the P5+1 format would bring some advantages as well as a measure of compromise. It would insulate the U.S. from the charge of unilateralism and create a real coalition to deal with the crisis whose legitimacy under the U.N. umbrella would be unassailable. It would impose the P5+1 framework on what otherwise is Russian unilateralism and could potentially harness Russian military presence constructively on behalf of the coalition. If this was not accepted by Putin, the U.S. could expose his bluff and open him to the charge of unilateralism.

The P5+1 format would require that the U.S. put aside the condition that Assad must step down prior to or as a result of the settlement talks. In fact, recent U.S. statements suggest there is some flexibility in the U.S. position on this issue. U.S. willingness to stop insisting on Assad’s departure and agree to address this issue in the future would open the possibility of creating a real coalition to defeat ISIL and a political solution for the Syrian war, which are the key U.S. goals, shared by Russia, Iran, Europe and—yes—Assad.

Other parties to the conflict—Turkey, Saudi Arabia, other Persian Gulf States—may complain about Iran’s role and Assad remaining in power for now. But in all the years of the war in Syria, they have offered no solution to the crisis, and no way to stop the bloodshed. They should have a voice, but they should not be in a position to block the talks.

Finally, for the Syrians themselves, the P5+1 involvement would offer the reassurance of the international community’s support and involvement in any future settlement in Syria. For the beleaguered Syrian opposition, it would be a commitment by the P5+1 countries that they will not be abandoned to the mercy of Assad’s troops after the conflict is over. For Assad and his supporters, Russia’s and Iran’s presence would serve as a reassurance and hold out the possibility of an orderly transition instead of a defeat or endless conflict.

This is neither the perfect nor a guaranteed solution to the Syrian war. But insisting on the perfect and ignoring the good is not an option while thousands of Syrians are dying.

This article was originally published in Time.

Obama and the Middle East: Rightsizing the U.S. Role

Marc Lynch

October 9, 2015

Источник: http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/10/09/obama-and-middle-east-rightsizing-u.s.-role/iiyo

Changing the failed regional order in the Middle East and rightsizing the American presence was never going to be easy, and the next president will likely discover a new respect for Obama as he or she grapples with the region’s continuing implosion.

Critics of U.S. President Barack Obama’s Middle East strategy often complain that Obama lacks a strategic vision. This is almost exactly wrong. Obama came to office with a conviction that reducing the United States’ massive military and political investment in the Middle East was a vital national security interest in its own right. The occupation of Iraq and the excesses of the war on terrorism had left the United States overextended, especially at a time of economic crisis. “Rightsizing” the United States’ footprint in the region meant not only reducing its material presence but also exercising restraint diplomatically, stepping back and challenging allies to take greater responsibility for their own security. Obama has adhered consistently to this strategy, prioritizing it ruthlessly along the way and firmly resisting efforts to force it off track. This was not a strategy much beloved in Washington or in a region hard-wired for the exercise of American power. But it was a clear and coherent strategy that led Obama to undertake major initiatives on the problems he viewed as rising to the level of core national security interests: Iran’s nuclear weapons program, terrorism, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the war in Iraq.

Yet for all of Obama’s analytic acuity, the implementation of his policies has often floundered. His administration has consistently failed to deliver on the promises raised by his inspirational speeches. It has struggled to communicate its policies effectively to publics in the Middle East and has been unable to explain obvious hypocrisies. Efforts to remain evenhanded and noninterventionist have infuriated partisans on all sides who wanted unconditional U.S. support rather than an honest broker.

The administration has struggled to adapt when its policies have failed, from Israel’s refusal to freeze settlement building to Egypt’s military coup to the disintegration of the Iraqi military in the face of what would become the self-declared Islamic State, or ISIS. It has also failed either to restrain or to reassure U.S. allies, which have therefore worked, without penalty, to undermine many U.S. foreign policy initiatives. The Middle East’s autocrats had previously thrived thanks to U.S. security guarantees and a shared antipathy to Iran and Islamists, and they wanted no part of a United States that might support, however tentatively, popular demands for democratic participation, diplomatic engagement with Tehran, or the political inclusion of Islamist movements. Nor did Israel under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, ever more closely aligned with the Republican Party, want much to do with U.S.-led peace talks with the Palestinians or outreach to Iran.

The end result has been a gaping chasm between Obama’s analytic successes and his operational failures. Yet the administration has nevertheless gotten the biggest issues shaping the region right. It avoided any deep military commitments in Syria and extricated U.S. forces from Iraq, secured a nuclear deal with Iran, and endorsed the Arab uprisings. On other key issues, such as pushing democratization in Egypt and pursuing Israeli-Palestinian peace, it had the right ideas but failed to deliver. Changing the failed regional order in the Middle East and rightsizing the American presence was never going to be easy, and the next president will likely discover a new respect for Obama as he or she grapples with the region’s continuing implosion.

A VISION UNREALIZED

When he entered office, Obama was determined to rebalance U.S. commitments to the Middle East. The repeated attempts to broker an Israeli-Palestinian peace seemed quixotic in the face of a hostile Israeli government and a fractured Palestinian polity, but either success or failure would finally free Washington from a process that had consumed astonishing amounts of diplomatic time and attention for more than two decades. Similarly, a nuclear agreement with Iran would not only resolve a primary national security challenge without war but also finally allow Washington to pivot away from that issue to others, within and outside the region, that had been subordinated for over a decade.

The Iraq fiasco deeply shaped the administration’s worldview. The administration correctly viewed the invasion of Iraq as a catastrophic misjudgment that had opened the doors to humanitarian suffering, civil war, virulent new forms of jihadism, and greater Iranian regional power. Obama saw that the 2007 U.S. troop surge had reduced the violence but failed to resolve the root political crisis. It was as clear in 2007 as it is today that military success would be irrelevant without political accommodation and that there would always be an insatiable demand for more troops, more weapons, and more commitment. Even if the Bush administration had not bequeathed to him a status-of-forces agreement mandating the ultimate withdrawal of all U.S. troops, and even if the Iraqi government had not wanted the troops to leave, Obama would still have had no interest in keeping large numbers of U.S. forces in Iraq.

The withdrawal from Iraq was a priority from the beginning, carefully implemented and successful on its own terms. No number of U.S. troops would have made a lasting difference in Iraq. Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki ignored U.S. guidance when tens of thousands of U.S. troops were on the ground, and he would have continued to pursue personal power even had a residual force stayed behind. Nor was there any serious chance that the United States could have forced the Iraqis in 2010 to accept a government led by Ayad Allawi, a supposed missed opportunity. Iraq’s subsequent failure, the renewed civil war, and the growth of the Islamic State are due not to the U.S. withdrawal but to Maliki’s sectarian, corrupt rule over a shattered state. The withdrawal was well timed: had Obama not withdrawn U.S. troops when he did, the fall of Mosul would almost certainly have led to the reintroduction of tens of thousands of U.S. soldiers to refight the same futile war in defense of the same failed state.

Beyond resolving old wars, Obama resisted efforts to drag the United States into new wars. The chaos in Libya following the U.S.-led military campaign in 2011 only confirmed Obama’s instincts that interventions rarely work as planned and that no amount of U.S. military commitment can favorably resolve the region’s conflicts. This is why he, for years, kept the United States out of Syria’s quagmire, except for reportedly providing covert support for rebel groups, despite immense pressure to do otherwise—an enormously wise decision that the interventionist policy community will likely never forgive.

THE IRANIAN PRIORITY

Obama’s nuclear diplomacy with Iran is a textbook example of a successfully conceived and implemented foreign policy: priorities outlined, resources allocated, outcome achieved. Obama’s team maintained the tenuous unity of the P5+1 (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, plus Germany) to achieve an agreement that met the most vital needs of all parties, with robust limitations on Iran’s nuclear program and staged sanctions relief. The deal delivers on the hopes of a generation of U.S. policymakers, against steep odds.

The case for the Iran deal has always been straightforward. Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons poses a major threat to U.S., regional, and global security, yet there has never been a viable military option for checking the country’s nuclear ambitions, whether it was Israel acting alone or a U.S.-led coalition. Sanctions could hurt Iran’s economy and put pressure on its leadership, but they could never on their own either bring down the regime or force it to capitulate. Hopes for regime change from below remained a fantasy, even during the height of the 2009 Green Movement protests.

That left only diplomacy, with the major questions revolving around whether two suspicious powers could strike a deal that would meet the demands of their cantankerous allies and domestic critics. The Obama administration found ways to thread multiple needles and arrived at a deal that meets the core needs of each side.

Many critics of the deal have raised serious concerns about the ability of its system of inspections to guarantee compliance and about the plausibility of restoring sanctions should Iran break its word. The deeper objection, however, is grounded in the fear that a deal is a prelude to an acceptance of Iranian regional hegemony. These critics fear that the nuclear deal will legitimize Iran’s hegemonic role in the region at the expense of the traditional U.S.-backed order, empowering Iran’s regional ambitions through sanctions relief and a diplomatic opening. They have thus sought to maintain the narrow focus on the nuclear realm and publicly signal the United States’ intent to continue to counter Iranian ambitions elsewhere in the region.

This effort to limit the politically transformative aspects of the deal will probably succeed in the short term. All the players, from Saudi Arabia and Israel to Iran itself, will likely escalate confrontational behavior in arenas such as Syria and Yemen to demonstrate to domestic and international constituencies that they have not capitulated. Over the longer term, however, the successful deal will likely build a shared interest in its continuation and begin to create common interests. That could pave the way toward more effective campaigns in Iraq and Syria, although within clear limits. Obama has no illusions about the nature of the Iranian regime or the depth of the ongoing regional conflicts. The idea that the United States will realign itself with Tehran is a fiction invented mostly by critics on the right. The end state, for Obama, is not a reorientation toward Tehran but rather the construction of a stable regional balance of power—one that does not require the permanent deployment of vast amounts of U.S. resources.

THE AUDACITY OF HOPE

For Obama, the Arab uprisings raised the tantalizing prospect of fundamentally changing the region’s toxic structures. On May 19, 2011, he gave one of the best speeches of his administration on the Middle East. He placed the Arab uprisings in the long sweep of history and aligned the United States with the protesters demanding change—puzzling, indeed, to the despots who had long counted the United States as their primary ally. The strategic vision and moral clarity in this speech were pitch perfect. Obama recognized the aspirations of Arab citizens suffering under autocracy while pushing both regimes and citizens alike toward democracy rather than violence. He was right to embrace the uprisings and to seek to channel them into democratic institutions. Although he failed to support the uprisings consistently across the region or to manage the political wars they unleashed, it was always unclear what more the United States could have done.

Whereas Tunisia’s uprising occurred on the margins of U.S. attention, Egypt’s struck at the heart of the U.S.-led regional order. The millions of Arabs who took to the streets in the first few months of 2011 rarely agreed on their ultimate objectives. What united them was an intense desire to break the existing political order, one in which Washington was deeply implicated. Obama nonetheless viewed the protests that swept the region through a guardedly hopeful lens, framing them within the vision of progressive and moral change that has so clearly run through his political vision at home. This was a remarkable and historically admirable stance, especially given the challenge the protests posed to U.S.-backed regimes.

This embrace of the uprisings was a gamble, of course, and Obama took real risks to try to realize a vision that has, at least in the short term, failed. Obama recognized that Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak could not survive and helped broker a peaceful transition. He supported elections and democratic institutions in Egypt, even as Islamists won most of the 2011 and 2012 elections and governance crumbled. That gamble—supporting the inclusion of the Muslim Brotherhood within the democratic system—could have been transformational. Had the Brotherhood suffered a defeat in elections following its lost popularity rather than being overthrown in a military coup in July 2013, Egypt and the Middle East would be a far better place today. The administration’s public warnings about the anti-Brotherhood protests and the dangers of a coup have been vindicated by the repressive, unstable regime that followed.

The administration applied its vision for the Arab Spring inconsistently, however, and when forced to choose, it usually opted to sacrifice transformation for expedience in the service of its broader strategy of rightsizing. It rarely spoke out about the brutal repression of protests in Bahrain for fear of alienating its Gulf partners. It allowed Saudi Arabia to take the lead in Yemen’s transition, with predictably antidemocratic results. It struggled to find the right balance between supporting Egypt’s postrevolution leaders, whether military or Muslim Brotherhood, and criticizing their mistakes. It watched as postwar Libya collapsed into anarchic, violent chaos.

Obama read the transformative potential of the Arab Spring accurately, but he couldn’t figure out how to guide it in the right direction. This failure was partly due to the primal forces unleashed and partly due to the destructive role of U.S. allies that worked hard to frustrate any movement toward democracy. The complaint that the administration did not offer the resources necessary to support the political transitions in Tunisia and Egypt is both true and somewhat beside the point. The amount of money the United States was willing to offer the Egyptians was not enough to meaningfully affect their calculations, especially when putative U.S. allies such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates were devoting far greater sums to promoting opposing policies. Egyptians who felt they were fighting an existential battle over the identity of their state had little interest in Obama’s advice, especially when the local media were attacking, insulting, and distorting his every move.

The trouble went beyond implementation, however. Obama’s approach to the Arab uprisings was both visionary and incoherent. The administration sympathized with the aspirations of the protesters and hoped to encourage democratic transitions. But it struggled to grasp the fact that the old order under attack was a U.S.-backed regional order, defended by U.S. allies concerned, above all, with keeping themselves in power. The right side of history, on which Obama hoped to place the United States, may have appealed to American values, but it viscerally challenged American interests. When the transitions failed, ending in authoritarian retrenchment or state collapse, the administration had few fallback options beyond cutting its losses and grudgingly accepting the new realities.

WARS, FOUGHT AND UNFOUGHT

Obama always wanted to extricate the United States from existing wars and avoid being dragged into new ones. He has largely succeeded. It is difficult to get credit for things that have not happened, but it is all too easy to imagine a United States today fighting major counterinsurgency campaigns in multiple Arab countries. That the United States currently has only a relatively small number of troops in advisory and support roles in Iraq, and an even more limited presence in Libya, Syria, and Yemen, is a major accomplishment on its own merits.

Before launching an air campaign against the Islamic State, Obama strayed from his rule of avoiding military interventions only once, in Libya. The humanitarian intervention there was, and remains, defensible. Had the United States not acted, it is almost certain that great bloodshed would have followed as the world watched and blamed the West for failing to protect civilians. The Libyan dictator Muammar al-Qaddafi showed no real signs of willingness to compromise, and he would likely have survived in power against a long, grinding insurgency. That would have been a crushing blow to the then vital Arab uprisings, emboldening other challenged leaders to escalate their use of military force.

Washington’s use of airpower and indirect military aid was therefore justifiable, saving thousands of lives and speeding the fall of a particularly nasty dictator. Libya’s subsequent collapse, however, provided ample support for skeptics of the intervention and should force a deeper rethinking of the virtues of military action in the region. The partisan investigations of the events in Benghazi in September 2012 are a sideshow compared with the broader lessons of the unintended, catastrophic consequences of even noble interventions. The intervention inspired at least some within the Syrian opposition to escalate their armed campaign in the hopes of attracting a similar U.S.-led operation, with tragic results. Interventionists have desperately fought to distinguish the U.S. campaign from its later outcome, just as they did after Iraq turned into a fiasco, but this is a fool’s errand.

The Obama administration’s willingness to support the Saudi campaign in Yemen has been more cynical. Few in Washington believe the Saudi rationale for war, and even fewer believe the campaign has any hope of success. In reality, the United States was appeasing the Saudis on Yemen in order to prevent them from acting as a spoiler on the Iran talks, thereby condemning millions of Yemenis to pointless suffering.

Middle East power politics today are dominated by proxy wars and interventions. The disruption or collapse of governments in Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen has transformed those countries into open arenas for regional powers to wage their political conflicts. Iran mobilized Shiite networks and militias, and Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey mobilized Sunni Islamist networks of various denominations. The resulting proxy wars have been hugely destructive, opening the way to more independent and potent nonstate actors, such as the Islamic State. The United States has wisely shied away from openly joining this game, but this has left it with limited options on the new battlefields, as it failed to prevent its allies or adversaries from doing their worst. Nobody has won the proxy wars, which have caused immense human suffering and exacerbated the core problems of state failure and radicalization.

The defining issue of Obama’s tenure will likely be Syria, whose bloodshed, radicalization, and regional destabilization will haunt the Middle East for decades to come. Few policies have been criticized more widely than Obama’s refusal to become militarily involved in support of Syria’s insurgency. It is easy to understand the outrage in the face of the Syrian regime’s unrelenting carnage and daily evils. But the hard reality, which Obama understood, is that none of the popular proposals for intervention would have made things better. Syria was doomed to its horrific civil war almost from the moment President Bashar al-
Assad chose to resort to military repression to stay in power and his opponents chose to take up arms and transform a peaceful uprising into an insurgency. U.S. forces could have been more or less deeply involved in the civil war that followed, but no degree of U.S. military intervention would have solved the problem. Even a large-scale military action would likely have failed, as the fruitless occupation of Iraq so painfully demonstrated.

Supporters of a Syria intervention usually insisted that they did not want U.S. boots on the ground. But the Obama administration was keenly aware of the pressures for escalation that would have followed even a limited operation, because the ideas for a limited U.S. intervention made little sense. Assad was not going to run away at the first sign of NATO bombers, and the limits of airpower have been demonstrated by the air campaign in Iraq and Syria against the Islamic State. A no-fly zone might have quickly grounded Assad’s air force, but it would not have protected rebels from mortars or ground actions. Providing antiaircraft weapons to the rebels would have made a tactical difference but would also have posed 
a threat to civil aviation. The U.S. military would have had to defend any safe areas that it declared, which could not be done from the air alone.

Arming the opposition, the most popular proposal and one that the United States has fitfully pursued, 
was always the least likely to succeed. The Syrian opposition was from the beginning hopelessly fragmented and has become increasingly radicalized as the war has ground on. As early as 2012, huge amounts of money and guns were already flowing to opposition groups from the Gulf countries and Turkey, and covert U.S. operations were already under way. But there were few effective and ideologically acceptable groups that the United States could comfortably arm. Arming the opposition would not have given the United States control over these groups, and it would have inevitably entailed U.S. support for extreme jihadists. Insurgents do insurgent things, and as the Syrian uprising morphed into an insurgency, it became increasingly radicalized and brutal.

Assad’s foreign patrons roughly matched whatever support came to the insurgents. As a result, increased external help for the Syrian rebels led only to a more destructive balance of power, with minor fluctuations in each direction within a broader strategic stalemate. And an empowered opposition was always going to become less willing to compromise, as was an empowered Assad. Short of an outright victory by one side, no balance of power could have compelled negotiations.

In the face of all of this, the Obama administration was wise to resist the slippery slope of intervention and instead to try to corral its allies, shape the conditions for negotiations, and alleviate human suffering. Its worst blunder, the aborted bombing threat of August and September 2013, demonstrated just how easy it was to get drawn in: Obama’s redline on the use of chemical weapons had been mostly a rhetorical sop to give the appearance of toughness, but once articulated, it became costly to abandon. Obama was wise enough to walk away and pay the reputational costs of backing down—but it is telling how near a thing the bombing was.

ISLAMISM EVOLVED

Obama came to office intending to defeat al Qaeda with a lighter footprint, through drone strikes, partnerships with local allies, and the cultivation of more moderate Islamist groups. He understood the nuances of intra-Islamist politics and seized the opportunity to divide the mainstream of Islamism from al Qaeda and stop the spiral toward a clash of civilizations.

For the first four years of his administration, this approach was largely successful. Al Qaeda lost political and organizational ground across the region, culminating in the May 2011 killing of Osama bin Laden. Mainstream groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliates entered the political process following the Arab uprisings, winning elections in Tunisia and Egypt. Obama’s June 2009 speech in Cairo, in which he rejected the notion that the West and Islam were locked in an inevitable contest, launched his strategy against Islamist violent extremism to an effective start, as did the withdrawal from Iraq and the repudiation of the cruder brutalities of the war on terrorism. Obama’s willingness to work with the Muslim Brotherhood following Mubarak’s fall was a departure from decades of U.S. policy and the strongest signal Obama ever sent that the United States believes in democracy regardless of who wins. By early 2012, Obama’s policies on Islamism were proving successful.

Egypt’s military coup and subsequent weakening of the Muslim Brotherhood, the regional support for the Syrian jihad, and Maliki’s sectarian misrule—all of which, to some degree, the Obama administration opposed—were the primary drivers of the resurgence of jihadism in the form of the Islamic State. The intense anti-Brotherhood drive in Egypt and the Gulf discredited the idea of democratic participation, much to the relief of antidemocratic Arab regimes, and removed the protection against violent extremism that the Brotherhood had long offered. The Islamic State has benefited from the regionwide setbacks of the Muslim Brotherhood, which have removed a principle ideological and organizational competitor. As Obama’s team foresaw, Egypt’s rising violence, instability, and extremism are the direct result of this repressive turn.

Syria’s civil war created the environment in which jihadism could regain its traction after years of decline. The Islamic State itself grew partly out of the remains of the never-fully-defeated Iraqi insurgency and thrived under 
the sectarian misrule of Maliki. It has prospered amid the fragmented, multipolar Syrian insurgency populated by countless ideologically similar groups funded by Turkey and the Gulf states. Other shattered states have offered secondary opportunities to expand. The Islamic State has also, ironically, benefited from Obama’s success against al Qaeda; the killing of bin Laden created a vacuum at the center that invited challenge from the periphery.

Analysts have fixated on the Islamic State’s ideological particularities, often acting as if no insurgency in history has ever seized and governed territory, used graphic violence as an instrument of power, and indoctrinated its members. The Islamic State’s strength derives from the weakness of its adversaries and from its ability to capitalize on the failures of the Arab uprisings. The group has thrived in areas of religious polarization and state collapse: in Iraq and Syria, of course, but also in shattered Libya and post-coup Egypt. It has tapped into the same jihadist narratives and networks that once fed al Qaeda’s insurgencies, and its tactics increasingly involve the types of terrorist attacks once associated with al Qaeda. It feeds off of the perception of inevitability but could crumble quickly if setbacks begin to pile up. But even the collapse of the Islamic State would do little to reduce the broader challenge posed by sectarianism and jihadism, which flourish in the current regional environment.

RIGHTSIZING AND WRONGSIZING

Such restraint will continue to be resisted by all the actors whose strategies were shaped by the old state of affairs. During the Bush administration, Israel faced little pressure to make peace with the Palestinians, and Arab despots figured out that cooperation against terrorism and Iran would deflect calls for democratic reforms. Iraq’s prime minister enjoyed regular videoconferences with the U.S. president and inexhaustible U.S. military support. Few, if any, of the region’s leaders and elites were eager to disrupt a regional order that suited them so well. Recent public power plays by Israel and the Gulf states to extract more support from Washington reflect their uncertainty about their place in the new order.

It remains to be seen whether Obama’s policies will represent a transformational moment in the United States’ approach to the Middle East or merely a temporary aberration. Obama’s successor, whether Democratic or Republican, will likely try to correct his alleged failings with interventions. Much of the U.S. foreign policy establishment would like to see a resurgence of the U.S. military presence in the region, especially in Iraq and Syria. And so the next president will almost certainly rush to distance him- or herself from Obama, only to discover that the structural realities of the region justify Obama’s vision.

This article was originally published in Foreign Affairs.

 

The 2015 National Security Strategy: Authorities, Changes, Issues for Congress

Nathan J. Lucas, Coordinator

Kathleen J. McInnis

October 1, 2015

Источник: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/index.html

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The Obama Administration released a new National Security Strategy (NSS) on February 6, 2015. It was the second NSS document to be published by the Administration; the first was published in May 2010. The 2015 document states that its purpose is to “set out the principles and priorities to guide the use of American power and influence in the world.” The NSS is a congressionally mandated document, originating in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-433, §603/50 U.S.C §3043).

The 2015 NSS emphasizes the role of U.S. leadership; the words “lead,” “leader,” “leading,” and “leadership” appear 94 times in the context of the U.S. role in the world. It also acknowledges national limitations and calls for strategic patience and persistence.

The 2015 report retains much of the underlying thought of the 2010 version. However, its emphasis appears to shift away from the U.S. role in the world being largely a catalyst for action by international institutions to one that reflects more involved leadership both inside those institutions and between nations.

It also takes a tougher line with both China and with Russia, while emphasizing the desirability for cooperation with both.

The 2015 report raises a number of potential oversight questions for Congress, including the following:

 Does the 2015 NSS accurately identify and properly emphasize key features and trends in the international security environment? Does it adequately address the possibility that since late 2013 a fundamental shift in the international security environment has occurred that suggests a shift from the familiar post-Cold War era to a new and different strategic situation?

 Does the 2015 NSS qualify as a true strategy in terms of linking ends (objectives), means (resources), ways (activities), and in terms of establishing priorities among goals? Is it reasonable to expect the unclassified version of an NSS to do much more than identify general objectives?

 Does the 2015 NSS properly balance objectives against available resources, particularly in the context of the limits on defense spending established in the Budget Control Act of 2011? Are Administration policies and budgets adequately aligned with the 2015 NSS?

 As part of its anticipated review of the Goldwater-Nichols act, how should Congress define its role in shaping national security strategy? Should Congress do this through an independent commission, or in some other way?

 Are NSS statements performing the function that Congress intended? How valuable to Congress are they in terms of supporting oversight of Administration policies and making resource-allocation decisions? Should the mandate that requires the Administration to submit national security strategy reports be repealed or modified? If it should be modified, what modifications should be made?

Putin and Politics Are Behind Obama’s Decision to Send Troops to Syria

David Rothkopf

October 30, 2015

Источник: http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/10/30/putin-and-politics-are-behind-obama-s-decision-to-send-troops-to-syria/ikrw

Whatever stated anti-Islamic State purpose there may be for the involvement of U.S. forces in Syria, it also—and perhaps even primarily—has a political purpose.

Vladimir Putin ordered U.S. troops into combat in Syria on Friday. That’s not what White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest said when explaining the decision to send as many as 50 special operations forces into a training, assistance, and advisory role in that country, but that’s the reality. If the Russian president hadn’t made his move into Syria, the United States would not have felt compelled to finally, belatedly, shore up support for anti-Islamic State and anti-Assad allies in that embattled, long-suffering country.

How do we know that? The past three years are how we know that. Those years have been a period during which the president’s own top national security advisors were unable to get him to take more decisive action to stop the decay in Syria — which gave way to the upheaval that now fuels not only the rise of the world’s most dangerous extremists but also the overflow of refugees into Europe and neighboring countries in the Middle East. But Putin, apparently, has more sway in the Oval Office than Hillary Clinton, Bob Gates, Leon Panetta, David Petraeus, and a host of others whose counsel went unheeded ever did.

Putin’s decisiveness in engaging in Syria has shifted the balance of power in that country. It has not only unquestionably shored up President Bashar al-Assad’s regime, but it has also sent a message that opponents of Assad (including some ostensible U.S. allies among the rebel fighters in Syria) were going to be the targets of the fiercest military attacks rather than the Islamic State extremists the United States and its allies were seemingly seeking to defeat. The Russians talked up their opposition to the Islamic State, but the pattern of their initial strikes indicated that the primary goal was protecting their man in Damascus. (Putin’s long-term motives in Syria remain misunderstood by many in Washington. They do not seem to understand that he does not seek to transform the country or do any of the things that would make Russia’s involvement a dangerous quagmire for him. He simply seeks to ensure that the regime in Syria’s capital is acceptable to him. That means keeping Assad in place or being involved enough to have a clear say in choosing his successor. That is all. If the rest of the country roils and sends refugees into Europe, shoring up nationalists and weakening support for the EU, all the better for Putin. In fact, it would be a win-win for the Russian Tarzan.)

Whatever stated anti-Islamic State purpose there may be for the U.S. forces involvement in Syria, it also — and perhaps even primarily — has a political purpose. (As a general rule, if a military action seems to be too small to advance a military objective then it probably is being done for political reasons.) Domestically, the move to send U.S. Special Forces into Syria helps the president address the perception of American inaction that was seen to have contributed to the Russian intervention while also helping to address concerns that the administration’s efforts to train the Syrian opposition have been a failure to date. As far as geopolitics is concerned, it lends credibility to America’s desired role in advancing the multiparty talks about Syria’s future taking place in Vienna this week. It says the United States is involved and also suggests to the Russians that the conflict in Syria may grow more complex for them (as we work toward not always overlapping goals) so it provides a little pressure on that front as well.

In fact, what it also ends up meaning is that for the foreseeable future in Syria there’s going to be a whole lot of “de-conflicting” going on. The United States and its allies, the Russians, the Iranians, and the Syrians will have to work to ensure that in the confused fog of the Syrian war — on which some battle zones contain scores of factions — the collateral damage does not include destabilizing otherwise stable relationships between major powers. A subsequent consequence that seems inevitable anyway, given the complexity of the Syrian conflict, is that the Russians or Iranians will be found increasingly attacking and killing fighters who are direct proxies of the Saudis, Qataris, and others. And when that happens, we will suddenly see the greatest geopolitical clusterfuck of the current era get even clusterfuckier.

I understand the White House’s decision clearly. It makes some political sense. It may help nudge political discussions regarding Syria’s future forward. Secretary of State John Kerry is pushing hard on this front, but at the moment there are too many moving parts to make real progress. And, as is the case in other conflicts, like that of Israel and Palestine, while the end deal is clear, getting politicians to admit that is going to be tough. (And the reality of that end deal looks like this: Assad stays for transition, leaves with immunity, is replaced by Assad-lite alternative acceptable to Moscow and Tehran, and the United States gets a fig leaf of promise of a more inclusive Syrian government — one that is soon forgotten because everyone values stability above niceties like democracy or respect for human rights — while much of the country will remain in turmoil because Damascus doesn’t, and may never again, control it.)

I also understand the decision to send in troops because of my extensive training in the field that is really the birthplace of geopolitics, which is to say “show business.” (My first half-dozen or so years after college were spent directing and writing for theater and television.) In show business, one of the most often quoted maxims is “acting is reacting.” It means that good actors listen to the other actors they are working with and respond to what they are given rather than anticipating their business or emotions simply because they are called for in the script.

In foreign policy, sometimes smart reacting is called for. As with theater, a performance is best when it comes naturally, quickly, and doesn’t seem forced or unduly delayed. But on the world stage, reaction is, of course, not enough. Leaders must lead. They must be willing to take the first step sometimes, show initiative, set the rules, and take risks. That is why canned (and let’s face it, tiresome and unconvincing) dismissals of Putin from U.S. officials and sympathetic commentators in the media aside, the Russian president has in Syria — as he did in Ukraine — really reset the terms of a situation in which his side had been losing ground. And he benefited because he did more than simply react. (Arguments that Putin has not benefited in Ukraine are unconvincing. He has Crimea. He has much greater influence in eastern Ukraine. Sanctions have hurt economically but not politically — his approval rating post-Ukraine and now Syria is near 90 percent. Or as Donald Trump would say enviously — “huge.”)

Will Putin’s gambit in Syria work exactly as he hopes? Maybe not. (Though I bet, as in Ukraine, he gets much of what he wants, even if not all of it and even if the cost is higher than anticipated.) But he is one of a breed of leaders who are looking at the last months of the Obama administration and seeing American passivity as an invitation for opportunism.

Iran is seizing the initiative as much as Russia is — beginning with but not limited to the collaboration of the two sides in Syria and Iraq. Iran sees America’s swoon and the not entirely unrelated struggles in the region’s Sunni pillar states — Egypt and Saudi Arabia — as an opportunity to gain influence. And in this sense Iran is also doing exactly what Russia has done: gaining control where it can, putting pressure where it can, and extending its sphere of influence. In this case, it must be said that America’s lack of leadership is compounded by the absence of a positive “moderate” Sunni agenda in the region. Like the GOP candidates for president, Egyptian, Saudi and many other Sunni moderate leaders may know what they are against but not what they are for. The result is that anyone with a clear agenda in the Middle East — whether a pragmatic one like the Iranians or a positively demonic one like that of the Islamic State — makes headway in the intellectual, policy, and action vacuum they have created.

And it’s not just a behavioral pattern being played out in the Middle East, China has done likewise in the South China Sea. In each of these instances, calculating international actors have seen America’s inertness, made an educated guess as to where the real red line that would trigger significant U.S. reaction might be, and then taken an initiative that has gone as far as, but not past, the red line. And these actors are making big gains wherever they see zones of U.S. indifference around the world.

And the U.S. pattern of reaction is the same over and over. It’s only after these opportunistic actors seize the day that we are roused into action. The kind of action that might make us look engaged but that does not change the situation very much — a destroyer sails around some artificial islands, a few troops and Humvees are deployed in Poland, some special operations forces are deployed in Syria. It is the equivalent of squeaking “Oh yeah?” to a bully who has come up to you on the beach, kicked sand in your face, and walked away with your picnic basket. It’s the Obama special, the illusion of action.

Acting may be reacting on the stage, but it’s not enough in foreign policy and not enough for leadership. Sometimes, you have to know what you want and be willing to have enough guts and courage in your convictions to make the first move.

This article was originally published in Foreign Policy.

Navigating a New U.S.-Japan Defense Technology Frontier

James L. Schoff

March 10, 2015

Источник: http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/03/10/navigating-new-u.s.-japan-defense-technology-frontier/i4b8

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Deeper U.S.-Japan defense technology cooperation can enhance the allies’ military advantage beyond what either can accomplish alone while avoiding a regional arms race.

 

Japan’s government is overhauling the way it develops, procures, and exports defense equipment and technology in a series of bold steps begun in April 2014 that should open a new avenue of U.S.-Japan security cooperation. It could be the most significant change in this area since 1954, when Japan established and began supplying its own Self-Defense Forces (SDF).

Fortuitously, Japan’s effort coincides with a recent U.S. defense technology initiative aimed to “sustain and advance America’s military dominance for the 21st Century.” It was launched amid concerns that America’s qualitative advantage is eroding steadily.

The United States and Japan should be able to collaborate more closely on developing the next generation of military technologies for mutual benefit and to help undergird regional stability. The allies already have experience cooperating on missile defense, and both countries’ defense industries are currently exploring new business opportunities. But a higher level of strategic collaboration can be pursued. A good time to begin shaping this cooperation is at the expected rollout of new bilateral defense cooperation guidelines in April 2015.

There are, of course, challenges to deeper collaboration. Questions remain about how far Japan’s government and industry will push these new boundaries and whether or not the allies can identify significant practical benefit for new technology cooperation and manage it more effectively than they have in the past. In addition, emerging powers like China that are investing in their own military might feel compelled to keep pace with a major defense innovation push by the United States, and Japan’s involvement could complicate this dynamic.

In fact, a major objective of such U.S.-Japan cooperation is to make a regional arms race seem both unappealing and unnecessary to Beijing, by maintaining a comfortable military edge without threatening China. Ineptly pursued, however, this confluence of the two countries’ defense technology initiatives could exacerbate regional suspicion even as it fails to qualitatively improve the allies’ defense condition.

Still, the potential benefits of bilateral collaboration make it worth taking on these challenges. Success requires deft diplomacy and an element of restraint, along with smart investments in technological innovation.

A Turning Point for Japan’s Defense Industry

Japan’s move to begin participating in the global defense market is just one part of a new national security strategy unveiled in late 2013 by the administration of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Concerned with rising Chinese military spending and activity amid bilateral tensions over disputed islands in the East China Sea, as well as North Korea’s ongoing nuclear and missile programs, the Abe government took steps to strengthen its crisis management capability. It is also loosening legal restrictions on the SDF to allow the force to better defend the country and contribute more to regional stability.

Japan’s new security strategy includes enhancing its defense production and technological bases, in part by strengthening international competitiveness. Overall, Tokyo is approaching defense procurement reform as a two-level strategy to help domestic firms at the micro-level reach the highest international standards and to diversify Japan’s security relationships at the macro-level through broader and deeper defense equipment and technology cooperation with trusted partners.

Accomplishing this strategy involves policy moves designed to extract more value from Japan’s limited defense spending, to strengthen the country’s defense industrial sector (for both economic and national security benefits), and to bolster alliance cooperation with the United States and other partners (to enhance competitiveness and deterrence).

Tokyo started to implement the defense-industry component of the strategy by revising its principles on the transfer of defense equipment and technology in April 2014. Until this administration, Japanese governments since the end of World War II have effectively banned defense exports as a way to demonstrate the country’s commitment to peace and avoid foreign entanglements. This included items that contained any Japan-made content, which made Japanese firms undesirable business partners because a co-developed product could only be sold in Japan.

Tokyo allowed a few exceptions when the United States and Japan collaborated on certain missile defense and aircraft technologies, but this never opened the door to meaningful exports. Instead, Japan’s defense industry focused only on the domestic market, developing some sophisticated capabilities but in small quantities and at relatively high prices.

Under the new rules, Japan now allows defense transfers overseas in a variety of situations, including those that support peacekeeping and disaster relief efforts as well as “international cooperation.” Transfers are also permitted when they contribute to Japan’s national security, such as by implementing joint development projects or otherwise deepening defense cooperation with allies and partners. Tokyo will still abstain from arms sales if they violate treaty obligations or United Nations–backed sanctions, or if they would be sales to a country in a current conflict where the UN is trying to broker peace.

The new rules also allow follow-on sales to another country beyond the initial buyer (a so-called third-party transfer) when “appropriate control” of that technology is ensured, which widens the potential market further. The first export license Japan issued under the new rules was for a small gyroscope used by the United States in the Patriot missile defense system (to be sold to Qatar), but it will not be long before the government is issuing licenses for parts of a submarine sold directly by Japan to Australia or an entire patrol plane to India.

Japan followed up its revised principles for defense transfers by publishing a Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases in June 2014 that aims to help industry navigate both the greater competition and the opportunities expected from the new transfer policies. The strategy calls for forging long-term government and industry partnerships, doubling the upper limit for contract length out to ten years, promoting international joint development of certain technologies, formulating a research and development vision for the industry, and strengthening research cooperation with universities, among several other measures.

To lay the groundwork for international collaboration, Japan has negotiated a series of defense equipment cooperation agreements with Australia, France, India, and the United Kingdom (so far) to complement its existing pact with the United States. These agreements create legal frameworks for Japan to participate in joint research, development, and production of defense technologies with partners, and they establish joint committees to manage each relationship. This should create more opportunities for Japanese industry and could even facilitate trilateral cooperation in certain cases involving the United States, Japan, and one other partner. Early ideas being considered include Japan-UK collaboration on an improved air-to-air missile and Japan-U.S. cooperation on a new amphibious vehicle to sell in Japan and abroad. These are incremental steps, but they could become more ambitious over time.

The final major part of Japan’s process of shoring up its defense industry is the formation of a new agency to oversee the entire procurement process, from R&D and identifying military requirements all the way through selection, purchasing, and life-cycle management of the equipment.

Over the course of 2015, Japan will stand up an Acquisition Technology and Logistics Agency (ATLA) under the minister of defense, consolidating functions that had been scattered around the ministry and the SDF branches and adding new capabilities to manage international collaboration and exports. Roughly 1,800 officials and SDF personnel will work in ATLA under an agency commissioner reporting directly to the defense minister (see figure). ATLA will be responsible for policy, R&D, testing and evaluation, project management, contracting, technology security, and other functions in close cooperation with the SDF, the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI), and the National Security Secretariat.

Deeper U.S.-Japan defense technology cooperation can enhance the allies’ military advantage beyond what either can accomplish alone while avoiding a regional arms race.

 

An Alliance Opportunity

If Japan took these policy steps a couple of decades ago amid lingering U.S.-Japan trade tensions, suspicion in Washington would have run high that Tokyo’s main goal was to seek to increase its market share at the expense of U.S. defense firms. Today, however, U.S. policymakers are welcoming Japan’s moves, in part for the opportunity to broaden the United States’ supplier network, improve cost efficiency, enhance alliance interoperability, and maintain an allied edge in certain military technologies where they fear other states are gaining.

As such, revised defense guidelines almost completed by the two governments will likely describe equipment and technology cooperation as a new bilateral enterprise. And large U.S. defense firms like Northrop Grumman and Lockheed Martin are currently upgrading their corporate presence in Japan to take advantage of these changes. This should lead to increased bilateral defense research and procurement collaboration in an almost organic or market-driven way, but the overall impact will be modest if there is not additional leadership on the issue and investment.

The allies have an opportunity to move beyond this incremental approach and take their cooperation to a higher level by involving Japan as a partner in executing the U.S. Defense Innovation Initiative. Also known as the Third Offset Strategy, this Defense Department effort harkens back to America’s Cold War military competition with the Soviet Union. It is being placed in a similar context as then president Dwight Eisenhower’s “New Look” of the 1950s and the second “offset strategy” developed in the 1970s and 1980s to address perceived defense gaps in the face of Soviet numerical or technological advantages.1 This time, China has joined Russia as a major concern, primarily due to its development of accurate long-range missiles and integrated air defense systems, its progress toward fielding fifth-generation fighter aircraft and well-equipped nuclear-powered submarines, and its significant cyberwarfare and space capabilities.2

China’s advances are expected to increase the vulnerability of U.S. bases in Asia and the United States’ most expensive weapons platforms. This vulnerability, in turn, could call into question America’s willingness to risk conflict escalation with China and thus undermine deterrence stability under certain circumstances. Many U.S. officials see foreign military investments by China, Russia, Iran, and others as designed to deter and defeat a regional intervention by the U.S. military, which is a concern to Japan as well.3

In response, Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work has emphasized the need to provide U.S. military personnel a competitive advantage, “so that they will never find themselves evenly matched in a conflict.” He called this “the essence of deterrence and what will ultimately safeguard all of our interests.”4

An important aspect of this new U.S. initiative is a Long-Range Research and Development Planning Program to identify, develop, and field breakthrough technologies in the areas of space, undersea, air dominance and strike, and air and missile defense as well as a flexible basket of emerging technologies. The Defense Department organized small teams for each category, drawing on the best talent in the government and military, which will solicit and receive information from industry, academia, federal labs, think tanks, and others—including from other countries. The department wants early results completed in time for inputs to the fiscal year 2017 budget submission, but once initiated, these technology programs could carry on for years and possibly decades.

The Defense Department is placing particular emphasis on the fields of autonomous systems, miniaturization, big data, and advanced manufacturing. Japanese prowess in robotics, energy storage, artificial intelligence, and other U.S. focus areas make this a natural new avenue for bilateral cooperation, involving not only traditional Japanese defense firms but also off-the-shelf commercial technologies from Japan repurposed for defense application.

The defensive nature of many of these systems makes them good candidates for bilateral collaboration, given Japan’s political sensitivity to offensive arms exports. Such collaboration could make cheaper and more effective missile defenses (using electromagnetic rail guns or directed energy), for example, that could defeat Chinese cruise missiles without threatening China itself. Unmanned underwater vehicles might strengthen deterrence vis-à-vis Chinese or Russian submarine operations. Improving the resiliency of forward bases and space-based command-and-control systems are other priorities, and all should be within Japan’s political limits.

Still, although the potential benefits of collaboration are great, so are the challenges.

Obstacles and Dangers Ahead

Some of these challenges stem from a lack of clarity about how Japan will implement its revised policies, how Japan’s corporate culture will respond, and what steps the allies take to manage this unique kind of public-private sector cooperation. Navigating this new frontier will require patience, persistence, flexibility, and consistent leadership attention.

The United States and Japan share a sense of urgency about trying to take advantage of this opportunity, but old habits are hard to break, regardless of whether they reside in the government or private sectors. Many Japanese bureaucrats, for example, hoped that last year’s defense transfer relaxation would stimulate multiple corporate deals and export license applications in something of a market-driven dynamic, but companies have been cautious. Japanese firms in particular are looking for more guidance from the government regarding what kinds of collaboration will be supported, and it will take an accumulation of new applications and precedents to clarify what ventures will contribute to “peace,” “international cooperation,” or “Japan’s security.” Japanese executives note that simply making money is not a sufficient reason to receive export license approval, and many would feel more comfortable working within a government-to-government framework at this early stage.

A policy-driven approach to defense technology cooperation, however, will take time to coordinate between the allies. To start with, the United States and Japan have slightly different ways of managing the process. The Defense Policy Bureau in Japan has traditionally overseen the fulfillment of the SDF’s acquisition needs, but its U.S. counterpart only supports the under secretary of defense for acquisition, technology, and logistics, who has the lead role in the United States. Additionally, there is a bilateral tool for coordinating government-to-government cooperation on defense-related R&D—the Systems and Technology Forum (S&TF)—but it was not designed to consider the wide range of cooperation options that now exist.

The recent introduction of a Capabilities Group to the S&TF is helping to bridge the gap between each country’s determination of technology requirements and how to acquire them, but it is possible that further adjustments will be needed if the allies are to take full advantage of the opportunity before them. The S&TF, for example, only involves the Ministry of Defense on the Japan side, but many of Japan’s technologies that interest Washington—energy storage, certain materials, and others—are not necessarily under the purview of the Defense Ministry. Consequently, the U.S. side will need to build linkages to the wider civilian-industry community in Japan, including in the space and cybersecurity arenas, via other ministries.

Another challenge is the legal confusion about what kinds of assurances Japan requires regarding third-party transfer. The lack of clarity in this area has added time-consuming procedures to gain approval for the few exports to date, so this needs to be streamlined. New legislation and regulation are also possible in Japan, perhaps in the form of a Defense Production Act to guarantee a reliable supply chain and/or new rules to protect Japan’s technology security. Accessing classified information in general is already a complex and expensive procedure for companies new to the process, and some believe that an industry annex to the bilateral agreement on securing military information might be required.

Japan’s revamped defense procurement agency should help address many of these challenges, but ATLA will not be fully operational until the fall of 2015, and it is not clear yet how effective and efficient it will be. Some in Japan already complain that the current ATLA plan leaves the agency understaffed and without sufficient funds to carry out all of its new responsibilities. This has the Defense Ministry looking for ways to leverage other parts of the Japanese government to assist, perhaps by conducting defense R&D in certain METI-funded laboratories that are already in operation or receiving marketing or financing help from other agencies currently providing this support to Japanese industry overall. The other ministries will cooperate to some extent, but their primary responsibilities are not in the defense arena.

On the U.S. side, Congress has put in place a variety of restrictions related to international defense procurement in general, and these cannot be sidestepped until Tokyo and Washington conclude a Reciprocal Defense Procurement memorandum of understanding. The U.S. government has signed these with several other partners, but doing so involves a review process that can take up to two years. Moreover, the U.S. defense technology and procurement structure is so expansive that it often defies a coherent process that moves predictably from the identification of requirements to R&D and then to acquisition, with a compatible disclosure policy that facilitates international participation. Industry representatives in both countries are actively exploring new opportunities and partnerships, but all of these uncertainties make them hesitant to consider major new investments.

Besides this bureaucratic or legal risk, Japanese firms also face an element of reputational risk. Defense-related sales often make up just a small percentage of a company’s total revenue, and many executives worry that high-profile arms exports might alienate the peace-loving Japanese public. Even if the defense operation is a separate division within a well-known Japanese electronics firm, for example, the business name might be tied to the weapons sales, which could generate more harm than good for the company overall. This is truer for companies considering a new entry into the defense industry supply chain. A few Japanese universities and science labs are beginning to collaborate on some research with defense applications, but this is politically sensitive for them as well.

Finally, the allies must also consider how neighboring countries might react to an allied push into the next generation of military technologies, especially one so clearly designed to counter recent Chinese advances. One country’s deterrent can always be another country’s perceived threat, which means the way in which Washington implements its new defense initiative will affect the security environment.

China’s response does not necessarily have to be negative, but that depends in part on whether or not Washington pursues its innovation initiative in ways that serve wider regional interests. The United States has a positive (though not perfect) track record when it possesses significant military advantages in support of public goods. Asia’s prosperity and relative stability since the end of the Cold War supports this observation. Japan, too, wants Washington to be confident in its ability to control escalation and discourage military adventurism in the region.

Early in the Defense Innovation Initiative, the Defense Department outlined multiple goals such as providing a significant warfighting advantage, disrupting and countering material investment strategies pursued by potential future adversaries, and imposing significant costs on future adversaries. This is sure to raise alarm bells in Beijing, and Moscow as well, but there are ways to dampen a potential arms race. If the allies can demonstrate an ability to develop new defense systems affordably, and if those new systems offer the allies military advantages to negate an opponent’s power projection without raising existential concerns, then this might actually foster restraint by making an effort to keep pace appear unsustainable and less necessary. The latter point can be strengthened by open-minded diplomacy and a focus on common interests.

Failure in this area, however, could foster mutual suspicion and a fruitless pursuit of total security and military dominance that would inevitably lead to greater defense investment by China (given its means), feeding into a vicious cycle. This will have expensive implications in terms of financial, human, and opportunity costs, echoing the Cold War experience. In that example, U.S. and Soviet defense budgets rose steadily through the 1970s and 1980s to reach about 6 percent and 30 percent of annual GDP, respectively, spending over $2 trillion combined on weapons procurement and R&D during that time.5 It was a tremendous waste, but it shows the lengths that countries will go to if they believe that their vital security interests are threatened.

Recommendations for a New Bilateral Enterprise

Investing time and money in U.S.-Japan defense technology cooperation can enhance the allies’ military advantage beyond what either can accomplish alone. Although it is not aimed foremost at reducing procurement costs, it might help in this regard, either through better manufacturing processes, more efficient sourcing, or improving such systems as missile defenses using directed energy instead of expensive missile interceptors. Cooperation can also facilitate breakthroughs that could be applied to other fields such as energy efficiency, protecting against terrorist threats, or mitigating environmental challenges and natural disasters.

Still, the main purpose of this new enterprise should be to reduce allied vulnerabilities and demonstrate clearly that military coercion or adventurism against their interests in the region cannot succeed. This will have to be combined with assurances and corresponding actions that show the interests of other stakeholders in the region will be respected, lest cooperation accelerate a costly security dilemma.

Until there is greater mutual agreement among the major nations in Asia regarding the region’s future, a concert of powers is unlikely to be harmonious and deterrence will remain vital. A Cold War redux should be avoidable in Asia given the absence of a true ideological struggle, growing economic interdependence, and many shared interests. The region’s nascent security architecture, however, is unable to prevent some countries from resorting to force to seize economic or military advantage, as they acquire the means and confidence to do so.

There is no single approach to successfully navigate this new defense technology frontier in alliance cooperation. The effort will be both driven by the market from the bottom up and guided—and occasionally subsidized—by top-down policymaking. Private firms will look to build partnerships and find ways to solve supply chain and technical problems, to make existing products more efficiently, and to develop innovative ways to satisfy evolving military requirements. The two governments, meanwhile, can also communicate and build an enabling environment for bilateral cooperation including opportunities for long-term R&D collaboration in key strategic areas.

The U.S. secretaries of defense and state plan to meet their Japanese counterparts this spring at a so-called 2+2 meeting ahead of a leaders’ summit in Washington between President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Abe. As the two countries’ defense and foreign policy leaders roll out the revised defense cooperation guidelines at the meetings, they should highlight this new bilateral enterprise of defense technology cooperation and instruct alliance managers to clarify policy objectives and mobilize an interagency effort to make the most of this opportunity.

The first step is for leadership in both countries to endorse long-term bilateral technology cooperation in support of certain U.S. and allied military requirements, and to involve Japan in the U.S. Defense Innovation Initiative when advantageous. Implementing this collaboration will likely require supplementing or expanding the bilateral Systems and Technology Forum with civilian agency, private sector, and academic involvement to better assess long-term technology trends and consider options to address a wide range of security challenges.

Policymakers should also enhance current S&TF linkages to the ongoing alliance dialogues on bilateral planning and military roles, missions, and capabilities so that U.S.-Japan cooperation is truly responsive to warfighter needs. At the same time, foreign and defense policy leaders need to coordinate closely on a strategy to reassure neighboring countries, maintain sufficient transparency, and consider ways to avoid an arms race in the region.

In addition, the two countries can facilitate government-industry communication to identify and remove obstacles to bilateral cooperation without jeopardizing technology security. An early issue is expediting the conclusion of a Reciprocal Defense Procurement memorandum of understanding. Leaders can also provide modest additional defense funding for R&D and public-private partnerships in Japan and the United States to incentivize cooperation and contributions from industry, academia, and other government bodies.

Meanwhile, industry in both countries should move quickly with small-scale cooperative projects to help establish administrative precedents while the architects of Japan’s new policies are in their current positions. Now is the time to invest—even if modestly—in order to clarify regulatory parameters and deepen personal networks in these fields. Focusing on defensive systems like missile defense, sensors, and reconnaissance early on will make it easier to win public and diplomatic support.

Change is coming to U.S.-Japan defense technology cooperation, but the extent to which this change contributes to peace and stability in East Asia depends on how effectively the two governments can harness this potential. They must organize for success and draw on all of the talent at their disposal—public, private, military, and civilian—while balancing long-term ambition with practical problem solving and the efficient use of resources.

It is okay to start slowly but important to start now, building in time to review performance and make improvements along the way. A strong technology edge for the allies will serve them and the region well in the future, just as it has before.

Notes

1 Robert Martinage, Toward a New Offset Strategy: Exploiting U.S. Long-Term Advantages to Restore U.S. Global Power Projection Capability, (Washington: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2014), http://csbaonline.org/publications/2014/10/toward-a-new-offset-strategy-exploiting-u-s-long-term-advantages-to-restore-u-s-global-power-projection-capability/.

2 See The Role of Maritime and Air Power in DoD’s Third Offset Strategy, 113th Cong. (2014) (statement of David Ochmanek, senior defense analyst with Rand Corporation); or A Case for Reform: Improving DOD’s Ability to Respond to the Pace of Technological Change, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of Frank Kendall, under secretary of defense for acquisition, technology, and logistics).

3 Kendall, 2015.

4 Claudette Roulo, “Offset Strategy Puts Advantage in Hands of U.S., Allies,” DoD News, January 28, 2015, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=128064.

5 Compiled by the author using the World Bank for U.S. GDP data, U.S. Office of Management and Budget for U.S. defense data, UN statistics for Soviet Union GDP data, and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency’s “Comparison of Soviet and U.S. Defense Activities from 1973-1987,” (published July 1988) for Soviet Union defense data.

 

A Shift in the International Security Environment: Potential Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress

Ronald O’Rourke

November 20, 2015

Источник: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/index.html

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World events since late 2013 have led some observers to conclude that the international security environment has undergone a shift from the familiar post-Cold War era of the last 20-25 years, also sometimes known as the unipolar moment (with the United States as the unipolar power), to a new and different strategic situation that features, among other things, renewed great power competition and challenges to elements of the U.S.-led international order that has operated since World War II.

A previous shift in the international security environment—from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era—prompted a broad reassessment by the Department of Defense (DOD) and Congress of defense funding levels, strategy, and missions that led to numerous changes in DOD plans and programs. A new shift in the international security environment could similarly have a number of implications for U.S. defense plans and programs. Of perhaps the greatest potential significance, such a shift could lead to a change in the current overall terms of debate over U.S. defense plans and programs. Russia’s seizure and annexation of Crimea, as well as subsequent Russian actions in eastern Ukraine and elsewhere in Eastern Europe, have already led to a renewed focus among policymakers on U.S. and NATO military capabilities in Europe, and on how to counter Russia’s so-called hybrid warfare tactics. China’s actions in the East and South China Seas have prompted a focus among policymakers on how to counter China’s so-called salami-slicing tactics in those areas. A shift in the international security environment may also be generating implications for areas such as nuclear weapons, submarines and antisubmarine warfare, and DOD reliance on Russian-made components.

Policy and oversight issues for Congress include the following:

Shift in strategic situations. Has there been a shift in the international security environment, and if so, what features characterize the new environment?

Reassessment of U.S. defense funding levels, strategy, and missions. Should there be a reassessment of U.S. defense funding levels, strategy, and missions?

Congressional role in reassessment. If there is to be such a reassessment, how should it be done, and what role should Congress play?

Potential effect on plans and programs. How might such a reassessment affect the current terms of debate on U.S. defense? What might be the potential implications for U.S. defense plans and programs?

Beyond American Predominance in the Western Pacific: The Need for a Stable U.S.-China Balance of Power

Michael D. Swaine

April 20, 2015

Источник: http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/04/20/beyond-american-predominance-in-western-pacific-need-for-stable-u.s.-china-balance-of-power/ijn1

Policymakers in the United States, China, and other Asian powers must choose whether to deal forthrightly and sensibly with the changing regional power distribution or avoid the hard decisions that China’s rise poses until the situation grows ever more polarized and dangerous.

A shorter version of this essay entitled “The Real Challenge in the Pacific: A Response to ‘How to Deter China’” appeared in the May/June 2015 issue of Foreign Affairs.

In 2011, I argued in a book entitled America’s Challenge: Engaging a Rising China in the Twenty-First Century, that, while Washington and Beijing are by no means fated to enter into a hot or even a cold war, the competing assumptions they hold regarding the necessary conditions for long-term stability and prosperity in Asia, if not moderated through a process of mutual accommodation, would likely result in steady movement toward a zero-sum, adversarial mind-set. I wrote that this dynamic could eventually polarize the region and undermine the goals of continued peace and prosperity toward which all sides strive. Unfortunately, in the past three years, this type of mind-set has deepened, in and out of both governments and across much of Asia. Indeed, the international media, along with a coterie of regional and international relations specialists, increasingly seem to interpret every action taken by one government, no matter how small, as being by necessity designed to diminish the position of the other.

Even more worrisome, this deepening mind-set is driving policy statements and recommendations in Beijing and Washington that serve to reinforce and strengthen, rather than moderate, the differences between the two sides. While China’s leader, Xi Jinping, speaks of the need to develop an “Asia for Asians” and to create a new regional security architecture as an alternative to the “Cold War era” U.S.-led bilateral alliance structure, American policymakers and analysts criticize Beijing for establishing an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea of the sort long possessed by Washington and Tokyo and encourage other Asian states to resist joining Chinese-initiated economic institutions, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.

Clashing Assumptions on the Foundations of the Asian Order

The core assumptions underlying this negative dynamic juxtapose, on the one side, the post–World War II American notion that long-term order and prosperity depend on the unique leadership role and dominant military power of the United States as a security guarantor, dispute arbiter, deterrent force, supporter of international law, and provider of public goods for states located in critical regions of the world, including the maritime Asia-Pacific. Indeed, for virtually all U.S. officials and many Asian leaders, American military predominance, meaning the clear ability to defeat any potential military challenge to U.S. and allied interests anywhere along the Asian littoral and across the Western Pacific, from the continental United States to the Indian Ocean, has provided the foundation for a seventy-year-long period of relative peace and economic growth throughout most of the region. In this view, U.S. maritime primacy has forestalled arms races and armed disputes over long-standing rivalries and permitted a sustained focus on peaceful economic development.

On the other side, the Chinese espouse the belief that order and prosperity, especially in an increasingly multipolar and interdependent world, should rely on a largely benign and roughly equal balance of power between the major nations, rooted in the need to cooperate to manage an arguably increasing number of common challenges and mediated, whenever possible, through international institutions such as the United Nations. In this more broadly dispersed yet hierarchical power structure, stronger powers have a duty both to guide and shape smaller powers in mutually beneficial directions, not to dominate and manipulate them. In this world, no single power should have the ability or the intention to keep other powers in a condition of military or political subservience, and no power should seriously infringe on the sovereignty of another power without the endorsement of the international community.

To some extent, these U.S. and Chinese views are self-serving. While taking on many burdens across the globe in defending public goods such as sea lines of communication and enduring persistent trade deficits in order to stimulate global development, Washington nonetheless benefits enormously from a U.S.-led international order in which its views and preferences are given special consideration. Its military power and economic clout ensure a privileged position in major finance, trade, and security-oriented regimes, meaning that the makeup, purpose, and rules of those regimes largely reflect its power and interests, operate in ways that affirm U.S. views on the most critical issues, and cannot be changed in major ways without Washington’s approval. Conversely, the Chinese seem to believe that a genuine balance-of-power system and a strengthened process of rules-based, international decisionmaking—meaning that no single power has the clear unilateral ability to compel others to accept its rules and procedures—will benefit China by giving it a greater voice among nations and serving to restrain a supposedly arrogant, unilateralist, and at times threatening the United States.

Aside from such obvious self-interest, however, policy communities in both nations genuinely believe that their preferred international distribution of power best reflects the current and future reality of the international system: For most Americans, despite the forces of globalization, which are creating ever more dispersed and interdependent levels of economic, political, social, and military power among nations, peace and stability only results from the unique ability of a single, relatively benign superpower to shape, lead, and deter major threats to global peace and prosperity. For the Chinese, all major industrialized powers seek to control the international order in ways that can and at times do weaken or threaten lesser (and especially developing) powers and to varying degrees diminish the overall stability and prosperity of the system. However, in light of the steady diffusion of power occurring across the international system, many Chinese also believe that even the most powerful states will need to overcome their drive for dominance and cooperate in unprecedented ways.

Despite such stark differences, these views coexisted more or less peacefully for many decades after World War II, primarily because Beijing had neither the capacity nor the desire to alter the U.S.-dominated order, both globally and in maritime Asia. From the 1950s through the late 1970s, China was wracked by economically and socially destructive Maoist ideological campaigns and internecine political struggles, and it was threatened by the Soviet Union, its huge, better-armed continental neighbor to the north. Such problems not only distracted China’s leaders for decades but also eventually compelled them to embark on an unprecedented overture to the West, both to counter the Soviet Union and to facilitate the kind of market-driven economic development strategy that was needed to reestablish China as a major regional and possibly global power. In fact, under such conditions, many Chinese viewed American predominance in maritime Asia and the U.S.-led alliance system that sustained it as on balance beneficial to China. It kept the Soviets largely out of the region, kept Japan nonmilitarized and oriented toward peace, and allowed Beijing’s Asian neighbors to concentrate on outward-oriented, beneficial economic growth instead of disruptive arms races or historical rivalries. Washington was only too happy to oblige Beijing in sustaining such an order.

All this is now changing, at least in Asia. China’s overseas trade- and investment-driven economic success, the collapse of the Soviet Union and other Communist regimes, and the fear—intensified by the massive Tiananmen demonstrations and bloody crackdown of 1989 as well as the more recent color revolutions—that the Chinese regime could be the next to fall, have vastly increased China’s dependence on and influence over external economic, political, and social forces across Asia and beyond, while deepening its sense of vulnerability and suspicion toward the United States. Prior to the reform era, China’s wealth and power derived largely from domestic sources, many located far from its coastline, and its security relied, by necessity, on a largely peasant-based but massive army and only rudimentary air and naval forces. These factors, along with its acquisition of a small nuclear weapons arsenal in the 1960s, made it possible for Beijing to rely on a security strategy of nuclear deterrence through a modest second-strike capability and attrition through a protracted conventional defense centered on “luring the enemy in deep.”1

This strategy can no longer provide adequate security for China. Beijing must now defend against threats before they can reach the Chinese homeland and vital coastal economic centers. For the first time in its history, Beijing now has both the ability and the motivation to seek to diminish significantly if not eliminate the potential threat to its domestic and growing regional economic interests posed by America’s long-standing predominance in the Western Pacific. Indeed, its ongoing acquisition of military capabilities designed in large part to counter or complicate U.S. and allied air, naval, missile, space, and cyber operations along its maritime periphery, as well as its increasing economic and political-diplomatic initiatives across the Asian littoral and its call for a new, post–Cold War cooperative security architecture for the Asia-Pacific, partly serve such ends. Moreover, the desire to reduce America’s past maritime superiority and economic power has become more achievable and hence more compelling to many Chinese as a result not only of China’s continued economic success but also of the troubles now plaguing America and the West, from anemic economic growth and domestic political dysfunction to image concerns resulting from arguably unjust Middle East wars and apparent egregious human rights abuses.

This should not be surprising to anyone who understands modern Chinese history and great power transitions. Beijing has an ongoing and likely long-term and deep incentive to work with the United States and the West to sustain continued, mutually beneficial economic growth and to address a growing array of common global and regional concerns, from pandemics to climate change and terrorism. At the same time, it understandably wishes to reduce its vulnerability to potential future threats from the United States and other politically and militarily strong nations, while increasing its overall influence along its strategically important maritime periphery. As Beijing’s overseas power and influence grow, its foreign interests expand, and its domestic nationalist backers become more assertive, it will naturally become less willing to accept or acquiesce in international political and economic relationships, norms, and power structures that it believes disproportionately and unjustly favor Western powers; put China at a strategic, political, or economic disadvantage; or generally fail to reflect movement toward a more multipolar global and regional power structure. It will also likely become more fearful that a declining (in relative terms) Washington will regard an increasingly influential China as a threat to be countered through ever more forceful or deliberate measures. Indeed, this view is already widespread among many Chinese observers.

One does not need to cast Beijing as an evil or predatory entity to understand the forces driving such beliefs. They stem from national self-interest, historical insecurity (and nationalist pride), suspicion, fear, and uncertainty. To some degree, they also stem from a level of opportunism, driven in part by fear, but also in part by the understandable desire to take advantage of China’s growing regional and global influence and America’s apparent relative decline in order to strengthen Chinese leverage in possible future disputes.

At the same time, heightened Chinese nationalism, arising from a combination of impressive economic success and a much greater public awareness, through social media and other means, of China’s external policies and influence, has greatly accentuated a self-righteous assertiveness in Chinese foreign and defense policy. Many Chinese observers now believe that Beijing’s past weakness and its need to cooperate with the United States and the West in general had made it too accommodating or passive in dealing with many perceived challenges to China’s vital national interests, from U.S. support for Taiwan and Asian disputants over maritime claims, to close-in U.S. surveillance and intelligence-gathering activities along the Chinese coast. For these analysts, China’s growing capabilities and influence, along with its expanding interests, make it both possible and necessary for Beijing to defend such interests in a more deliberate and in some cases a more forceful manner. Moreover, the intensity of emotion and resolve that usually accompanies such views is often associated with deep resentment of the allegedly sanctimonious arrogance of a hegemonic America.

The more extreme variants of this ultranationalist viewpoint threaten to transform China’s long-standing peaceful development policy, keyed to the maintenance of amicable relations with the United States and other powers, into a much more hard-edged approach that is deliberately and perhaps openly calibrated to undermine U.S. influence in Asia. In fact, there have been indications of some possible first steps in this direction, reflected in the so-called bottom-line concept of Xi Jinping’s foreign policy, which stresses the need for China to stand resolute in managing territorial and sovereignty issues, such as the disputes with Japan over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea and with Vietnam, the Philippines, and others over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. Despite a continued stress on the search for “win-win” outcomes with all powers, such trends could eventually weaken existing Chinese support for a cooperative and peace-oriented foreign policy and for movement toward a genuine balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region, favoring instead a more Sino-centric Asian order.

On the U.S. side, for an arguably growing number of American and some foreign observers, Beijing’s de facto challenge to American predominance in the Western Pacific is a mere prelude to a larger effort to eject the United States from Asia and eventually replace it as the regional (and for some, global) superpower. Chinese support for a multipolar, balance-of-power system is thus seen as a mere tactical feint designed to undermine U.S. power while Beijing prepares to become the new hegemon. Indeed, for such observers, Beijing’s greater assertiveness regarding maritime territorial disputes as well as U.S. and Japanese intelligence and surveillance activities along its coastline constitute strategic gambits designed to “test” U.S. and allied resolve and ultimately to create “no-go” zones essential for the establishment of Chinese control over the Western Pacific. Such an outcome would directly threaten both U.S. and allied interests in an open, secure, and peaceful Asia-Pacific region. Given this supposedly unambiguous threat, for these observers, the only logical course of action for the United States is to decisively disabuse Beijing of its aspirations by enhancing American predominance and thereby increasing, rather than reducing, Chinese vulnerability in the Western Pacific.

This view is held not only by scholars and policy analysts outside Washington. It is also fairly common among U.S. government officials, both civilian and military. It offers a black-and-white, Manichean-type solution to a supposedly clear-cut threat, and one that is extremely appealing to those many U.S. policymakers and analysts convinced of the huge merits (and necessity) of continued American predominance in maritime Asia. In fact, even for those who reject the notion that Beijing is working to dislodge the United States from the region, predominance remains the best insurance against an uncertain future, for the reasons outlined above. While the type of U.S. predominance in Asia espoused by most U.S. observers can vary somewhat, depending in part on how one views China’s capabilities and intentions, the bottom line for virtually all such individuals is the need for a clear U.S. ability to prevail in any important military-political contingency involving China. Moreover, this view is reinforced, in their minds, by the notion that America’s allies and friends also supposedly desire and require continued U.S. maritime predominance.

The problem with this outlook is that it is based on an inaccurate, increasingly unrealistic, and dangerous assessment of both the threat the United States confronts in Asia and the likely consequences of the remedy proposed. Beijing’s de facto attempts to limit or end U.S. predominance along its maritime periphery are motivated almost entirely by uncertainties, fears, insecurities, and a certain level of opportunism, not a grand strategic vision of Chinese predominance, despite the arguably growing expression of ultranationalist views within China. Those who view China as an aspiring hegemon seeking America’s subordination and ultimate ejection from Asia almost without exception base their argument on shaky theoretical postulates and faulty historical analogies or on the decidedly non-authoritative views of a few Chinese analysts, not current, hard evidence regarding either Chinese strategies and doctrines or Chinese behavior, past and present.

Such observers argue that all rising powers seek hard-power dominance in an anarchic interstate system and that China is a power that always sought to dominate its world. However, such absolutist beliefs run counter to the very mixed record of power grabbing and power balancing, aggression and restraint, deterrence and reassurance that has characterized great power relations historically. They also ignore the fact that, in the premodern era, Chinese predominance within its part of Asia most often consisted of pragmatic and mutually beneficial exchanges of ritualistic deference for material gains, not Chinese hard-power control. While implying a preference for symbolically hierarchical relationships with smaller neighbors, China’s premodern approach did not amount to a demand for clear-cut dominance and subordination. Moreover, the advent of modern, independent, and in most cases strong nation-states along China’s borders; the forces of economic globalization; and the existence of nuclear weapons have enormously reduced, if not eliminated, both the willingness and the ability of Chinese leaders today to dominate Asia and carve out an exclusionary sphere of influence, especially in hard-power terms. By necessity, their objective is to reduce their considerable vulnerability and increase their political, diplomatic, and economic leverage in their own backyard to a level where Chinese interests must be reflected in those major political, economic, and security actions undertaken by neighboring states. This is a much less ambitious and in many ways understandable goal for a continental great power. And it does not necessarily threaten vital U.S. or allied interests.

The Unsustainability of American Predominance and the Chinese Response

While continued American predominance cannot, at present, be justified on the basis of a Chinese drive for predominance, what of the widespread argument in U.S. policy circles that such predominance is necessary regardless of Chinese intentions, as the best possible means of ensuring regional (and global) order? While deeply rooted in both American exceptionalism and beliefs about the benefits of hegemonic power in the international order, the notion that unequivocal U.S. predominance in the Western Pacific constitutes the only basis for long-term stability and prosperity across the Asia-Pacific is a dangerous, increasingly obsolete concept, for several reasons.

First, it is inconceivable that Beijing would accept the unambiguously superior level of American predominance that the many proponents of this course of action believe is required to ensure long-term regional stability in the face of a rising China, involving total U.S. “freedom of action” and a clear “ability to prevail” militarily without excessive costs in any conceivable contingency occurring up to China’s mainland borders. The United States would never tolerate such predominance by any power along its borders, and why should an increasingly strong China? Given China’s expanding interests and capabilities, any effort to sustain an unambiguous, absolute level of American military superiority along Beijing’s maritime periphery will virtually guarantee an increasingly destabilizing and economically draining arms race, much greater levels of regional polarization and friction than at present, and reduced incentives on the part of both Washington and Beijing to work together to address a growing array of common global challenges.

U.S. efforts to sustain and enhance its military superiority in China’s backyard will further stoke Beijing’s worst fears and beliefs about American containment, sentiments inevitably reinforced by domestic nationalist pressures, ideologically informed beliefs about supposed U.S. imperialist motives, and China’s general commitment to the enhancement of a multipolar order. In fact, by locking in a clear level of long-term vulnerability and weakness for Beijing that prevents any assured defense of Chinese territory or any effective wielding of influence over regional-security-related issues (such as maritime territorial disputes, Taiwan, or the fate of the Korean Peninsula), absolute U.S. military superiority would virtually guarantee fierce and sustained domestic criticism of any Chinese leadership that accepted it. This will be especially true if, as expected, Chinese economic power continues to grow, bolstering Chinese self-confidence. Under such conditions, effectively resisting a U.S. effort to sustain predominance along China’s maritime periphery would become a matter of political survival for future Chinese leaders.

Second, and equally important, it is far from clear that American military predominance in the Asia-Pacific region can be sustained on a consistent basis, just as it is virtually impossible that China could establish its own predominance in the region. Two Carnegie reports on the long-term security environment in Asia, China’s Military and the U.S.-Japan Alliance in 2030 and Conflict and Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region,2 concluded that, while the United States will remain the strongest military power on a global level indefinitely, Washington will almost certainly confront increasingly severe, economically induced defense spending limitations that will constrain efforts to decisively keep well ahead of a growing Chinese military and paramilitary presence within approximately 1,500 nautical miles of the Chinese coastline, that is, the area covered by the so-called first and second island chains. This will occur despite Washington’s repeated assertion that the rebalance to Asia will sustain America’s predominant position in the region. Moreover, such largely economic constraints will almost certainly be magnified by the persistence of tensions and conflicts in other parts of the world, such as the Middle East and Central Europe. These events are likely to complicate any U.S. effort to shift forces (and resources) to the Asia-Pacific.

Of course, a continuing U.S. capacity to shift military assets from other parts of the globe to Asia in a crisis or conflict could conceivably correct America’s relative military decline in the Western Pacific. But such a surge-based “solution” would require considerable time to implement, while any future threatening Chinese military action, for example, with regard to Taiwan or maritime disputes near its border, would almost certainly involve a very rapid strike aimed at establishing a fait accompli that could prove extremely difficult and costly to undo. Equally important, a growing day-to-day Chinese capability and presence along the Asian littoral and a perceived relative U.S. military decline in daily presence would inevitably affect the security calculations of other Asian states, especially American allies and friends, regardless of the overall ramp-up capacity of the U.S. military in any confrontation. In the current, increasingly competitive U.S.-China relationship, a clear relative shift in day-to-day regional power toward China would likely cause such states to hedge more deliberately against a U.S. failure to prevail in a crisis or conflict by developing stronger, more independent, and potentially destabilizing military capabilities and/or by accommodating Chinese interests, possibly at the expense of the United States, for example, by spurning past or future security arrangements with Washington.

The limits on U.S. maritime predominance do not mean that China will eventually grow into the position of Asia’s next military hegemon, however. The above-mentioned Carnegie reports also concluded that American military power in Asia will remain very strong under all but the most unlikely, worst-case scenarios involving a U.S. withdrawal from the region. While China’s regional military capabilities will continue to grow significantly in key areas such as submarines and surface warships, ballistic and cruise missiles, offensive aircraft, air defense, and joint warfare, they will not provide an unambiguous level of superiority over U.S. forces in the Western Pacific, and certainly not in any other region. Therefore, any eventual Chinese attempt to establish predominance in Asia would almost inevitably fail, and not only because of U.S. capabilities and resolve, but also because such an effort would drive regional states much closer to the United States. The result would be either a cold or a hot war in Asia, with intensifying polarization, arms races, and an increased likelihood of crises and conflicts.

The Chinese leaders understand this and hence might only seek some form of predominance (as opposed to acting opportunistically and in a more limited manner) if American words and actions were to convince them that even the minimal level of security they seek were to require it. Such a belief could emerge if Washington insists on maintaining its own historical level of military superiority in Asia by attempting to neutralize entirely Chinese military capabilities right up to China’s 12-nautical-mile territorial waters and airspace or to develop a force capable of blockading China from a distance. Variants of operational concepts currently under consideration in U.S. policy circles, such as Air-Sea Battle or Offshore Control (the former designed to defeat Beijing through preemptive, precision strikes deep into Chinese territory, and the latter to throttle China via a blockade along the first island chain bordering the eastern and southern Chinese mainland), contain such features. Indeed, any effort to sustain U.S. predominance in the face of a growing relative decline in U.S. capabilities alongside steady increases in Chinese power and influence will almost certainly intensify the U.S.-China security competition, deepen tensions between the two powers, and greatly unsettle U.S. allies and friends.

Fortunately, this zero-sum dynamic has yet to emerge, but growing suspicions and beliefs in both capitals—founded on the above clashing assumptions held by each side regarding the necessary conditions for long-term order and prosperity in Asia—are certainly moving events in this direction.

Of course, a fundamental shift in the Asian power balance and its likely consequences will become moot if China’s economy collapses or declines to such a level that it is unable to meaningfully challenge American maritime predominance. Indeed, for some analysts of the Asian security scene, such a possibility is real enough to justify a rejection of any consideration of alternatives to such predominance. But the above-mentioned reports, China’s Military and the U.S.-Japan Alliance in 2030 and Conflict and Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region, found that such an adverse outcome for China is highly unlikely in any foreseeable time frame. Equally important, a major delay in adjusting to current and likely future realities due to a misplaced belief in China’s ultimate decline will make it far more difficult to undertake adjustments years hence, given both the long lead time required to implement them and the likelihood that mutual suspicions will have by then deepened to the point where neither side is willing to make the required accommodations.

The Need to Transition to a Stable Balance of Power

Thus, for both the United States and China, the primary future strategic challenge is to develop a mutually beneficial means of transitioning away from U.S. maritime predominance toward a stable, genuine balance of power in the Western Pacific in which neither nation has the clear capacity to prevail in an armed conflict. This will be difficult to achieve and potentially dangerous, but nonetheless necessary, given the existing and future trends shaping the region.

In general, true balance-of-power environments can at least potentially increase both risk taking and miscalculation, especially if one or both sides conclude that they must confirm or consolidate a perceived increase—or compensate for a perceived decline—in leverage by acting more aggressively to test the resolve of the other side, advance specific interests, or manage a serious political-military crisis. Avoiding or effectively controlling such situations will require not only a variety of crisis management mechanisms and confidence-building mechanisms (CBMs) beyond what have been developed thus far in Asia, but also high levels of mutual strategic reassurance and restraint, involving substantive and verifiable limits on each side’s freedom of action or ability to prevail militarily along China’s sensitive maritime periphery, as well as the maintenance of deterrent and shaping capabilities in those areas that count most.

Many knowledgeable observers have offered a variety of recommendations designed to reduce mistrust and enhance cooperation between Washington and Beijing, involving everything from caps on U.S. and Chinese defense spending to mutual, limited concessions or understandings regarding Taiwan and maritime disputes, and clearer, more calibrated bottom-line statements on alliance commitments and core interests.3 While many of these initiatives make eminent sense, they generally fail to address both the underlying problem of clashing assumptions and beliefs about the requirements for continued order and prosperity in Asia and the basic threat perceptions generated by inaccurate historical analogies about China’s past and domestic nationalist views and pressures. Moreover, almost no observers offer recommendations designed to significantly alter the power structure in volatile areas along China’s maritime periphery, such as on the Korean Peninsula and in and around Taiwan, in ways that could significantly defuse those areas as sources of conflict over the long term.

In order to minimize the potential instabilities inherent in a roughly equal balance-of-power environment, specific actions must be taken to reduce the volatility of the most likely sources of future U.S.-China crises and the propensity to test each side’s resolve, and to enhance the opportunities for meaningful cooperation over the long term. In particular, Washington and Beijing will need to reach reliable understandings regarding the future long-term status of the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, the management of maritime territorial disputes, and the scope and function of U.S. (and other foreign) military activities within the first island chain—or at the very least within both China’s and Japan’s exclusive economic zones (EEZs). Such understandings should almost certainly involve some credible form of neutralization of these areas as locations from which to project U.S. or Chinese power, or the creation of a stable U.S.-China balance of power within them, thereby creating a de facto buffer zone along China’s maritime periphery.

In the case of Korea, this implies the emergence of a unified, nonaligned (or loosely aligned) peninsula free from foreign military forces. This would require prior credible security assurances by both the United States and China that a unified Korea would remain free from coercion and always open to close economic and political relations with both countries. Such assurances might involve a continuation in some form of a greatly reduced security relationship with Washington, at least in the short to medium term. This process might also require Japan to provide security assurances to a unified Korea, at least to the extent of agreeing to not acquire nuclear weapons or some types of conventional weapons that Korea might find threatening, such as precision ballistic and cruise missile strike capabilities. Of course, none of this could happen as long as the Korean Peninsula remains divided, with South Korea under threat of attack from North Korea. Thus, ideally, the development of a stable balance of power in the Western Pacific will require Korean unification sooner rather than later. Failing that, a clear, credible understanding must be reached as soon as possible among the powers concerned regarding the eventual disposition of the Korea problem.

In the case of Taiwan, any credible neutralization of the cross-strait issue as a threat to either side’s interests would require, as a first step, a U.S.-China understanding regarding restrictions on U.S. arms sales in return for certain types of verifiable limits on Chinese military production and deployments relevant to the island, such as ballistic missiles and strike aircraft. Beijing would also likely need to provide credible assurances that it would not use force against Taiwan in any conceivable contingency short of an outright Taiwanese declaration of de jure independence or the U.S. placement of forces on the island. In the past, Beijing has resisted providing assurances regarding any non-use of force toward the island, viewing such an assurance as a limit on Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan. However, as in the case of Korea, Beijing would likely view such a conditional limitation on its right to employ force as acceptable if viewed as a requirement for the creation of an overall stable balance of power in the Western Pacific; Chinese leaders might also regard it as a step toward the eventual unification of the island with the mainland. In addition, Beijing would also likely need to accept: a) explicitly that such unification could only occur on the basis of a peaceful process involving the willing consent of the people of Taiwan, and b) tacitly that eventual unification would likely not occur, if at all, for many decades. For its part, the United States would likely need to provide assurances to China that it would neither place forces on the island nor provide any new level of defense assistance to Taipei, as long as Beijing abides by its own assurances. And both countries would need to consult closely with Taiwan and Japan at each step of this process and provide clear and credible assurances regarding the understanding reached between them.

Regarding territorial disputes in the East China Sea and South China Sea, the United States needs to make clear that it has little if any direct interest in the interactions occurring between the disputants, beyond clear security threats leveled against the two U.S. allies involved: Japan and the Philippines. While supporting, in an even-handed manner, a binding code of conduct and established legal procedures for resolving clashes and arbitrating claims, Washington should avoid staking its credibility on ensuring that a noncoercive process is followed in every instance. That said, it should also make clear that it will oppose, forcefully if necessary, any attempt to establish an exclusion zone or de facto territorial waters beyond accepted 12-nautical-mile limits. For its part, Beijing must clearly affirm, through its words and actions, that there is no military solution to these disputes and that it will never seek to dislodge rivals forcefully from occupied areas. It must also credibly and convincingly state, privately if not publicly, that those waters in the South China Sea located within its so-called nine-dashed line and outside the territorial waters and EEZs of specified land features constitute open ocean. Although doubtless difficult to achieve, such understandings will likely become more possible in the larger context of a neutralized first island chain as U.S.-China suspicions abate.

In the larger conventional military realm, U.S. military primacy within at least the first island chain will need to be replaced by a genuinely balanced force posture and accompanying military doctrine. This should likely be centered on what is termed a “mutual denial” operational concept in which both China and the United States along with its allies possess sufficient levels of anti-access and area denial (A2/AD)–type air, naval, missile, and space capabilities to make the risks and dangers of attempting to achieve a sustained advantage through military means over potentially volatile areas or zones clearly prohibitive. In such an environment, neither side would have the clear capacity to prevail in a conflict, but both sides would possess adequate defensive capacities to deter or severely complicate an attack, for example, on Taiwan, on the Chinese mainland, and against U.S./allied territory, or any effort to close or control key strategic lines of communication (SLOCs) in the Asia-Pacific. This will likely require agreed-upon restraints on the production and/or deployment of certain types of weapon systems operating in the Western Pacific, such as deep-strike stealth aircraft, ballistic and cruise missiles, and deployed surface and subsurface warships.

On the nuclear level, a stable balance-of-power environment in the Western Pacific requires a clear set of mutual assurances designed to strengthen the deterrence capacity of each side’s nuclear arsenal and thereby reduce significantly the dangers of escalation from a conventional crisis or conflict into a nuclear confrontation. To attain this goal, American and allied defense analysts need to discard the dangerous notion that U.S. primacy must extend to the nuclear realm, via the establishment of a clear ability to neutralize China’s nuclear arsenal. Instead, Washington should authoritatively indicate that it accepts and will not threaten China’s retaliatory nuclear strike capability. In other words, it must unambiguously affirm the validity of a U.S.-China nuclear balance based on a concept of mutual deterrence, something it has never done. Moreover, to make this credible, Washington must abandon consideration of a long-range, precision global strike system, or any other new type of system capable of destroying China’s nuclear arsenal through both nuclear and conventional means, and provide greater assurances that its ballistic missile defense capabilities cannot eliminate a Chinese second strike. For its part, Beijing must be willing to accept such U.S. assurances and eschew any attempt to transition beyond its existing modest minimal deterrent, second-strike nuclear capability to a much larger force.

Obviously, these sorts of changes will present major implications for U.S. allies and friends in the region. Japan in particular would play a major role in any effort to create a stable U.S.-China balance of power in the Western Pacific. In order for Tokyo to provide Seoul with the kind of assurances identified above, and to accept the above adjustments in the U.S. force posture and stance toward Taiwan, certain clear understandings with Washington and Beijing would be necessary. In general, the creation of a de facto buffer zone or a neutral/balanced area within the first island chain would almost certainly require that Japan significantly strengthen its defense capabilities, either autonomously or, more preferably from the U.S. perspective, within the context of a more robust yet still limited U.S.-Japan security alliance. In the latter case, Tokyo would become a critical partner in the creation of the sort of defensive, mutual denial operational concept. This would entail the creation of a more fully integrated U.S.-Japan C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) infrastructure, stronger passive defenses against possible Chinese ballistic and cruise missile threats to U.S. and Japanese military assets, and enhanced Japanese logistics and support facilities, alongside improvements in specific defensive-oriented Japanese military capabilities, such as ASW (antisubmarine warfare) and interceptor aircraft. However, this would not require Japan to become a fully normalized security partner alongside the United States, undertaking alliance-based security activities across the Western Pacific and beyond.

For China, acceptance of a strengthened but still limited U.S.-Japan alliance, a unified, largely nonaligned Korean Peninsula, verifiable limits on Chinese capabilities vis-à-vis Taiwan, and the other elements of the stable balance-of-power structure mentioned above would require a clear willingness to forgo those more ambitious security objectives toward which some Chinese might aspire, either now or in the future. These include, most notably, the clear ability to establish control over the waters and airspace along China’s maritime periphery and a Sino-centric Asian economic and political order that largely excludes the United States. This will likely require, in turn, that Beijing make concerted, public efforts to reject and invalidate among the Chinese citizenry those more extreme interpretations of Chinese nationalism that call for China to dominate Asia and to employ aggressive or violent means to resolve various sovereignty and other disputes with its neighbors. Although not mainstream at present, such notions nonetheless could become more popular and influential as China’s power grows (and if Washington responds to such growth by seeking to sustain its past predominance), and would in turn represent a clear threat to regional stability. The benefits for China of these accommodations would be an enhanced level of security via a reduced U.S. threat to vital Chinese interests and the avoidance of a costly and likely increasingly dangerous security competition. These new circumstances would also allow China to concentrate even more than at present on establishing a stable and prosperous domestic environment.

Obstacles to Establishing a Stable Balance in Asia

Several obstacles stand in the way of Washington and Beijing undertaking such a substantial change in perceptions and practices, force deployments, and power relations in the Western Pacific.

On the U.S. side, first and foremost is the general refusal of most if not all U.S. decisionmakers and officials to contemplate an alternative to U.S. military predominance in this vital region. Such maritime predominance has arguably served Washington and most of the region well for many decades, and it accords with the deep-seated notion of American exceptionalism, which prescribes a dominant U.S. leadership role throughout the world. In addition, the short-term perspective, natural inertia, and risk avoidance of bureaucrats and policy communities in Washington (and elsewhere) militate against major shifts in policy and approach, especially in the absence of an urgent and palpable need for change. Indeed, it is extremely difficult for any major power, much less a superpower, to begin a fundamental strategic shift in anticipation of diminished relative capabilities before that diminishment fully reveals itself.

In the Western Pacific in particular, with regard to both U.S. ISR activities along the Chinese coast and the larger U.S. military presence within the first island chain, the United States Navy and many U.S. decisionmakers are wedded to the notion that American power (and in particular naval power) must brook no limitation in areas beyond a nation’s 12-nautical-mile territorial waters and airspace. This derives in part from the belief that any constraints on U.S. naval operations will lead to a cascade of coastal states challenging the principle of U.S. maritime freedom of action and to possible reductions in the level of resources and the scope of operations available to support U.S. naval power. Moreover, the specific U.S. desire to maintain a strong naval presence along China’s maritime periphery reflects a perceived need to acquire more accurate intelligence regarding Beijing’s growing offshore air and naval capabilities. Such a presence is also viewed as essential to sustaining U.S. credibility with Asian allies such as Japan and the Philippines, and to the maintenance of deterrent capabilities against a possible Chinese attack on Taiwan. This combination of service interests, intelligence needs, and perceived security requirements reinforces the general U.S. bias in favor of continued maritime predominance. However, an inevitable Chinese refusal to accept that predominance over the long term will be expressed first and foremost in opposition to the past level of U.S. naval activities along the Chinese coastline, that is, within China’s EEZ at the very least, and possibly within the entire first island chain.

Second, and closely related to the prior point, U.S. decisionmakers are extremely loath to contemplate significant adjustments in the current status of the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan. From the U.S. perspective, any movement toward a reduction in or even a significant modification of the U.S. security commitment to these two actors (a U.S military ally and a de facto U.S. protectorate, respectively) could result in either moving to acquire nuclear arms, and/or threats or attacks from North Korea or China. In addition, Japan might react to such movement by questioning Washington’s basic security commitment to Tokyo, which could result in a break in the U.S.-Japan alliance and/or Japanese acquisition of nuclear arms. These concerns are real, if no doubt exaggerated by some in Tokyo or Taipei in order to justify maintenance of the existing U.S. relationship, and in some cases to avoid undertaking costly defense improvements of their own.

On the Chinese side, perhaps the most significant obstacle to undertaking a transition toward a stable balance of power in Asia derives from the insecurities and weaknesses of the Chinese government, both domestically and abroad. China’s leaders rely, for their legitimacy and support, not only on continued economic success and rising living standards, but also on a form of nationalism that prizes the ability of the regime to correct past injustices meted out by “imperialist” powers during China’s so-called “century of humiliation” and to stand up to current slights, both real and imagined. Thus, their policies often capitalize on the resentments felt by many Chinese citizens toward the supposedly arrogant West and Japan.

This viewpoint makes the Chinese leadership hesitant to quell the more extreme forms of nationalism described above and deeply suspicious of the United States and its allies. It also makes it more receptive to the notion that a rising yet still underdeveloped and relatively weak China must continue to conceal its military capabilities while developing its overall capacities to the maximum extent possible. In other words, the Chinese regime is both excessively vulnerable to ultranationalist pressures and disinclined to contemplate self-imposed limitations on its sovereign rights (for example, with regard to Taiwan) and its political, economic, and military abilities, especially in Asia. While this does not translate into a drive for predominance, it does make Beijing less willing to accept the kind of mutual restraints necessary to achieve a stable balance of power in the Western Pacific.

No Grand Bargain, but a Clear Understanding and a Staged Process Are Required

These obstacles clearly indicate that Washington and Beijing are not about to undertake, much less reach, a formal grand-bargain-type of agreement to establish a new regional security environment anytime soon.4 Such a fundamental shift in policies and approaches can only occur gradually, in stages, and over an extended period of time. But it can only begin if elites in Washington, Beijing, and other Asian capitals seriously examine the enduring trends under way in Asia and accept the reality of the changing power distribution and the need for more than just marginal adjustments and assurances. Only then will they undertake a systematic examination of the requirements of a stable balance of power over the long term, involving a serious consideration of the more fundamental actions. Such an examination and acceptance must initially occur domestically, then among allies and protectorates, and finally via a bilateral U.S.-China strategic dialogue aimed at developing understandings about the process and actions required. Such understandings must provide for ample opportunities and means for both sides to assess and evaluate the credibility and veracity of the actions of the other side.

If such understandings can be reached regarding the overall need for strategic adjustment, then the specific concessions to minimize potential instabilities and arrangements for meaningful cooperation, involving Korea, Taiwan, and maritime issues within the first island chain, will become much more possible. In particular, a strategic understanding designed to achieve a peaceful and stable transition to a genuine balance of power in the Western Pacific could make Beijing more likely to pressure or entice North Korea to abandon or place strong limits on its nuclear weapons program and undertake the kind of opening up and reforms that would almost certainly result eventually in a unified peninsula. While difficult to envision at present, such a shift in Chinese policy is certainly possible, given the obvious incentives to do so. While South Korea might also resist movement toward a nonaligned status in a post-unification environment, the obvious benefits that would result from a stable balance of power, if presented properly, could very likely overcome such resistance. Regarding Taiwan, if both U.S. and Chinese leaders can convince Taipei of the benefits of the kind of mutual assurances and restraints necessary to neutralize the cross-strait issue, none of which require the U.S. abandonment of the island, these possible adverse outcomes of the proposed or ongoing shift, including any resort to nuclear weapons, would almost certainly be avoided.

As for Japan and the U.S.-Japan alliance, in the past, many observers viewed a much-strengthened alliance and a stronger Japan as either a major provocation to Beijing not worth the cost or as a largely unfeasible option for Tokyo, given domestic political and economic constraints. However, as with the Taiwan and Korea cases, if viewed as a requirement for the creation of a buffer-like arrangement basic to a stable balance of power in the first island chain, and if limited in scope and purpose, such a calibrated strengthening would almost certainly prove acceptable to Beijing, and eventually necessary for Tokyo, particularly considering the unpalatable alternatives.

Unfortunately, there is no magic formula or technique that will guarantee or facilitate the transition to a new security environment based on a stable balance of power. It will require courageous and farsighted leadership in all relevant capitals, some significant risk taking (especially in the domestic political arena), and highly effective diplomacy. But the alternative, involving current attempts to sustain American predominance in the Western Pacific while muddling through by managing various frictions with Beijing in a piecemeal and incremental manner and cooperating where possible, will likely prove disastrous. And a much-delayed attempt to transition to a more stable balance, perhaps as a result of a clear failure of the existing strategy, will simply make the process more difficult.

Ultimately, the choice facing policymakers in the United States, China, and other Asian powers is whether to deal forthrightly and sensibly with the changing regional power distribution or avoid the hard decisions that China’s rise poses until the situation grows ever more polarized and dangerous. There are no other workable alternatives.

The author is deeply indebted to Mike M. Mochizuki, Avery Goldstein, Douglas H. Paal, Chas W. Freeman Jr., Charles L. Glaser, and Rachel E. Odell for their comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this essay.

Notes

1 Michael K. Metcalf, Imperialism With Chinese Characteristics? Reading and Re-reading China’s 2006 Defense White Paper (Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence Agency, 2013) 29.

2 Michael D. Swaine et al., China’s Military & the U.S.-Japan Alliance in 2030: A Strategic Net Assessment (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013) and Michael D. Swaine et al., Conflict and Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region: A Strategic Net Assessment (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2015).

3 For a recent, excellent example, see James Steinberg and Michael O’Hanlon, Strategic Reassurance and Resolve: U.S.-China Relations in the Twenty-First Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014).

4 Those few analysts, such as Hugh White, who recognize the changing power distribution in Asia, incorrectly identify China as seeking its own form of regional predominance and/or call for highly unrealistic means of addressing the overall problem, such as via a formal U.S. presidential declaration of the abandonment of American primacy and the establishment of a formal Concert of Europe–type agreement between Beijing, Washington, and other major Asian powers. See Hugh White, The China Choice: Why We Should Share Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). For an example of an argument in support of a bilateral grand bargain between Washington and Beijing, see Charles L. Glaser, “A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice Between Military Competition and Accommodation,” International Security 39, no. 4 (forthcoming).

Wanted: a U.S. Strategy for Syria and Iraq

By Melissa Dalton

Nov 16, 2015

Источник: http://csis.org/publication/wanted-us-strategy-syria-and-iraq

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Fifteen months since the U.S.-led coalition began its campaign against the Islamic state in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), ISIS remains a formidable force in both countries. Although coalition airstrikes and local forces have taken back some territory in the northern regions, ISIS maintains military momentum, continues to lure recruits internationally, and retains control of substantial areas in Syria’s north and east and Iraq’s west.

 

Afghanistan and “Failed State Wars”: The Need for a Realistic Transition

By Anthony H. Cordesman

Oct 15, 2015

Источник: http://csis.org/publication/afghanistan-and-failed-state-wars-need-realistic-transition

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President Obama has decided on a limited change in U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. He will keep 5,500 U.S. troops in Afghanistan through 2017, rather than reduce the number to a nominal 1,000 or less deployed around Kabul at the end of 2016. An article in the Washington Post indicates that this will cost about $15 billion a year, about $5 billion more than the smaller, 1,000-person Kabul-based force.

The problem is, that like so many of the President’s decisions, this is an awkward compromise with reality. It is not conditions-based and designed to meet Afghan needs, but rather than absolute minimum a U.S. military responding to the President’s clear desire to leave by the end of 2016 could have asked for.

Too Low a Number, No Real Strategy, and Media that Don’t Ask the Right Questions

The new number is almost certainly too low to be effective. Like all of the President’s previous manpower totals, it is not explained and exploits news media that never seems to realize that total personnel numbers are almost meaningless as a measure of effectiveness.

There is no way to no how many personnel are now in – and will remain in — given aspects of the train and assist mission, be involved in the counter terrorism force, have a role in providing air support, be dedicated to protecting other U.S. forces and the Embassy, or be involved in various logistic and support functions. There is no indication of what other kinds of support the U.S. will really provide, the role it expects its allies to play, U.S. goals in trying to improve various parts of the Afghan security forces, and the scale and distribution of future military aid and equipment transfers.

The White House has gotten away with announcing meaningless manpower totals in the past, rather that describing a real strategy. It seems to have little fear that the media will asking meaningful questions this time, probe hard, or examine the range of options that led to a 5,500 man total.

Too Little and Not Late Enough

What is clear from the problems in the present nominally 9,800 personnel effort is that the existing numbers are not adequate to meet Afghan needs, much less a 5,500 personnel figure roughly half the present total. The new total will only apply through 207, not be tailored to a realistic time scale. It will be far too little to properly cover every Afghan corps, much less major combat units. It will not be large enough to provide advisors and train and assist efforts that can deal with the Afghan police and local police.

It does not mark any clear commitment to keep some form of U.S. combat capability like the counterterrorism force to help in emergencies, and does not commit the U.S. to providing the combat air support which is the only way the U.S. can ensure that Afghan forces have the combat power to prevent more Taliban and insurgent victories until – and if – the Afghan Air Force can really become effective. It is to be blunt, a half-assessed compromise – rather than a shift that goes from simply set a deadline to getting out before the President leaves office to conditions-based strategy designed to meet enough Afghan needs to have a credible change of success.

Changes in the U.S. military effort that are lean and demanding might make the present 9,800 adequate, but lean and mean is not the present American way. Past contingency studies created figures around 13,000 military personnel and above and looked towards phasing out around 2020. Times may have changes, but too little too early has not reduced most requirements and may have increased them.

At a minimum, the President should explain the options, justify his choices, and describe a real strategy.

A Military and Not a Civil-Military “Strategy”

The other critical problem is that the military dimension is only half of a credible strategy. The Afghan forces may have recovered Kunduz –at least for the present – but the overall situation in the country continues to deteriorate in terms of politics, governance, economics and security.

The U.S. can only justify a meaningful military effort if it has both a strategy to deal with the Taliban and insurgent threat, and with the critical problems on the civil side. These problems are analyzed in depth in an updated briefing by the Burke Chair at CSIS.

This briefing examines current trends and metrics in depth, provides comparison data in key areas, and provides further evidence that Afghanistan cannot stand on its own and will requires U.S. help in terms of aid, train and assist support, and airpower well beyond 2016.

It is entitled Afghanistan and “Failed State Wars”: The Need for a Realistic Transition, and is available on the CSIS web site at http://csis.org/files/publication/150929_Cordesman_Afghanistan_Failed_State_Wars_1.pdf.

It has 21 main sections. The content of each section covers the following issues in detail:

  • Key Lessons of “Failed State” Wars summarizes the key lessons that the U.S. should have learned to date.
  • Uncertain Claims of Success highlights the fact that many U.S. claims of success to date are exaggerated and uncertain
  • A Nation Under Acute Population Pressure and with Critical Ethnic
    and Sectarian Divisions
    provides detailed tables and comparative charts and maps describing the impact of population growth, Afghanistan’s deep ethnic and sectarian divisions, and the impact of its exceptionally young population and youth “bulge” on the need for jobs to maintain stability.
  • Key Civil Challenges provides a detailed analysis of the real world civil challenges that Afghanistan still faces and the extent to which the State Department and USAID have made exaggerated claims of progress and success. It provides metrics on Afghanistan’s level of corruption, human development indicators, real world progress in education, and how the Afghan people view such challenges.
  • Uncertain Politics and Large Areas of Failed Governance highlights the critical problems in the quality of Afghan governance, and the political problems that limit public support and trust.
  • The Corruption Challenge summarizes the problem of official corruption in Afghanistan, and highlights studies provided by Transparency International and others on how much of a threat corruption in the Afghan government is.
  • The Budget Challenge underscores the key budgetary challenges facing the Afghan government and the fiscal challenges to Transition, including declining levels of aid, increased dependency on civilian and military aid, increasing government expenditures, and investment in the public services sector and physical infrastructure.
  • Economic Challenges details the economic factors driving civilian unrest, including the slow rate of GDP growth, the threat of ignoring growing demographic pressures, corruption cost and impacts, and critical problems in governance and budgetary planning and execution.
  • Economic Stability and Development Challenges highlighting major challenges that are not war related, including poverty and demography, aid dependence, security and fragility, corruption and governance, lack of confidence in private sector job growth, and societal differences and divisions.
  • Poverty Challenge summarizes the growing challenges posed by Afghanistan’s lagging economy, and the demographic pressures of a society leaving the rural agricultural regions to find work in the cities, creating urban slums and exacerbating poverty.
  • Business, Investment, Mining, and LoC Challenges highlights the barriers to investment, development, and doing business in Afghanistan, key problems in the transport, agriculture, and power sectors, massive dependency on outside aid and uncertainty of future aid.
  • Narco-Economy Challenge underscores the challenges of Afghanistan shifting back towards a narco-economy, the pervasiveness of opium, cannabis and other drugs, problems with the counter-drug effort, the negative impact of power brokers and the Taliban, and the flow of Afghan drugs into Europe, Russia, and Asia.
  • Warfighting and Violence Challenges highlights the continued levels of violence challenging Afghan stability, the failure of the Afghan “surge” in defeating the Taliban, and the continued threat posed by Afghan insurgents and extremist networks.
  • A Focus on Tactical Outcomes Disguises a Lack of Meaningful Reporting on the Key Impact of the Insurgency: Growing Insurgent Influence and Control and Declining Support for the Government uncovers the problems in reporting, “Lying By Omission,” and underscores the threat levels of districts that have limited government presence or none at all, and the fact that 27 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces suffer from violence levels rated “high” or “extreme”.
  • Casualty Challenge details the discrepancy between reporting that disguises growing insurgent influence and increased casualty levels.
  • ANSF Force Strength and Readiness Challenge highlights the most critical challenges to the Afghan National Security Forces, the heavy reliance on Afghan National Police forces to carry out paramilitary functions they are not trained for, and the lack of unclassified reporting on army and police readiness by the media and government officials.
  • U.S. and Allied Transition and Force Levels underscores the failures of the Transition plan, the errors in delaying preparing for Transition, and the mistakes of decisions on troop reduction levels out of step with realities on the ground.
  • NATO and US Advisory Manning Levels summarizes the missteps surrounding the advisory role, including not providing sufficient numbers of advisors, and misplaced advisory emphasis on sustainment and not combat.
  • Afghan Air Force vs. US and Allied Air Support highlights the unworkable Afghan Air Force development plan that is disconnected with the actual combat needs, contributing to the reliance on outside air support.
  • U.S. Civil and Military Aid warns of repeating the same mistakes the U.S. and Allied countries have made historically, namely cutting aid too soon, inability to follow through on aid commitments made at Tokyo conference and elsewhere, and the dangers of declaring “victory” and leaving Afghanistan to fend for its own with rising dependence on foreign aid and decreased development assistance.
  • An Uncertain Pakistan highlights the critical but destabilizing role that neighboring Pakistan has in the stability of Afghanistan despite rhetoric and efforts at senior levels, underscoring the challenges of mistrust and high levels of violence.
  • Post-2014 Security Challenge summarizes the key warfighting challenges, urges reshaping U.S. and other partner roles to win popular support, support the Afghan government and ANSF, shifting the response to address new and continued threats, encourages plans and strategies that address Afghan problems from an Afghan perspective, and demands meaningful reporting and net assessments that have been largely absent since 2012 and 2013.

Time for a Real Strategy and Real Transparency

The risks are simply too high to task about 5,500 men through 2017. Some 14 years of poorly structure strategies which never honestly assessed costs and risks, described real longer-term strategy in any detail, and made “whole of government” a slogan that never led to serious integrated civil-military efforts have wasted billions, cost American and allied lives, and left Afghanistan unready for Transition.

The white House need to start asking itself serious question about what a realistic civil military strategy should be, the costs involved, the risks, and whether a serious conditions-based effort is worth it. The Congress and the media need to put real pressure on the White House to do this, do it openly, and allow the kind of review and debate that will decide whether a meaningful U.S. commitment should be made.

The President’s 5,500 figure may be a way to leave office before the cost of a failed approach becomes fully clear, but it is not a strategy. It is also an effort in political expediency that may be a clear failure before the President make it to the exit door.

The Arab-U.S. Strategic Partnership and the Changing Security Balance in the Gulf

Joint and Asymmetric Warfare, Missiles and Missile Defense, Civil War and Non-State Actors, and Outside Powers

By Anthony H. Cordesman

Contributor: Michael Peacock

Oct 19, 2015

Источник: http://csis.org/publication/arab-us-strategic-partnership-and-changing-security-balance-gulf-0

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The ongoing confrontation with Iran, the war against ISIL, the instability in Iraq, the civil war in Syria, and the conflict in Yemen have all caused major changes in the security situation in the Persian Gulf and in the regional military balance. The strategic partnership between Arab Gulf states, and with the United States and other outside states, must now evolve to deal with conventional military threats and a range of new threats, including ideological extremists, non-state actors and their state sponsors, and a growing range of forces designed to fight asymmetric wars.

 

This new report from the CSIS Burke Chair in Strategy provides a 2015 assessment of the Gulf military balance, the military capabilities of each Gulf state, the role of the United States as a security partner, and the priorities for change in the structure of both the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Arab Gulf military partnership with the United States. The assessment goes far beyond the conventional military balance and examines how force developments in the region affect joint and asymmetric warfare, missiles and missile defense, nuclear forces, as well as terrorism, the role of non-state actors, and outside powers.

 

Россия и США на развилке

Сергей Рогов, Виктор Есин, Валентин Кузнецов, Павел Золотарев

02.08.2013

Источник: http://nvo.ng.ru/realty/2013-08-02/1_rf_usa.html

«Дело Сноудена» в очередной раз продемонстрировало, насколько неустойчивым и уязвимым для внешних неконтролируемых факторов является нынешнее взаимодействие между Москвой и Вашингтоном. Между тем российско-американские отношения оказались на развилке.
17 июня с.г. состоялась встреча Барака Обамы и Владимира Путина на саммите «большой восьмерки». Два президента подписали несколько важных договоренностей, направленных на укрепление двусторонних отношений между Россией и США, которые пережили сложный период в 2012 году. По существу удалось выработать новую повестку после исчерпавшей себя «перезагрузки».
Приняты решения по дальнейшей институализации отношений между Москвой и Вашингтоном в рамках Президентской комиссии, созданной в 2009 году. Нельзя позволять сводить взаимодействие двух держав к «личной химии» двух президентов.
В частности, вопросы торговли и инвестиций теперь будут курировать вице-президент США и премьер-министр РФ. Это может дать серьезный импульс развитию двусторонней торговли и инвестиций, которые не соответствуют потенциалу двух стран. Экономические отношения должны стать опорой стабильных отношений двух стран в XXI веке, помочь преодолеть чрезмерную милитаризацию и идеологизацию отношений.
Вопросы «стратегической стабильности, международной безопасности и общих угроз для наших стран» будут рассматриваться в формате 2х2, то есть министрами иностранных дел и обороны. Видимо, четыре министра должны обсуждать не только такие проблемы, как Сирия (и Иран), но и военно-стратегические темы, включая противоракетную оборону, ядерное и высокоточное обычное оружие и другое. Кроме того, президенты поручили советам безопасности поддерживать регулярный диалог.
14 июня 2013 года в Вашингтоне было подписано соглашение о реформированной программе Совместного сокращения угрозы (программа Нанна-Лугара). Теперь американская сторона не будет финансировать уничтожение снимаемых с вооружения российских ракет. Бюджет Российской Федерации позволяет это сделать самостоятельно. Но сотрудничество в других областях будет продолжаться.
Владимир Путин и Барак Обама решили провести новый саммит 3–4 сентября с.г. в Москве. Конечно, наивно ожидать, что за оставшееся время удастся подготовить юридические соглашения по ПРО или ядерному оружию. Но договориться о формате и принципах новых официальных переговоров по этим вопросам представляется реальным.
НОВАЯ ЯДЕРНАЯ СТРАТЕГИЯ США
19 июня с.г. американский президент Барак Обама объявил об изменениях в подходе США к применению ядерного оружия. Тем самым завершился продолжавшийся почти два года пересмотр американской ядернойстратегии. Хотя Обама упоминает провозглашенную им пять лет назад цель ядерного разоружения, в новом доктринальном документе «Доклад о стратегии применения ядерного оружия» подчеркивается, что в обозримом будущем США не отказываются от ядерного сдерживания. Однако вносятся серьезные коррективы, которые Пентагон должен осуществить в течение ближайшего года.
Во-первых, роль ядерного оружия в американской военной политике будет снижаться, сужаться до применения ядерного оружия сугубо «в чрезвычайных обстоятельствах для защиты жизненно важных интересов Соединенных Штатов и их союзников и партнеров». Что понимается под жизненно важными интересами – не поясняется. При этом подчеркивается, что США «не могут ограничить роль сдерживания только предотвращением ядерного нападения».
Во-вторых, предусматривается усиление роли неядерных средств в сдерживании неядерных атак. Очевидно, это относится к нападению с применением химического, биологического, кибернетического оружия, не говоря уже об обычных вооружениях.
В-третьих, Пентагон должен определить способы отказа от «запуска в условиях нападения», то есть от ответно-встречного удара, поскольку «риск внезапного разоружающего удара является все менее вероятным». При этом США сохраняют возможность произвести «запуск в условиях нападения».
В-четвертых, США будут добиваться «сохранения и укрепления стратегической стабильности как с Россией, так и с Китаем». Поэтому Вашингтон намерен сохранить ядерную триаду. Этот тезис заслуживает особого внимания, поскольку обычно говорилось о поддержании стратегической стабильности (по существу – взаимного гарантированного уничтожения) только с Россией. Готов ли Вашингтон согласиться на модель взаимного гарантированного уничтожения с Пекином?
В-пятых, США будут сохранять так называемый контрсиловой потенциал, то есть способность наносить удар по хорошо защищенным военным целям (таким как шахтные ПУ). Американские ядерные силы не переходят к так называемому противоценностному нацеливанию. При этом подчеркивается, что США не будут придерживаться «минимального сдерживания».
В-шестых, объявлено, что поддержание надежного стратегического сдерживания возможно при сокращении ядерных сил на треть по сравнению с уровнем нового Договора СНВ (1550 развернутых боеголовок). США намерены вступить в переговоры с Россией для достижения взаимных и контролируемых сокращений запасов стратегического и нестратегического ядерного оружия.
ПРОБЛЕМА ВОЗВРАТНОГО
ПОТЕНЦИАЛА
Как известно, новый Договор СНВ устанавливает для сторон потолки в 1550 «развернутых» ядерных боезарядов и 700 «развернутых» пусковых установок (ПУ) МБР и БРПЛ, а также тяжелых бомбардировщиков (ТБ). Общее же  количество «развернутых» и «неразвернутых» пусковых установок МБР и БРПЛ, а также ТБ не может превышать 800 единиц. По правилам засчета, установленным по Договору, за каждым ТБ засчитывается один боезаряд.
Согласно официальным данным, на 1 марта 2003 года у США имелось 1654 «развернутых» ядерных боезаряда и 792 «развернутые» пусковые установки МБР и БРПЛ, а также ТБ. Россия же находится на уровне, значительно уступающем потолкам нового Договора СНВ – 1480 «развернутых» ядерных боезарядов и 492 «развернутых» МБР, БРПЛ и ТБ.
По оценке СИПРИ, у США (с учетом фактической загрузки тяжелых бомбардировщиков, а не по правилам атрибуции, как это предусмотрено в новом Договоре СНВ) имеется 2150 развернутых боезарядов, у России – примерно 1800. В 2010 году администрация Обамы объявила, что ядерный арсенал США составляет 5113 «активных» боезарядов. По данным американских экспертов Роберта Норриса и Ханса Кристиансена, к 2013 году это количество сократилось до 4650 боезарядов. Это связано, в частности, с тем, что в прошлом году были сняты с вооружения примерно 320 ядерных КРМБ TLAM-N, а их боеголовки были деактивированы.
С 2015 года Пентагон планирует начать сокращение ПУ БРПЛ «Трайдент» на американских стратегических подводных лодках с 24 до 20, а количество «развернутых» МБР «Минитмен-3» будет сокращено до 400–420 единиц, чтобы уложиться в потолки, установленные новым Договором СНВ. Однако окончательный состав стратегических ядерных сил США пока еще окончательно не определен.
В общей сложности у США имеется 449 «развернутых» ПУ МБР и 108 «неразвернутых» ПУ МБР (57 «Минитмен-3» и 51 «Пискипер»), а также 232 «развернутых» ПУ БРПЛ и 104 «неразвернутых» ПУ БРПЛ. В море постоянно находится 8–9 американских стратегических подводных лодок. Из них 4–5 осуществляют боевое патрулирование в пределах досягаемости запланированных целей. Кроме того, у США имеется 111 «развернутых» и 24 «неразвернутых» ТБ.
В «Докладе о стратегии применения ядерного оружия» говорится о том, что «преимущество в неразвернутых вооружениях дает США способность произвести дозагрузку боеголовок в случае, если геополитические изменения потребуют скорректировать нашу оценку потребности в развернутых стратегических силах». Это можно истолковать как возможную реакцию, с одной стороны, на ускоренную модернизацию ядерных вооружений Китая, а, с другой, – на потенциальную возможность выхода России из нового Договора СНВ.
В недавно частично рассекреченном документе Министерства обороны США утверждается: «Американские ядерные силы имеют такой состав, который позволяет принимать во внимание любые возможные изменения конфигурации стратегических сил России в ходе выполнения нового Договора СНВ. В частности, это включает развертывание дополнительных стратегических боезарядов, количественно существенно превышающих уровень нового Договора СНВ, что не окажет никакого эффекта на потенциал гарантированного ответного удара США, на котором основывается наше стратегическое сдерживание. Следовательно, Россия не получит никаких существенных выгод в случае наращивания своих стратегических сил путем обмана или выхода из нового Договора СНВ. Это связано с обеспеченной живучестью запланированной структуры стратегических сил США, особенно благодаря ПЛАРБ «Огайо», которые постоянно находятся на боевом патрулировании. Кроме того, в ответ на нарушения России США могут провести дозагрузку дополнительных боезарядов на все составляющие своей стратегической триады.
Таким образом, у США имеется огромный возвратный потенциал, поскольку сокращения по новому Договору СНВ осуществляются в основном за счет разгрузки боеголовок с МБР и БРПЛ. По нашим подсчетам, этот потенциал составляет не менее 2500 ядерных боезарядов. То есть американские 1550 боезарядов, ограничиваемые новым Договором СНВ, в течение 6–12 месяцев могут превратиться в 4000.
У России же иная ситуация. Официальные данные Москва не публикует. По американским данным, российские СЯС включают 326 «развернутых» МБР с 1050 боеголовками, 10 «развернутых» стратегических подводных лодок с 160 БРПЛ (до 624 боеголовок) и около 80 «развернутых» ТБ. На боевом патрулировании находится не более 1–2 подводных лодок. Это вынуждает держать на боевом дежурстве значительную часть МБР.
Особо следует отметить, что по мере снятия с вооружения «тяжелых» МБР возвратный потенциал российских СЯС сократится и будет значительно уступать американскому. А забрасываемый вес новых МБР «Тополь-М» и «Ярс» невелик. Это очень существенный момент, потому что к власти в США могут прийти республиканцы и выйти из нового Договора СНВ, как они это проделали с Договором по ПРО. Тогда США по стратегическим ядерным вооружениям получат значительное, не менее чем двойное, превосходство над Россией.
Ситуация может поменяться только в начале 2020-х годов, когда произойдет развертывание российских стратегических ракет нового поколения. Однако для этого потребуются весьма крупные ассигнования. Необходимо также решить ряд серьезных проблем, возникших в оборонной промышленности России.

ПЕРСПЕКТИВЫ ПРОТИВОРАКЕТНОЙ ОБОРОНЫ
Выйдя из Договора по ПРО в 2002 году, администрация Буша-младшего в 2004 году начала развертывание стратегических перехватчиков GBI на Аляске, а позднее – в Калифорнии. Однако в значительной степени этот шаг был блефом. Большинство из 16 проведенных испытаний системы GBI были неудачными, хотя и проводились по облегченной схеме (заранее были известны время запуска и траектория мишени, контрмеры не применялись, лишь один тест проводился в ночное время, который завершился неудачно). Позднее было принято решение оснастить эту систему новой ступенью перехвата (СЕ-2). Но после неудачного испытания обновленной системы в 2008 году пять лет испытания GBI вообще не проводились. Наконец, 5 июля с.г. было возобновлено испытание GBI с усовершенствованной системой перехвата СЕ-1 (стоимость испытания – 218 млн. долл.), которое кончилось полным провалом.
Имеющиеся у США 30 стратегических противоракет GBI (20 оснащены ступенью перехвата СЕ-1, 10 – ступенью перехвата СЕ-2) продемонстрировали крайне низкую эффективность. Несмотря на неудачные испытания, администрация Обамы намерена увеличить количество этих противоракет к 2017 году до 44 единиц, закупая по два перехватчика этого типа в год. Стоимость одной ракеты GBI – примерно 70 млн. долл. До сих пор Пентагон ни разу не испытал свои перехватчики против МБР. На 2015–2020 годы запланированы 8 испытаний противоракеты GBI со ступенью перехвата СЕ-2 для перехвата цели, имитирующей МБР.
Следует отметить, что при администрации Обамы размах планов развертывания стратегической ПРО существенно сократился. Было отменено создание в Восточной Европе 3-го позиционного района стратегической ПРО (администрация Буша-младшего планировала разместить в Польше перехватчики GBI в 2010 году). Как уже отмечалось, несколько месяцев назад администрация Обамы аннулировала 4-й этап ЕвроПРО и отказалась от разработки ракеты-перехватчика SM-3 Block 2B, которая могла бы обладать характеристиками, позволяющими осуществлять перехват МБР (скорость 5 км/сек).
Республиканцы в Конгрессе требуют от Белого дома развернуть 3-й позиционный район с перехватчиками GBI на Восточном побережье США. По оценке Бюджетного управления Конгресса, стоимость создания 3-го позиционного района составит 3,6 млрд. долл, в том числе 1,3 млрд. долл. на закупку 20 дополнительных перехватчиков GBI. Однако это предложение отверг сенатский Комитет по делам вооруженных сил.
Пентагон также считает этот план нецелесообразным. В условиях болезненного секвестра военного бюджета Министерство обороны не хочет тратить деньги на ненужные и неэффективные системы вооружений. К тому же министр обороны Чак Хейгель никогда не был фанатичным сторонником ПРО.
Пентагон начал работы по выяснению возможности развертывания 3-го позиционного района стратегической ПРО. Свою позицию по этому вопросу Министерство обороны сформулирует не ранее 2016 года.
Кроме того, продолжаются НИОКР по двухступенчатой ракете GBI, хотя пока нет никакой информации о сроках завершения этих работ и возможных вариантах развертывания этой системы.
Широкой политической поддержкой в Вашингтоне пользуется оперативно-тактическая система ПРО морского базирования «Иджис», которой оснащаются крейсеры типа «Тикондерога» и эскадренные миноносцы типа DDG-51.
Как заявил на слушаниях в Сенате директор Агентства ПРО адмирал Сиринг, в 2013 году у США имеется всего 27 кораблей, оснащенных системой «Иджис», а в 2014 году будет 29 кораблей. К 2018 году системой «Иджис» с противоракетами будет оснащен 41 американский крейсер и эсминец, количество перехватчиков SM-3 разных типов достигнет 328 единиц – в среднем по 8 противоракет на один корабль.
В настоящее время на вооружении ВМС США имеется три типа противоракет «Стандард миссайл» – 72 SM-2 Block 4, 90 SM-3 Block 1/1A и 18 SM-3 Block 1B. Компания «Рейтион», которая производит перехватчики семейства «Стандард миссайл», планирует произвести в 2014–2018 годах  431 ракету SM-3 Block 1A и SM-3 Block 1B. 36 из них предназначены для Японии.
Что касается тактических и оперативно-тактических перехватчиков наземного базирования Patriot PAC-3 и THAAD, то их общее количество не превышает 1000 единиц. Пентагон на данное время закупил 50 перехватчиков THAAD, что позволило развернуть 2 батальона, оснащенных этими ракетами. В 2014 году количество перехватчиков THAAD возрастет до 98. В 2013 году намечено закупить 36 ракет THAAD и 84 ракеты Patriot PAC-3. К концу нынешнего десятилетия их количество может возрасти до 1,5 тыс. Но эти системы не в состоянии осуществлять перехват МБР и не оказывают существенного влияния на военно-стратегический баланс.
Таким образом, через пять лет у США может быть не более 50 стратегических перехватчиков (44 GBI и 6 SM-3 Block 2A). Это в два раза меньше, чем было разрешено Протоколом 1974 года к Договору по ПРО. Напомним, что вокруг Москвы в настоящее время развернуты 68 стратегических перехватчиков.
Система ПРО А-135 вокруг Москвы заступила на боевое дежурство 17 февраля 1995 года. На последнем этапе разработки находится обновленная система ПРО вокруг Москвы А-235 «Самолет-М», которая заменит устаревшую А-135. Сообщается, что противоракеты 53Т6 будут заменены на новые ракеты с более точной системой наведения и системой поражения осколочно-фугасными боевыми частями, а не ядерными боеголовками.
Семейство зенитно-ракетных систем (ЗРС) С-300ПС, С-300ПМ, С-300ПМУ («Фаворит») и С-400 («Триумф») предназначено для защиты административно-промышленных центров и военных объектов от ударов авиации и баллистических ракет малой и средней дальности. Характеристики данных этих ЗРС близки к характеристикам американской системы ПВО/ПРО Patriot PAC-3, а в дальнейшем – системе SM-3 Block 1.
Разрабатывается ЗРС С-500, принятие на вооружение которой ожидается в 2016 году. По своим характеристикам она будет сопоставима с американской противоракетной системой THAAD и, как и предшествующие ЗРС С-300 и С-400, не будет способна перехватывать МБР. К концу нынешнего десятилетия у России будет более 1 тыс. ракет-перехватчиков различных типов.
Таким образом, российские ЗРС С-300, С-400 и С-500 и американские системы Patriot PAC-3, THAAD, SM-3 Block 1A, 1B и 2A не окажут существенного влияния на военно-стратегический баланс России и США.
НАДО ЛИ НАЧИНАТЬ ПЕРЕГОВОРЫ?
Администрация Обамы считает, что ее решение об отмене 4-го этапа ЕвроПРО и отказе от разработки перехватчика SM-3 Block 2В должно снять озабоченность России относительно американской противоракетной обороны. Но в Москве утверждают, что, хотя эти шаги были сделаны в правильном направлении, они недостаточны. Ситуацию осложняют попытки республиканцев в Конгрессе добиться развертывания 3-го позиционного района стратегической ПРО на Восточном побережье США.
Если на президентских выборах 2016 года победят республиканцы, то даже в этом случае в начале 2020-х годов у американцев не будет такой стратегической ПРО, которая могла бы сорвать наш ответный удар, не говоря уже про ответно-встречный удар. Состояние американской ПРО явно не соответствует паническим рассуждениям о том, что США могут за несколько часов нейтрализовать 90% российского ядерного потенциала.
Отвечают ли американские инициативы интересам России? Ядерные сокращения могут быть как выгодны для нас, так и невыгодны. В принципе стратегическая стабильность вовсе не обязательно повышается, если сокращается количество ядерных вооружений.
К сожалению, нельзя не признать, что администрация Обамы перехватила инициативу в разоруженческой сфере. Бескомпромиссная риторика с нашей стороны будет создавать в мире ложное впечатление, что Россия препятствует устранению ядерной угрозы и прекращению гонки вооружений.
Москва увязывает эти вопросы с ПРО, обычными стратегическими вооружениями и с необходимостью подключения к процессу сокращения других ядерных держав. Следует напомнить, что, когда при Рейгане были прерваны все переговоры и после встреч Рейгана и Горбачева в Женеве переговоры возобновились, они шли в трех «корзинах» – стратегические ядерные вооружения, ракеты средней и меньшей дальности и по космосу. Хотя повестка была широкая, переговоры шли по конкретным проблемам, а не было все слито в одну «посуду». В результате были заключены два новых договора – СНВ-1 и РСМД, а Договор по ПРО был сохранен.
На смену эмоциональным пропагандистским декларациям должны прийти реалистический анализ интересов национальной безопасности, экспертная оценка технических возможностей ПРО сегодня и в обозримой перспективе  переосмысление критериев ядерного сдерживания и стратегической стабильности в XXI веке. Надо использовать открывшееся «окно возможностей» и тщательно продумать позицию России на предстоящих переговорах. И пора не только реагировать на предложения США, а выдвигать собственные инициативы.
Пока нет впечатления, что предложение Обамы по дальнейшим сокращениям ядерных вооружений было нами всесторонне проанализировано. Пора выдвинуть свои собственные инициативы. Мы говорим, что американские предложения недостаточны, а где наши конкретные предложения?
ШЕСТЬ КОРЗИН
На наш взгляд, Россия могла бы выступить с пакетным предложением о начале переговоров по всему комплексу вопросов военно-стратегической стабильности. Такие переговоры могут вестись параллельно, по разным трекам и с разной скоростью.
1. Прежде всего надо договариваться о необратимом сокращении ядерного оружия с тем, чтобы ликвидировать преимущество США по возвратному потенциалу. На наш взгляд, следовало бы предложить сократить и количество развернутых стратегических средств доставки (например, с 700 до 500, как у нас). Если сократить количество стратегических ПУ и ТБ США до 500 единиц, то американский возвратный потенциал сократится на треть, а то и на половину.
1.1. Формат возможной договоренности. Политическая ситуация в США, в частности, расстановка сил в Сенате фактически исключает возможность заключения в ближайшие годы нового юридически обязательного договора по стратегическим наступательным или оборонительным вооружениям. Поэтому, если Москва и Вашингтон смогут достичь соглашений, то они вряд ли могут быть оформлены в виде договора. Однако возможны и другие решения.
Например, при заключении Договора СНВ-1 в 1991 году СССР и США обменялись политическими заявлениями, в которых обязались обмениваться планами развертывания ядерных КРМБ на 5 лет и не развертывать более 880 ядерных КРМБ в течение срока действия этого Договора. Напомним, что в 2012 году США полностью сняли с вооружения ядерные КРМБ, а у России некоторое количество таких систем сохраняется.
Такого рода договоренности не имеют режима проверки, но верификация не была предусмотрена и подписанным В.В.  Путиным и Дж.  Бушем-младшим в 2002 году Договором о сокращении стратегических наступательных потенциалов (Договор СНП).
Сокращение стратегических ядерных сил США и России (например, до 1000 боезарядов и 500 носителей) на основе обмена политическими заявлениями может верифицироваться механизмами проверки, предусмотренными новым Договором СНВ до истечения срока его действия в 2021 году, а в случае его продления – до 2026 года.
1.2. Тактические ядерные вооружения. И в США, и в Европе много говорят, что у России здесь большое преимущество. У американцев 500 тактических ядерных боезарядов (из них 200 – в Европе). У нас, по экспертным оценкам, около 2000. Но тут имеются серьезные нюансы. У нас три класса нестратегических ядерных боезарядов: для систем ПРО и ПВО, морские ядерные вооружения и, наконец, авиационные бомбы и ракеты малой дальности. У американцев только авиабомбы. Вопрос: зачем считать боезаряды наших ПРО и ПВО – они же не могут стрелять ни по Европе, ни по другим странам. С морскими – особая тема: США никогда не соглашались на ограничения военно-морских вооружений. И наконец, если мы говорим о ядерном балансе в Европе между Россией и НАТО, то в НАТО три ядерных государства. Значит, надо считать британский и французский потенциал, но Париж и Лондон не хотят идти на ядерные сокращения. У нас еще есть и азиатская территория, где также существует необходимость в ядерном сдерживании.
Почему бы не вынести эти вопросы на публичное обсуждение? Можно было бы предложить начать переговоры о ядерном оружии НАТО и России в Европе, которое не попадает под ограничения Договора СНВ, т.е. американское ТЯО, а также английское и французское ядерное оружие. Пусть НАТО «вертится» и оправдывается, если Великобритания и Франция откажутся от переговоров.

1.3. Договор РСМД. В США идет шумиха о том, что Россия готовится к выходу из этого Договора в связи с испытаниями ракетной системы «Рубеж», которая представляет собой МБР, но с уменьшенной дальностью полета (соответственно, она может выполнять задачи по поражению целей на европейском театре). В принципе траектория полета может быть сокращена и у американских МБР и БРПЛ. Думается, что выход из Договора РСМД усложнил бы ситуацию – в этом случае в Польше, Румынии, а то и в Прибалтике появились бы не только системы ПРО, но и американские ракеты средней дальности, которые могут уже не за 10–15 минут как БРСД «Першинг-2» из Германии долетать до Москвы, а за 5–6 минут. Резкие шаги здесь нецелесообразны.
2. ПРО. Что касается противоракетной обороны, то перспектива заключения нового юридического обязательства Договора ПРО отсутствует. Но из-за отмены 4-го этапа ЕвроПРО и отказа от разработки перехватчика СМ-3 Блок 2Б у США будет не более 100 стратегических ракет-перехватчиков до конца срока действия Договора СНВ.
Чтобы обеспечить предсказуемость развития ситуации Москва и Вашингтон могли бы для начала договориться о создании Центра сотрудничества в области ПРО. В рамках Центра можно осуществлять комплекс мер по обеспечению транспарентности – проведение технических брифингов о характеристиках существующих и перспективных систем ПРО, представление ежегодных заявлений о системах ПРО. Кроме того, возможно проведение совместных учений сил ПРО – компьютерное моделирование, командно-штабные учения, совместная подготовка и использование в рамках учений систем ПРО России и США, сбор и обмен сведений, полученных с РЛС и спутников раннего оповещения, а также направление информации в центры командования и управления России и США. Эти договоренности можно было бы закрепить в «исполнительном соглашении» (такая форма была применена при заключении соглашения ОСВ в 1972 году).
3. Что касается высокоточного обычного оружия, то заключение каких-либо соглашений с США по их запрещению представляется крайне маловероятным. Однако можно предложить американской стороне ограничить количество развернутых высокоточных систем большой дальности, таких как «Быстрый глобальный удар»; ежегодно обмениваться планами развертывания этих систем (с указанием их местонахождения); в случае применения этих систем в отношении третьих стран заблаговременно уведомлять другую сторону в конфиденциальном порядке. Эти договоренности могут быть оформлены в виде политических заявлений.
Было бы также целесообразно начать многосторонние переговоры о новом общеевропейском режиме контроля над обычными вооружениями вместо ДОВСЕ. При этом помимо танков, боевых бронированных машин, артиллерии, боевых самолетов и ударных вертолетов можно было бы включить и высокоточные средства поражения.
Кроме того, можно предложить США начать консультации о новых мерах доверия в военно-морской сфере. В частности, поставить вопрос о необходимости предоставления информации о заблаговременном информировании друг друга в случае захода надводных кораблей и подводных лодок в акватории вблизи территории другой стороны. Это позволило бы уменьшить угрозу для стратегических сил России в случае развертывания ВМС США, оснащенных крылатыми ракетами и перехватчиками SM-3.
4. В сфере кибербезопасности целесообразно обсудить с США возможность приглашения других стран к российско-американскому соглашению по противодействию киберугрозам. В июне с.г. Путин и Обама достигли беспрецедентной договоренности по борьбе с киберугрозами «в целях создания механизма обмена информацией для обеспечения более эффективной защиты критически важных информационных систем». При этом в случае необходимости будет задействована горячая линия, которая с 1963 года используется Москвой и Вашингтоном для предотвращения ядерного конфликта.
Необходимо создание системы обмена информацией, информирование об опасной активности в киберпространстве, сбор и обмен данными, полученными из национальных систем об угрозах и нападениях в киберпространстве. Было бы полезным и создание постоянно действующего двустороннего или многостороннего Центра по снижению угроз кибербезопасности.
5. Космическое оружие. В настоящее время Россия и Китай ратуют за выработку договора о запрете развертывания в космосе любого оружия, а Европейский Союз – за принятие Кодекса поведения в космосе. Представляется целесообразным поддержать кодекс. Поскольку США не торопятся присоединиться к этому кодексу, это поставит Вашингтон в затруднительное положение. Следует сблизить позиции на основе компромисса: на первом этапе принять Кодекс поведения в космосе (прецедент – РКРТ) с указанием о том, что на втором этапе (в рамках Конференции по разоружению в Женеве) начать переговоры по выработке договора о запрете развертывания в космосе любого оружия.
Кроме того, можно было бы предложить американской стороне выступить на саммите в Москве с совместным заявлением о том, что Россия и США не намерены размещать ударные системы в космосе, и предложить другим странам, включая Китай, присоединиться к этому обязательству.
6. Другие ядерные державы. Прямые многосторонние переговоры по ограничению и сокращению ядерных вооружений в формате «ядерной пятерки» в обозримой перспективе недостижимы, поскольку исходные позиции сторон ныне сильно разнятся. Следует также учитывать, что на долю России и США, по данным СИПРИ, приходится 16,2 тыс. из 17,3 тыс. всех ядерных боезарядов, имеющихся в мире. То есть доля Франции (300 ядерных боезарядов), Великобритании (225), Китая (250), Индии (110), Пакистана (120), Израиля (80) и Северной Кореи (около 10 ядерных боезарядов) вместе взятых составляет менее 7% от суммарного ядерного арсенала на нашей планете.
Но представляется возможным предложить принять на саммите в Москве совместное заявление двух президентов с предложением другим ядерным державам вступить в переговоры о мерах доверия. России и США следует предоставлять некоторые данные, которыми они обмениваются на двусторонней основе, другим ядерным державам, и предложить им, в свою очередь, предоставлять некоторые сведения, соответствующие набору данных, которыми обмениваются Россия и США в рамках Договора СНВ
Следует воспользоваться существующим форматом «П-5» (прошло уже четыре заседания в его рамках). Достижимым в рамках этого формата представляется взятие политических обязательств Великобританией, Францией и Китаем о ненаращивании своего ядерного потенциала при условии продолжения США и Россией процесса сокращения своих ядерных арсеналов.
«ОКНО ВОЗМОЖНОСТЕЙ»
Новая повестка дня в российско-американских отношениях намечена, но пока не начала еще осуществляться. Поэтому ключевую роль сыграет встреча В.В. Путина и Б. Обамы в сентябре с.г. Если два президента договорятся начать переговоры по экономическим и по военно-стратегическоим вопросам, то начнется движение вперед.
Как заявил президент В.В. Путин 16 июля с.г., у России есть «свои государственные задачи и по направлению строительства российско-американских отношений». У руководителей двух стран есть стремление наладить диалог, договориться о новой повестке дня. Но ее реализация потребует немалых усилий.
Дипломатия – это искусство возможного. Нельзя не учитывать и фактор времени. Через полтора года в США пройдут промежуточные выборы, после которых Обама превратится в «хромую утку», поскольку в стране начнется подготовка к президентской избирательной кампании 2016 года. «Окно возможностей» невелико, серьезные переговоры надо начинать сейчас, чтобы завершить их в следующем году. Дальше внутриполитическая ситуация в США не будет позволять добиться каких-то договоренностей.
Таким образом, успех или провал российско-американского диалога в ближайший период может определить на долгие годы характер отношений между двумя странами. Будут ли эти отношения устойчивыми и стабильными, или мы будем отброшены к «холодному миру» и новой гонке вооружений?

10 лет без Договора по ПРО

Сергей Рогов, Виктор Есин, Павел Золотарев, Валентин Кузнецов

06.06.2012

Источник: http://russiancouncil.ru/inner/?id_4=465#top-content

Институт США и Канады Российской академии наук подготовил доклад о результатах отказа Вашингтона от Договора между Союзом Советских Социалистических Республик и Соединенными Штатами Америки об ограничении систем противоракетной обороны 26 мая 1972 года (Договор по ПРО). «НВО» публикует основные тезисы этого документа.

12 июня исполняется 10 лет с момента выхода администрации Джорджа Буша-младшего из Договора по ПРО. С 1972 по 2002 год Договор по ПРО рассматривался в качестве краеугольного камня стратегической стабильности. В рамках взаимного ядерного сдерживания (или взаимного гарантированного уничтожения) Москва и Вашингтон пришли к согласию относительно дестабилизирующего воздействия противоракетной обороны на стратегический баланс. В целях предотвращения ядерного армагеддона две сверхдержавы договорились о существенном ограничении стратегической ПРО, поддерживая тем самым взаимную уязвимость от ракетно-ядерного удара. Такой подход позволял поддерживать стратегический баланс, обеспечивая неизбежность ядерного возмездия потенциальному агрессору. Это давало возможность договариваться о сокращении стратегических наступательных вооружений.

В последнее время на центральное место в мировой политике и российско-американских отношениях выдвинулся вопрос о противоракетной обороне. Проблема ПРО постоянно фигурирует на международных переговорах, в политических дискуссиях, в средствах массовой информации. В начале мая с.г. в Москве состоялась международная конференция, где обсуждались вопросы противоракетной обороны.

Действительно, со времен холодной войны поддержание стратегической стабильности было связано не только с ракетно-ядерными вооружениями, но и с противоракетной обороной. Поэтому выход США в июне 2002 года из Договора по ПРО, который ограничивал противоракетную оборону 100 перехватчиками и одним позиционным районом базирования, естественно, негативно сказался на стратегической стабильности.

Экспертами Института США и Канады РАН был подготовлен доклад по проблеме противоракетной обороны.

ПРЕДВАРИТЕЛЬНЫЕ ВЫВОДЫ

Вашингтон аргументировал выход из Договора по ПРО ракетно-ядерной угрозой со стороны третьих государств (Иран и КНДР). Официальная оценка США постоянно основывается на «наихудшем сценарии», когда военно-технические возможности и агрессивные намерения Пхеньяна и Тегерана существенно преувеличиваются. В результате потенциальная опасность объявляется прямой и непосредственной угрозой, и на этом основании Вашингтон принимает решения по противоракетной обороне, которые вызывают понятную озабоченность Москвы.

К сожалению, обсуждение проблемы противоракетной обороны у нас зачастую ведется крайне некомпетентно, на уровне пропагандистских мифов и стереотипов. При этом доминируют алармистские оценки, многократное преувеличение военно-технических возможностей американской ПРО. У общественности создается ложное представление о ненадежности нашего потенциала ядерного сдерживания. Полностью игнорируется уже имеющиеся и новейшие российские средства преодоления ПРО. Складывается впечатление, что и у нас возобладали оценки, основанные на наихудшем сценарии развития противоракетной обороны США.

Как показывает объективный анализ фактической ситуации, через 10 лет после выхода из Договора по ПРО у США нет и в обозримом будущем не будет стратегической противоракетной обороны, способной отразить ответно-встречный и даже ответный удар российских стратегических ядерных сил.

Стратегическая противоракетная оборона США имеет только наземный эшелон перехвата с ограниченными возможностями (30 перехватчиков GBI в двух позиционных районах). Нынешняя американская система стратегической ПРО в состоянии перехватить несколько примитивных МБР, если нападающая сторона не применяет средств противодействия противоракетной обороне (маневрирование во время полета, применение ложных целей, подавление информационных систем и так далее).

Стратегические перехватчики США ни разу не испытывались против МБР. Испытания проводились только для перехвата ракет средней дальности, причем в заранее установленное время при заранее известной траектории полета. До сих пор не было ни одного успешного перехвата в условиях запуска противником ложных целей.

Остаются пока нерешенными ключевые проблемы информационного обеспечения ПРО. В частности, имеющиеся у Пентагона радары и сенсоры не в состоянии на среднем участке полета ракеты отличить ложные цели от настоящих боеголовок. Между тем, как известно, в головной части всех российских МБР установлен комплекс средств преодоления противоракетной обороны.

Группировку новых американских спутников, которая должна усилить систему боевого управления ПРО, США планируют развернуть к началу следующего десятилетия, но это не гарантирует решения проблемы селекции боевых блоков на фоне ложных целей, пассивных и активных радиолокационных, оптико-электронных и другого типа помех.

Отсутствуют космический, авиационный и морской эшелоны перехвата МБР. Это существенно ослабляет эффективность американской стратегической противоракетной обороны.

Для поражения большого числа целей (тысяч) по программе «Звездных войн», провозглашенной Рональдом Рейганом в 1983 году, предусматривалось использование активных средств поражения, основанных на новых физических принципах, в том числе лучевых, электромагнитных, кинетических, сверхвысокочастотных. За 29 лет, прошедших со времени программы СОИ, США не удалось создать противоракетное лазерное оружие космического базирования. Не были решены проблемы сходимости лучевой энергии на больших расстояниях, прицеливания по высокоскоростным маневрирующим целям и так далее. Не удалось создать и космические перехватчики типа «блестящие камушки» (кинетический перехват).

Конечно, нельзя исключать, что в случае прихода к власти республиканцев работы по созданию космического эшелона ПРО будут возобновлены. Но вряд ли удастся быстро решить технические и финансовые проблемы. Развертывание космических боевых платформ вряд ли возможно ранее второй половины 2020-х годов. Скорее всего космический эшелон противоракетной обороны с сотнями таких платформ может быть создан только в середине XXI столетия.

Что касается ПРО морского базирования, то здесь Пентагону удалось добиться определенных успехов. Система «Иджис» позволяет не только обеспечить противоракетную оборону кораблей американских ВМС, но и перехват ракет малой и средней дальности. Однако скорость перехватчиков «Стандард миссайл» (SM-2 и SM-3 Block 1) не превышает 3,5 километра в секунду, что не позволяет осуществлять перехват МБР на среднем участке траектории. Следует напомнить, что российско-американский протокол 1998 года о разграничении стратегической и нестратегической ПРО (к сожалению, он не был ратифицирован) устанавливал подобный предел для нестратегической противоракетной обороны.

Эти скоростные характеристики относятся и к системе ПРО наземного базирования ТХААД, которая также не может быть использована для перехвата межконтинентальных баллистических ракет.

В конце нынешнего – начале следующего десятилетия планируется начать развертывание перехватчика SM-3 Block 2B, скорость которого должна составлять 5,5 километра в секунду. Пока еще нет даже предварительного дизайна такой противоракеты. Создание SM-3 Block 2B, в которой предусмотрены жидкотопливная и твердотопливная ступени, требует решения сложных технических задач, что произойдет не раньше 2020 года. Если это произойдет, то у США появится стратегическая противоракета нового поколения, стоимость которой будет в четыре-пять раз ниже, чем стоимость нынешних систем GBI. Хотя нельзя исключать, что SM-3 Block 2B постигнет та же судьба, что и другой высокоскоростной перехватчик KEI, который предназначался для перехвата МБР на разгонном и среднем участке полета, работа над которым была прекращена администрацией Обамы в 2009 году.

Противоракеты SM-3 Block 2B планируется развернуть в наземном варианте в Польше и Румынии. Но, как показывает моделирование, из этих районов данные перехватчики не способны оказать существенное девальвирующее воздействие на потенциал сдерживания российских СЯС. Кроме того, противоракеты SM-3 Block 2B должны быть установлены и на крейсерах и эсминцах, хотя американский флот отказался от любых жидкотопливных ракет еще 20 лет назад. В этом случае возможно появление нескольких сотен противоракет, способных перехватывать МБР на среднем участке полета. Нельзя исключать и развертывания группировки морских средств ПРО вблизи побережья США для перехвата МБР на завершающем участке полета. Но это возможно не раньше середины 2020-х годов.

В целом же создающаяся в настоящее время система американской противоракетной обороны уже в ближайшие годы позволит осуществлять достаточно эффективную защиту регионального масштаба от ракет малой и средней дальности (ПРО на ТВД). Поскольку Россия и США полностью уничтожили ракеты меньшей и средней дальности в соответствии с Договором РСМД, эти системы ПРО не представляют угрозы для России.

Стратегическая ПРО США до конца нынешнего десятилетия будет обладать весьма ограниченными возможностями.

Важную роль в ближайшие годы будет играть финансово-экономический фактор. Бюджетная ситуация в США вынуждает сокращать или замораживать государственные расходы, в том числе и бюджет Пентагона. Это делает маловероятным резкое увеличение расходов на ПРО по сравнению с нынешним уровнем. Между тем для развертывания стратегической противоракетной обороны потребуется увеличить затраты в полтора-два раза.

В случае секвестра государственных расходов, если не будет достигнут компромисс между Демократической и Республиканской партиями, бюджет Пентагона может сократиться на 15–20%. Это может привести к отмене некоторых программ ПРО.

Для Республиканской партии ПРО является приоритетом номером один. Если на выборах 2012 года победят республиканцы, то можно ожидать попытки оградить противоракетную оборону от бюджетных сокращений и даже увеличить расходы на стратегическую ПРО. Республиканская администрация, в которой, несомненно, будут доминировать неоконсерваторы, может пойти на отказ от соглашений о контроле над вооружениями и выход США из Договора СНВ (как это произошло с Договором по ПРО в 2002 году). Естественно, что в этом случае какие-либо американо-российские договоренности по противоракетной обороне исключаются.

В случае победы на выборах Демократической партии преемственность в подходе к ПРО сохранится. Видимо, бюджет расходов на противоракетную оборону несколько сократится. По-прежнему главное внимание будет уделяться ПРО на ТВД, приоритетность стратегической ПРО будет невысокой. Вторая администрация Барака Обамы, вероятно, продолжит усилия по дальнейшему сокращению ядерных вооружений. Скорее всего Обама действительно продемонстрирует определенную гибкость на переговорах о противоракетной обороне с Россией на основе каких-то политических соглашений, не носящих юридического характера.

Дипломатия, как известно, это искусство возможного. К сожалению, политическая ситуация в США полностью исключает заключение нового Договора по ПРО. По этому поводу не стоит питать каких-либо иллюзий. Поэтому требование юридических гарантий ненаправленности американской противоракетной обороны против России звучит по крайней мере странно. Никаких шансов на принятие этого требования нет.

Договор – не самоцель. Цель заключается в том, чтобы обеспечить предсказуемость стратегической ситуации на достаточно длительный период. Например, новый Договор СНВ обеспечивает стабильность в сфере стратегических наступательных вооружений на 10 лет. Затем потребуются новые договоренности. Точно так же и предсказуемость в сфере стратегических оборонительных вооружений достижима лишь примерно на такой же срок. Стратегическая стабильность – это процесс, а не закрепление статус-кво раз и навсегда. Об этом свидетельствует опыт четырех десятилетий договоренностей между Москвой и Вашингтоном по контролю над вооружениями.

Возможные подходы к договоренностям по ПРО наметились на российско-американских консультациях в 2011–2012 годах, хотя компромисса пока добиться не удалось. Дело не только в различиях между позициями сторон, но и в мощном негативном воздействии внутриполитических факторов – выборах в России и США. Очевидно, что до завершения избирательной кампании в США серьезные переговоры вряд ли возможны. Но готовиться к ним надо уже сейчас.

В случае успеха переговоров и достижения компромисса в 2013–2014 годах можно рассчитывать на сохранение стратегической стабильности до конца нынешнего десятилетия. В дальнейшем поддержание стратегического баланса, видимо, потребует разработки принципиально новых подходов к стратегическим наступательным и оборонительным вооружениям.

ПОСЛЕДСТВИЯ РАЗРЫВА ДОГОВОРА

Как известно, инициатором ограничения ПРО стал Вашингтон, и бессрочный Договор по ПРО был подписан в мае 1972 года, когда хозяином Белого дома был республиканец Ричард Никсон. Но уже в 1983 году президент Рональд Рейган провозгласил Стратегическую оборонную инициативу, призванную обеспечить защиту территорию США от ракетно-ядерного удара. Однако программа «Звездных войн» носила характер блефа, поскольку в этот период отсутствовали технологии неядерной противоракетной обороны. При президенте-демократе Билле Клинтоне США отказались от СОИ и перенесли упор на разработку тактической ПРО.

Тем не менее со времен Рейгана идея обеспечения неуязвимости США стала идеологическим кредо Республиканской партии. При этом в качестве предлога для выхода из Договора по ПРО республиканцы использовали тезис о ракетно-ядерной угрозе со стороны Северной Кореи и Ирана. В 1998 году так называемая Комиссия Рамсфелда объявила, что Иран и КНДР в течение трех–пяти лет могут создать межконтинентальные ракеты, способные достигать территории США. Выводы комиссии были сформулированы в духе докладов времен холодной войны о фальшивом отставании США от СССР по бомбардировщикам и ракетам.

Вслед за этим Конгресс, который контролировала Республиканская партия, принял Закон о национальной противоракетной обороне, предусматривавший скорейшее развертывание ПРО, насколько это позволяют технические возможности. После этого республиканцы начали пропагандистскую кампанию за скорейших выход США из Договора по ПРО.

Приход к власти Джорджа Буша-младшего и истерическая обстановка в США после террористической атаки 11 сентября 2001 году создали предпосылки для разрыва Договора по ПРО. В декабре 2001 года Вашингтон заявил о выходе из Договора в одностороннем порядке, что и произошло в июне 2002 года.

Белый дом объявил, что в 2004 году на Аляске будет создана база ПРО. Впоследствии было решено установить систему ПРО и в Калифорнии.

В 2004–2007 годах администрация Буша-младшего развернула 24 трехступенчатые стратегические противоракеты GBI, оснащенные ступенью перехвата СЕ-1. С 2007 года перехватчики оснащаются более совершенной ступенью перехвата СЕ-2. При Буше-младшем Пентагон планировал развернуть 44 ракеты GBI. Кроме того, намечалось развернуть Третий позиционный район с 10 двухступенчатыми перехватчиками GBI в Польше (а также РЛС в Чехии).

Помимо этого осуществлялась разработка ряда других систем стратегической ПРО, в том числе таких, как высокоскоростной перехватчик KEI, система MKV («умная шрапнель»), космические средства (space test bed) и др.

Администрация Барака Обамы в 2009 году радикально изменила приоритеты противоракетной обороны, сделав упор на ПРО на ТВД. Было принято решение ограничить количество противоракет GBI 30 единицами. Тогдашний заместитель председателя ОКНШ генерал Джон Картрайт заявил, что 30 пусковых установок (ПУ) стратегических перехватчиков «более чем достаточно для защиты от режимов-изгоев». При этом ни разу не проводились испытания по перехвату МБР. Тем не менее директор Агентства по ПРО генерал-лейтенант Пэтрик О’Рейли на слушаниях в Конгрессе утверждал, что имеющиеся противоракеты GBI «с 90-процентной надежностью» в состоянии одновременно перехватить до семи МБР, запущенных такими противниками, как Иран или КНДР».

По оценкам представителей Пентагона, для перехвата одной ракеты может потребоваться 4–6–8 перехватчиков. Утверждается, что необходимо довести это соотношение до двух к одному, что позволило бы сократить количество необходимых перехватчиков, однако решение этой задачи крайне затруднено.

Всего Пентагон запланировал закупить 57 противоракет GBI. В случае необходимости предполагается установить дополнительно восемь противоракет в пустующих шахтных ПУ на Аляске. В этом случае общее количество развернутых перехватчиков составит 38 единиц.

Кроме того, продолжается ОКР по двухступенчатому перехватчику GBI, испытания которого намечены на 2012 год.

В то же время администрация Обамы объявила об отказе от ряда систем стратегической ПРО, в том числе KEI, MKV и космической программы, а также от Третьего позиционного района в Восточной Европе. Фактически была приостановлена и разработка ПРО для перехвата баллистических ракет на разгонном участке с использованием химического лазера воздушного базирования на самолете «Боинг-747», которая была начата в 1996 году.

Одновременно был провозглашен Европейский поэтапный адаптивный подход (ЕПАП), предусматривающий приоритетное развертывание различных модификаций трехступенчатой противоракеты SM-3, предназначенной для заатмосферного перехвата на среднем участке полета баллистических ракет малой и средней дальности. Разгонная скорость перехватчиков SM-3 Блок 1 составляет 3,5 км/сек. У ракет SM-3 Блок 2 она должна достигать 5,5 км/сек.

Первый этап Европейского поэтапного адаптивного подхода (ЕПАП) был завершен в 2011 году. На боевое дежурство в Средиземное море вышел крейсер «Монтерей», оснащенный системой «Иджис» с противоракетами SM-3 Block 1A. В Турции был установлен радар AN/TPY-2. В Германии на базе «Рамштайн» вошел в строй Центр управления ПРО.

На саммите НАТО в Чикаго в мае 2012 года было официально объявлено, что введена в действие «промежуточная система» европейской противоракетной обороны. По словам генерального секретаря НАТО Андерса Расмуссена, Североатлантический альянс намерен «расширять систему, пока не будет полностью введен в действие ее потенциал».

Второй этап должен быть завершен в 2015 году, когда намечается развернуть 24 перехватчика SM-3 Block 1B наземного базирования в Румынии, а также перебросить четыре эсминца, оснащенных системой «Иджис», на военно-морскую базу «Рота» (Испания).

На третьем этапе к 2018 году должны быть размещены 24 перехватчика SM-3 Block 2A наземного базирования в Польше.

На четвертом этапе базы ПРО в Европе к 2020 году планировалось переоснастить на противоракеты SM-3 Block 2B, которые должны обладать способностью осуществлять перехват МБР. Кроме того, предусматривается использование этой системы для перехвата баллистических ракет на разгонном участке.

Как утверждает директор Агентства по ПРО О’Рейли, «прежде всего программа SM-3 Block 2B предназначена для перехвата МБР, и именно с этой целью она разрабатывается». По словам Брэда Робертса, помощника министра обороны, «целью четвертой фазы Адаптивного подхода является защита территории США».

Ныне у США имеется 29 кораблей, оснащенных системой «Иджис». На этих кораблях установлены радары SPY-1 и разнообразное вооружение, включая ракеты ПВО, противолодочные ракеты и крылатые ракеты морского базирования (КРМБ) «Томагавк» (количество КРМБ для поражения наземных целей на борту может достигать 60 единиц), а также два типа противоракет: SM-2 и SM-3.

Системой «Иджис» предполагается оснастить все крейсера класса CG-47 «Тикандерога» и эскадренные миноносцы DDG-51 «Арли Берке». В настоящее время у США имеется 22 крейсера CG-47, семь из которых должны быть сняты с вооружения в 2013–2014 годах, и 66 эсминцев DDG-51. Еще 10 эсминцев планируется закупить до конца нынешнего десятилетия. В 2020 году у США будет в общей сложности 94 корабля, оснащенных системой «Иджис». В дальнейшем их количество должно сократиться до 65 в 2034 году.

По оценкам экспертов, вместо КРМБ на борту могут быть установлены до 60 противоракет SM-3, но это лишает корабль возможности атаковать наземные цели, что является ныне одной из главных задач американских ВМС.

Ранее американские ВМС закупили 72 двухступенчатые ракеты ПВО SM-2 Block 4 с осколочной боеголовкой. С 2015 года планируется заменить их на новые перехватчики SM-6, оснащенные кинетической боеголовкой. Они должны поражать воздушные цели на расстоянии до 250 километров на высоте до 33 километров.

В настоящее время на вооружении США имеется 92 перехватчика SM-3 Block 1A и 12 перехватчиков SM-3 Block 1B. Всего же к 2015 году планируется закупить 136 ракет SM-3 Block 1A и 100 ракет SM-3 Block 1B. К 2020 году будет закуплено в общей сложности 472 SM-3 Block 1B.

Мобильные системы наземного базирования ТХААД предназначены для перехвата ракет малой и средней дальности. В 2012 году программа ТХААД подверглась существенному урезанию. Принято решение вместо 503 перехватчиков закупить 320 – соответственно, шесть вместо девяти батарей ТХААД. При этом производственная линия не будет закрыта, что позволит в будущем произвести дополнительные закупки для Пентагона, а также осуществлять продажи этой системы вооружения американским союзникам.

Следует отметить, что в 2011 году США подписали соглашение о продаже системы ТХААД Объединенным Арабским Эмиратам. Стоимость сделки – около 3,5 млрд. долл.

Кроме того, США тесно сотрудничают с Израилем, финансируя создание израильской противоракетной обороны. Комитет по иностранным делам Палаты представителей увеличил американскую помощь на создание противоракетной системы «Железный купол» в 2013 финансовом году до 680 млн. долл. (сверх обычной экономической помощи Израилю в размере примерно 3 млрд. долл. в год). Комитет по ассигнованиям Палаты представителей довел финансирование израильской ПРО в следующем финансовом году до 949 млн. долл. Несомненно, что здесь главную роль играет предвыборный фактор.

На 2012 год запланировано провести учения по одновременному перехвату трех баллистических ракет малой и средней дальности и двух крылатых ракет, для чего будут использованы перехватчики «Пэтриот Пак-3», ТХААД и SM-3 Block 1A, а также радар AN/TPY-2.

Расходы Агентства по ПРО с 2002 года составили 80 млрд. долл. До 2016 года будет истрачено еще 44 млрд. долл. Стоимость каждой ракеты GBI составляет 70 млн. долл., стоимость противоракет SM-3 Block 1A и Block 1B – около 10 млн. долл., ожидаемая стоимость SM-3 Block 2A и Blok 2B – примерно 15 млн. долл.

НЕРЕШЕННЫЕ ПРОБЛЕМЫ

Следует отметить, что со времен администрации Буша-младшего работа по созданию ПРО ведется с грубыми нарушениями нормальных процедур разработки и испытаний систем вооружений, принятием решений о производстве ракет противоракетной обороны до успешного завершения их испытаний. Деятельность Агентства по противоракетной обороне была выведена за рамки, установленные законодательством для разработки систем вооружений.

В результате, как отмечается в докладе Главного управления отчетности (Счетная палата США), опубликованном в апреле 2012 года, практически все программы ПРО сталкиваются с серьезными техническими проблемами. По данным Главного управления отчетности, из 39 наиболее важных технических проблем разработчикам американской ПРО удалось решить лишь семь. Определены пути решения еще 15 технических задач. Но еще 17 проблем пока вообще «не имеют технического решения».

Широкое распространение получило нарушение контроля качества. Три из четырех систем, запущенных в серийное производство, были приостановлены для исправления выявившихся недостатков. Задержки и дополнительные испытания приводят к отставанию от объявленных сроков осуществления ЕПАП.

Администрация Обамы в 2012 году приняла решение заморозить работу над химическим лазером воздушного базирования.

Возникли проблемы и с информационным обеспечением ПРО. Принято решение законсервировать РЛС морского базирования SBX. Кроме того, администрация Обамы в 2012 году объявила о сокращении закупки радаров AN/TPY-2 для систем ПРО с 18 до 11 единиц.

На два с лишним года была отложена спутниковая программа STSS (ранее именовалась SBIRS). Только в 2009 году было выведено на орбиту два спутника этого типа (срок нахождения на орбите – четыре года). При испытаниях перехватчиков они неоднократно демонстрировали свою бесполезность.

Сроки завершения ОКР по новой системе космических сенсоров PTSS отложены, хотя, по словам генерала О’Рейли, создание этой системы «является наиболее важным усилением как национальной, так и региональной ПРО, поскольку она позволяет контролировать целиком траекторию полета ракет противника». Утверждается, что спутники PTSS позволяют контролировать большие районы запусков ракет, в том числе и для перехвата баллистических ракет на разгонном участке. Группировка таких спутников способна заменить 50 радаров AN/TPY-2 или 20 радаров SBX. Вывод первых спутников на орбиту был ранее запланирован на 2015 год. К 2018 году планировалось запустить девять спутников PTSS. Теперь же первый запуск спутника этого типа перенесен на 2017 год. На проведение НИР по PTSS в 2013 финансовом году запрошено 297 млн. долл.

Противоракета GBI уже трижды подвергалась переделке из-за того, что по требованию администрации Буша-младшего на вооружение была принята «незрелая» технология – до завершения НИОКР и проведения соответствующих испытаний. Из 15 испытаний перехватчиков GBI только восемь были признаны успешными.

Дорогостоящая переделка системы продолжается. В 2013–2017 годах намечена переделка 15 противоракет GBI. Лишь 20 противоракет со ступенью перехвата СЕ-1 EKV находится на оперативном дежурстве. Из-за неудачных испытаний в январе и декабре 2010 года противоракеты, оснащенной ступенью перехвата СЕ-2 EKV, эта система была временно снята с дежурства.

Новые испытания ступеней перехвата СЕ-2 EKV намечены на июль 2012 года. По оценке Главного управления отчетности, потребуется несколько лет для устранения выявленных недостатков. В результате стоимость этой системы вооружения возросла в четыре раза. Согласно последним официальным оценкам, она может достигнуть примерно 40 млрд. долл.

Первоначально Пентагон намеревался завершить производство перехватчиков SM-3 Block 1A в 2009 году и полностью перейти к закупке ракет SM-3 Block 1B. Однако этот график оказался невыполненным, хотя производство перехватчиков SM-3 Block 1B началось, не дожидаясь завершения испытаний.

Только в 2011 году впервые было проведено испытание противоракеты SM-3 Block 1A по перехвату ракеты средней дальности. Из-за неудачной попытки перехвата цели была приостановлена поставка 12 ракет этого типа. Однако неудачи с испытаниями противоракеты SM-3 Block 1A могут привести к тому, что второй этап ЕПАП, который намечалось завершить к 2015 году, будет отложен.

Проведенное в сентябре 2011 года испытание противоракеты SM-3 Block 1B оказалось неудачным. Тем не менее производство этих противоракет было продолжено, но более медленными темпами. Поскольку у противоракет SM-3 Block 1A и Block 1B один и тот же двигатель, требуется его серьезная доработка. Это поставило под вопрос развертывание противоракет SM-3 Block 1B в Румынии. Но 10 мая 2012 года перехватчик SM-3 Block 1B, запущенный с крейсера «Эри», впервые осуществил успешный кинетический перехват ракеты малой дальности. Это несколько разрядило возникшую критическую ситуацию.

Общая стоимость разработки и закупки противоракет SM-3 Block 1B должна составить примерно 4 млрд. долл. (676 млн. долл. на НИОКР и 3330 млн. долл. на закупки). Бюджетный запрос на эту систему вооружения в 2013 финансовому году составил 992 млн. долл., в том числе 389 млн. долл. на закупку 29 перехватчиков SM-3 Block 1B.

Расходы на НИОКР по перехватчику SM-3 Block 2A запланированы в размере 2,5 млрд. долл. Стоимость закупок пока не определена. Разработку этой системы США осуществляют совместно с Японией, которая взяла на себя часть расходов.

Программа создания противоракеты SM-3 Block 2A была начата в 2006 году. Предусматривается, что ее разгонная скорость будет на 45–60% выше, чем у ракет SM-3 Блок 1. Серьезные проблемы возникли с двигателем для этой противоракеты. В результате график работ был сдвинут. Испытания этой системы перенесены с 2014 на 2016 год. Бюджетный запрос на SM-3 Block 2A в 2013 финансовому году составил 420 млн. долл. К 2020 году планируется закупить 70 ракет SM-3 Block 2A.

Программа создания противоракеты SM-3 Block 2B была начата лишь в 2010 году. Разработка перехватчика SM-3 Block 2B затянулась. Начало ОКР по этой системе запланировано на 2013 год. Стоимость НИОКР по SM-3 Block 2B должна составить около 1,7 млрд. долл. Однако в прошлом году Конгресс значительно сократил финансирование этой программы с 110 до 13 млн. долл. Бюджетный запрос на эту систему вооружения в 2013 финансовому году составил 224 млн. долл. До сих пор не определены ключевые технические решения, стоимость и сроки завершения НИОКР. Развертывание этой противоракеты отложено по крайней мере до 2021 года. Количество ракет SM-3 Block 2B, которое собирается закупить Пентагон, пока не объявлено. «Из-за отсутствия надежной базы для начала программы SM-3 Block 2B она находится под угрозой из-за роста стоимости и растягивания графика работ, а также из-за того, что не отвечает боевым потребностям», – утверждается в докладе Главного управления отчетности.

Следует отметить, что ракета SM-3 Block 2B имеет значительно больший диаметр, чем ее предшественницы. Это требует изменения габаритов пусковой установки VLS Mark 41, установленной на американских кораблях, что создает серьезные проблемы, поскольку нынешняя универсальная ПУ «Иджис» используется для различных систем вооружения, имеющих меньший диаметр.

Сроки завершения разработки платформы для наземных ПУ противоракет SM-3 Block 1A и Block 1B, а также радаров SPY-1, предназначенных для развертывания Румынии и Польше (кроме того, планируется установить такую платформу в целях испытаний на Гавайях), также отложены. Среди технических проблем, с которыми столкнулись разработчики, – воздействие на РЛС мобильных телефонных сетей и ветряных мельниц. Стоимость программы «Иджис» наземного размещения выросла с 622 млн. долл. до 1,6 млрд. долл. Первые испытания этой системы намечены на 2014 год, а количество испытаний сокращено с семи до четырех в том числе только два испытания по перехвату баллистических ракет.

Из-за обнаружившихся технических проблем были отложены закупки противоракет ТХААД наземного базирования. Только в октябре 2011 года было проведено первое успешное испытание этой системы. Общая стоимость разработки и закупки противоракет ТХААД должна составить примерно 22 млрд. долл. (16,2 млрд. долл. на НИОКР и 5,5 млрд. долл. на закупки). С отставанием от графика из-за производственных сложностей Пентагон закупил две батареи противоракет наземного базирования ТХААД (примерно 50 перехватчиков). На 2013 финансовый год намечено приобрести 36 противоракет.

В целом пока окончательные параметры американской ПРО не определены. Более или менее сформулированы планы на период до 2018 года (первые три этапа ЕПАП), но четвертый этап и последующие шаги пока не ясны.

В настоящее время американская стратегическая ПРО включает 26 перехватчиков GBI на Аляске («Форт Грили») и четыре перехватчика в Калифорнии (авиабаза «Ванденберг»). Следует отметить, что Пентагон ни разу не проводил испытаний перехвата МБР, а также группового запуска противоракет GBI. Кроме того, как подчеркивается в докладе Главного управления отчетности, «способность СЕ-1 и СЕ-2 поражать цели в условиях применения противником средств преодоления ПРО не установлена». Первое такое испытание противоракеты намечено на 2015 год, второе – лишь на 2021 год.

Модификация перехватчика SM-3, способного перехватывать МБР, должна поступить на вооружение лишь к началу следующего десятилетия. Количество и технические параметры SM-3 Block 2B пока не объявлены. Как отмечают эксперты в статье «ЕвроПРО без мифов и политики» (см. «НВО» № 12 от 13.04.12), потенциальные возможности у этой противоракеты велики, но для осуществления реального кинетического перехвата одного боевого блока потребовался бы расход от 5 до 10 противоракет этого типа. Поэтому по крайней мере до 2020 года эта система не способна оказать сколько-нибудь значимое влияние на снижение потенциала стратегических ядерных сил России, которые в настоящее время проходят существенную модернизацию.

 

Creeping Incrementalism: U.S. Strategy in Iraq and Syria from 2011 to 2015

By Anthony H. Cordesman

Nov 9, 2015

Источник: http://csis.org/publication/creeping-incrementalism-us-strategy-iraq-and-syria-2011-2015

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President Obama’s decision to allow up to 50 Special Forces to deploy in northern Syria has triggered an almost inevitable debate over crossing the threshold from train and assist into deploying combat personnel. So far that debate has taken three forms. One has focused on the president’s past statements about not sending “boots on the ground.” The second has focused on the risk this could be the start of a major combat presence and lead to serious U.S. casualties. The third has focused on whether this step—and the other small increments in the U.S. effort announced after General Joseph Dunford, the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of staff, visited the region in October 2015—will still fall short of the levels necessary to have meaningful results.

The first form of this debate is political and irrelevant in military terms. It does not judge the merits of the decision and implies that a president should not react to changing conditions – the kind of “gotcha” issue that suits the politics of what have become election years. It is totally dysfunctional in national security terms because it assumes that the president can predict the future and make pledges regardless of how things change and the need to act in ways that serve the national interest.

The second form of the debate touches on a valid strategic issue: whether the United States should send major land combat units back to Iraq and/or into Syria. However, it focuses on an option the United States rejected long ago—a decision that seems even more valid today. Thrusting U.S. land combat units into the middle of the sectarian and ethnic quarrels and fighting in either Iraq or Syria seems almost certain to create new enemies and more divisions in both countries, and confront the U.S. with having to take sides in their internal struggles.

The third form of the debate is all too relevant. Deploying 50 Special Forces forward in Syria is probably a useful step, but it is scarcely a meaningful game changer. Ever since 2011, the United States has failed to develop any grand strategy for either Iraq or Syria, to cope with the emerging civil war in Syria and growing sectarian and ethnic tensions in Iraq, or to take decisive enough military action to make a major impact. The United States has not shown strategic patience. It has instead reacted to events with creeping incrementalism that is largely focused on ISIS and almost exclusively focused on security.

Once one looks beyond the conceptual rhetoric that the administration has issued with each new crisis in Iraq and Syria, it is remarkably hard to see anything approaching an effective level of execution. U.S. actions have never addressed the key issues involved in any meaningful way or shown the United States has a credible overall strategy for Iran and Syria other than simply degrading and destroying ISIS.

Any grand strategic success has to bring lasting security and stability to both Syria and Iraq. It has to go beyond security, and deal with the fundamental problems in politics, governance, economics and demographic pressures that have made both Iraq and Syria failed states.

So far, neither the United States nor anyone else has given an indication it has a strategy for looking beyond security and the use of force. The Obama Administration has focused on fighting ISIS in ways that have done little more than partially contain the “caliphate” in Iraq and Syria. ISIS has had some reversals in Iraq and Syria but still advances in other areas, and increasingly competes with Al Qaeda on a broader regional level.

When it comes to the sectarian and ethnic conflicts in Iraq and Syria, the United States has not developed a clear path to creating a solution to either state’s worst security problems. And, as the later portions of this analysis show, it is far from clear that any measures that have come out of Chairman Dunford’s visit to the region – 50 Special Forces notwithstanding – will be anything more than another step in creeping incrementalism on a military level.

These issues are addressed in depth in a new analysis by the Burke Chair at CSIS entitled Creeping Incrementalism: U.S. Strategy in Iraq and Syria from 2011 to 2015.

The analysis includes the following major sections, as well as detailed maps, figures, and operational cost tables.

The “Impossible” American Grand Strategic Objective: Iraqi and Syrian Stability and Security: Addresses the fact that U.S. strategy and action — as distinguished from conceptual rhetoric — has focused almost exclusively on the security dimension of degrading and destroying ISIS rather than the broader grand strategic objective of bringing stability and security to Iraq and Syria.
It has failed to address both the sectarian and ethnic divisions that have brought both states to civil war, and the political, governance, economic and demographic dimensions of the conflict.

Mission “Possible?” — Relying on Creeping Incrementalism for Security Aid: The mission of helping Iraq and Syria is less challenging, but as the following sections show, the United States has pursued a de facto strategy of minimizing most of its military efforts, reacting after the fact, and making each increment of additional action come too little and too late.
Strategic Incrementalism on the Ground: The United States has never attempted to create the kind of train and assist mission that is needed to develop effective combat capability, has put keeping costs and casualties before effectiveness, and acted in ways that may ultimately increase the level of tension between Arab and Kurd, and possibly sectarian tensions as well. It is unclear how the United States intended to come to grips with the fact that the land operation in Iraq cannot be separated from those in Syria.
Strategic Incrementalism in the Air: The United States has deployed significant air combat forces, but these too have made incremental increases in combat activity that seem largely reactive, and lacking in any public explanation of the strategic rationale for such operations, their impact on air-land operations, and how operations in Iraq and Syria are structured to produce some unified concept of operations.
The Lack of Meaningful Data on the Effectiveness and Ineffectiveness of Strategic Incrementalism: The administration and the Department of Defense have provide only limited largely meaningful data on the overall patterns and effectiveness of land and air operations. Some of these data are questionable at best and seem to deliberately exaggerate what has been accomplished to date.
No Land-Air Effectiveness Data: Just are there is no clear strategy for joint land and air warfare, there are no systematic effectiveness data tying air operations to program on the ground.
Creeping Incrementalism May Be Cheaper, But Is Anything But Cost-Effective: The cost data provided by the Department of Defense raise serious questions about their accuracy, and even more serious questions about the impact of limiting short terms costs in ways that may serious raise the total cost of operations.
The Need for a Broader Strategy for Defeating ISIS and Post-ISIS Security and Stability: This section highlights changes needed in the land and air aspects of U.S. military efforts, and the need to make a start at creating an international effort to help Iraq and Syria recover and build at the political, governance, economic, and demographic levels.
So far, a de facto U.S. strategy of creeping incrementalism has at best partially contained ISIS, has done nothing to reduce the growing internal divisions in either Syria or Iraq, has left Syria open to Russian intervention, and has failed to integrate U.S. security efforts effectively with those of Turkey and U.S. Arab allies. It has proved to be so reactive that events have consistently outpaced every new increment in U.S. military activity, and it at best addresses only part of the strategic challenge –leaving Iraqi and Syrian politics and governance to fracture, and corruption, the economy, and the impact of population pressures and the youth “bulge” to grow worse in both states.

If there are merits to creeping incrementalism, they largely consist of negatives. Creeping incrementalism is no worse than the strategies and actions of any of Iraq and Syria’s neighbors, it is less threatening to Syria’s people than that of Russia and Iran, and has been limited more by the internal divisions in Iraq and Syria than by the shortfalls in U.S. efforts.

One can also argue that it is far cheaper in the short-term than the cost of major military and civil intervention in Iraq from 2003-2011, or the ongoing intervention in Afghanistan. However, reducing the short-term cost of failure is no guarantee regarding future costs, and a cheaper form of failure is scarcely a metric of success.

This does not mean that leaping from creeping incrementalism to massive intervention and “shock and awe” is likely to be any more successful. Throwing massive amounts of U.S. ground forces into deeply divided Arab states, in the face of Iranian hostility, and in the middle of a major struggle for the future of Islam is no more likely to be successful in the future than it was in Iraq. The last few years have also made it all too clear are no good short-term solutions to the broader problems in Iraq and Syria.

The administration does not need to deploy major combat forces, but it does need to articulate a meaningful overall security strategy for air-land operations, for both Iraq and Syria, and for dealing with its allies in the region. It needs strategic communications to explain this strategy credibly and publicly to the American people, the Congress, and our allies. It needs to establish a clear level of conditionality for its military and aid efforts, but also to treat Iraq and its regional allies as real partners. It needs to accept the fact that the most it can hope for in dealing with Russia and Iran is a troubled coexistence and confront them as necessary.

Science, Technology, and U.S. National Security Strategy

The Role of the War Colleges

By Raymond F. DuBois, James M. Keagle

Contributor: John J. Hamre, Paul Gaffney, Collin Dudeck

Nov 12, 2015

Источник: http://csis.org/publication/science-technology-and-us-national-security-strategy

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Rapid scientific and technological (S&T) advancements have placed a strain on our nation’s warfighters and strategic thinkers in recent years. Developments can take place in a matter of months that shift our national security strategy and leave us racing to address new threats and opportunities. The education of our armed forces’ future leaders needs to keep pace with ever-changing strategic and technological realities. The senior war colleges would be enhanced by developing instruction methods that better prepare our future military minds to grasp the strategic impacts of emerging sciences and advanced technologies. As emphasized in the 2015 National Military Strategy, such enhancements would lead strategists to better understand that the “diffusion of technology is challenging competitive advantages long held by the United States such as early warning and precision strike” and that a grasp of strategic innovation is a critical skill for those who will lead on the battlefield of the future.